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7I. Executive Summary 
 and Recommendations
A.  Executive Summary
Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, 32 percent of British Muslims report being 
subjected to discrimination at airports. Police carrying machine guns have conducted 
identity checks on 11-year-olds at German mosques. Moroccan immigrants have 
been called “moro de mierda” (“Arab shit”) by Spanish police. The personal data of 
8.3 million people were searched in a massive German data mining exercise which 
targeted—among other characteristics—people who were Muslim, and which did 
not identify a single terrorist. 
These are examples of ethnic profiling by police in Europe—a common, long-
standing practice that has intensified in recent years. Evidence from countries across the 
European Union shows that police routinely use generalizations about ethnicity, reli-
gion, race, or national origin in deciding whom to target for identity checks, stops, and 
searches. Contemporary concerns about terrorism underlie a rising interest in ethnic 
profiling in Europe, which many see as an effective way to identify terrorist suspects. 
It might be comforting to believe that police can spot terrorists and other crimi-
nals based on generalizations about ethnicity, race, national origin, or religion. But that 
is not the case. As this report demonstrates, ethnic profiling by police in Europe may 
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be pervasive, but it is inefficient, ineffective, and discriminatory. Fortunately, better 
alternatives exist.
Defining Ethnic Profiling
The term “profiling” refers to a police practice in which a defined set of characteristics 
is used to look for and apprehend someone who has committed a crime (criminal pro-
filing) or to identify people likely to engage in criminal activity (behavioral profiling). 
Criminal and behavioral profiling are accepted and lawful policing tools designed to 
allow the most efficient allocation of scarce law enforcement resources. As long as the 
profiles used by police are based on specific information about an individual or factors 
that are objective and statistically proven to be significant indicators of criminal activity, 
profiling is legal.
The term “ethnic profiling” describes the use by law enforcement of generaliza-
tions grounded in ethnicity, race, religion, or national origin—rather than objective 
evidence or individual behavior—as the basis for making law enforcement and/or inves-
tigative decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity. Ethnic 
profiling is manifest most often in police officers’ decisions about whom to stop, ask 
for identity papers, question, search, and sometimes arrest. Ethnic profiling may result 
from the racist behavior of individual police officers, or from the institutionalized bias 
ingrained in many police forces. 
A host of bad outcomes stem from ethnic profiling, including stopping, searching, 
and even arresting innocent people; overlooking criminals who do not fit the established 
profile; undermining the rule of law and perceptions of police fairness; stigmatizing 
entire communities; and alienating people who could work with police to reduce crime 
and prevent terrorism.
Ethnic Profiling Is Pervasive—and Has Grown Since 9/11
Ethnic profiling did not emerge as a post-9/11 response to terrorism. Evidence clearly 
indicates that police across Europe have long engaged in ethnic profiling of immigrant 
and minority communities. Despite a dearth of quantitative information on policing 
and ethnicity in most of Europe, the data that exist indicate ethnic profiling is 
widespread. 
Since the 9/11 attacks, interest in and use of ethnic profiling have grown sharply. 
Even if the European public may condemn high-profile abuses (such as rendition and 
torture) associated with the “war on terror,” many see the profiling of Muslims as a mat-
ter of common sense. According to this argument, young Muslim men destroyed the 
World Trade Center in New York, blew up Madrid’s Atocha train station, and bombed 
the London Underground, so they should be the targets of police attention. With so 
much at stake, ethnic profiling may seem like smart law enforcement. 
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Police in Europe seem to agree. In the United Kingdom (the only EU mem-
ber state to systematically gather ethnic data on police practices), data show dramatic 
increases in stops and searches of British Asians following terrorist attacks: stops of 
persons of Asian descent conducted under counterterrorism powers increased three-
fold following the 9/11 attacks, and five-fold after the July 2005 London Underground 
bomb attacks.1 In Germany, police have used preventive powers to conduct mass identity 
checks outside major mosques. In France and Italy, raids on homes, businesses, and 
mosques—often lacking a basis in specific evidence—have targeted Muslims, particu-
larly those considered religiously observant. Numerous studies since 2001 have docu-
mented “a growing perception among Muslim leaders and communities across Europe 
that they are being stopped, questioned, and searched not on the basis of evidence and 
reasonable suspicion but on the basis of ‘looking Muslim’.”2 
Since 2001, the frequency of ethnic profiling in Europe has alternately increased 
and decreased in response to notorious crimes. Ethnic profiling has spiked in the imme-
diate wake of terrorist attacks, then declined. A number of the ethnic profiling practices 
described in this report are less prevalent in mid-2009 than they were immediately 
following the March 11, 2004 Madrid and July 7, 2005 London bombings. In particular, 
the most overt forms of ethnic profiling, such as broad data mining and large-scale raids 
and mass identity checks outside places of worship, are now rarer. 
The apparent decline in the more egregious forms of ethnic profiling underscores 
that, all too frequently, the practice is more of a public relations tool than a reasoned 
response to crime and terrorism. In this respect, it reflects a political reality that is sub-
ject to change. Although public concern has waned since the summer of 2006, another 
attack would almost certainly prompt political authorities and security agencies to revive 
the explicit and public targeting of Muslims. 
Ethnic Profiling Is a Form of Discrimination
Ethnic profiling, although widespread, constitutes discrimination and thus breaches 
basic human rights norms. By relying on ethnic, racial, or religious stereotypes, ethnic 
profiling breaches one of the most fundamental principles of law: that each person 
must be treated as an individual, not as a member of a group. In employing physical 
appearance as code for criminal propensity, ethnic profiling turns the presumption of 
innocence on its head. Except where police use of ethnicity, race, or religion is limited 
to the characteristics contained in individual suspect descriptions, or based on concrete, 
trustworthy, and timely intelligence that is time- and/or place-specific, profiling is a 
violation of European and international law, which, for important reasons of history and 
logic, has placed strict limits on distinctions based on ethnicity, race, national origin, 
and religion. 
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The European Convention on Human Rights prohibits discrimination and guar-
antees the full and equal enjoyment of rights in respect of, inter alia, the adminis-
tration of justice. The European Court of Human Rights has made clear that ethnic 
profiling, like other differences in treatment based “exclusively or to a decisive extent 
on a person’s ethnic origin,” is per se unlawful. The European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has repeatedly expressed concerns with ethnic profil-
ing across a wide range of EU member states. In fact, ECRI has specifically addressed 
ethnic profiling by police, even in the context of counterterrorism measures. ECRI’s 
General Policy Recommendation Number Eight on Combating Racism while Fighting Terror-
ism (2004) urges governments to “pay particular attention to…checks carried out by law 
enforcement officials within the countries and by border control personnel.”3 And yet, 
notwithstanding the overwhelming weight of European jurisprudence and legal organs, 
to date, ethnic profiling has not been expressly outlawed by the European Union or any 
European government.
European law on matters pertaining to ethnic profiling is a complex patchwork 
of protection and gaps. Article 29 of the Treaty on the European Union states that the 
Union’s objective shall be “to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area 
of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member 
States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by pre-
venting and combating racism and xenophobia.” Although some suggest that the term 
“goods and services” that are addressed in the EU Racial Equality Directive should be 
understood to encompass policing within member states, most European authorities 
argue that under current regional treaties, the EU has competency only in matters of 
law enforcement cooperation between member states, not in regard to domestic law 
enforcement practices. On this basis, an increasing number of operational agreements 
have been developed to facilitate law enforcement cooperation and automated access to 
law enforcement information between member states in order to fight terrorism and 
serious crime.4 Furthermore, the EU is rapidly building vast databases for immigration 
and border control and allowing law enforcement access to these resources to aid in 
fighting terrorism and crime.5 
Operational capacity and cooperation are being developed at a pace that far out-
strips the development of regional accountability standards and oversight mechanisms. 
It is troubling that these initiatives fall within the scope of EU action, but outside 
the scope of EU protections against discrimination. It is even more troubling when 
the inadequate state of data protection standards for law enforcement cooperation is 
added to the equation. The Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data in 
the context of law enforcement cooperation has been criticized as establishing lesser 
standards than those set out in the 2005 European Data Protection Directive. This is 
a disturbing trend that can and should be remedied through the creation of a regional 
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norm that clearly defines ethnic profiling and establishes minimum safeguards that 
build on—rather than erode—the European Union’s current non-discrimination and 
data protection law. 
Ethnic Profiling Is Ineffective
There is no evidence that ethnic profiling stops crime or prevents terrorism. Separate 
studies in the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands have 
all concluded that ethnic profiling is ineffective.6 Stops and searches conducted under 
counterterrorism powers in Europe have produced few charges on terrorism offenses 
and no terrorism convictions to date. 
In fact, profiling reduces security by misdirecting police resources and alienating 
some of the very people whose cooperation is necessary for effective crime detection. 
When law enforcement officers engage in ethnic profiling, they are, wittingly or not, 
contributing to a growing sense of marginalization in minority and immigrant com-
munities. Ethnic profiling stigmatizes entire racial, ethnic, or religious groups as more 
likely to commit crimes and thereby signals to the broader society that all members of 
that group constitute a threat. If the police and government security agencies use eth-
nicity to determine who is a terrorist or a criminal, why should not local shopkeepers, 
restaurant owners, or airplane flight attendants? 
Many law enforcement professionals understand these dangers. A senior U.K. 
police officer recently warned that “there is a very real risk of criminalizing minority 
communities” through “the counterterrorism label….The impact of this will be that just 
at the time when we need the confidence and trust of these communities, they may 
retreat inside themselves.”7
Extensive research and the findings in this report indicate not only that ethnic 
profiling does not improve police efficacy, but that in all likelihood it reduces it, both 
in countering terrorism and addressing common crime. Numerous studies of policing 
show that when police operate on the basis of their personal judgments—that is, with 
a high level of discretion—they rely more on stereotypes and focus disproportionate 
attention on minorities, which reduces their effectiveness. With a plethora of crime 
and terrorist threats confronting Europe, it is critical that police resources be used as 
efficiently as possible. 
Equally important, when police treat an entire group of people as presumptively 
suspicious, they are more likely to miss dangerous persons who do not fit the profile. 
Before the July 7, 2005 London attacks, the leader of the bombers “had come to the 
attention of the intelligence services as an associate of other men who were suspected 
of involvement in a terrorist bomb plot. But he was not pursued because he did not 
tick enough of the boxes in the pre-July profile of the terror suspect.”8 Ethnic profiling 
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in fact creates a direct incentive for terrorist organizations to recruit persons who do 
not fit the profile. 
Alternatives to Ethnic Profiling
It’s not just that ethnic profiling is illegal and counter-productive; there are better ways 
of fighting crime and terrorism. The reform of the United States Customs Service 
(which searches travelers at U.S. borders for contraband) in the late 1990s demonstrates 
that profiling based on individual behavior is more effective than profiling based on 
race or ethnicity. In 1999, when the Customs Service abandoned a profile based on 
ethnicity and instead focused on behavior, its productivity and efficiency soared. The 
number of searches declined from 10,733 in the first quarter of 1999 (pre-reform) to 
2,814 searches in the first quarter of 2000 (post-reform), but the percent of searches 
that yielded contraband leaped from 3.5 percent to nearly 11 percent.9
In 2007–2008, a pilot project undertaken by the Open Society Justice Initiative 
in collaboration with a municipal police force in Spain similarly reduced the dispro-
portionate rate at which minorities were stopped, while increasing police efficiency. 
In Fuenlabrada, Spain, police achieved dramatic results by moving away from ethnic 
profiling and adopting new methods that emphasized the use of data and greater com-
munication and cooperation with minority communities. In a four-month period, the 
number of stops declined from 958 per month to 396 per month, but the percentage 
of successful stops (i.e., stops that uncovered a crime or other infraction) rose from 6 
percent to 28 percent.10 
A key component of the Fuenlabrada success was the collaboration between police 
and minority communities—a factor central to effective law enforcement, but often 
overlooked by proponents of ethnic profiling. As leading counterterrorism experts have 
noted, one of the main elements of an effective counterterrorism policy is to “develop 
strong confidence-building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most 
likely to come or hide in.”11 This is possible, but only if those communities are not being 
alienated by race-based policing.
The threat of terrorist violence, like the everyday reality of ordinary crime, is 
genuine and must be addressed. The challenge is to do so in ways that enhance, rather 
than undermine, both security and individual rights. Ethnic profiling strikes at the heart 
of the social compact linking law enforcement institutions with the communities they 
serve. It wastes police resources, discriminates against whole groups of people, and 
leaves everyone less safe. Fortunately, alternatives exist. Ending the use of ethnic profil-
ing by police does not mean doing nothing; rather, it means changing police practices 
to make them more effective. New practices can direct law enforcement resources more 
efficiently, based on intelligence rather than prejudice.
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Abandoning accepted practices and implementing new ones is never easy. But 
until ethnic profiling is recognized as a problem, expressly banned in law, and addressed 
in practice, the damage it wreaks will only deepen. In a Europe under threat from ter-
rorism and characterized by increasing xenophobia, it is essential that those entrusted 
to enforce the law do so with maximum effectiveness and full respect for the basic 
principle of equal justice.
B.  Recommendations
To European Authorities:
• Outlaw profiling at the European level. The European Union should adopt a Frame-
work Decision12 defining ethnic profiling, making clear that it is illegal, and pro-
viding safeguards against it. Ethnic profiling should be defined as the use by law 
enforcement officers of generalizations grounded in race, ethnicity, religion, or 
national origin, rather than objective evidence or individual behavior, as the basis 
for making law enforcement and/or investigative decisions about who has been 
or may be involved in criminal activity. 
• Ensure that data mining does not rely on ethnic profiling. Data mining—the process 
of extracting patterns or trends from large amounts of information—increas-
ingly relies upon ethnic profiling. The European Commission and Council should 
provide guidelines for national authorities on adequate safeguards against ethnic 
profiling in data mining operations. Guidelines should reinforce the standard 
set forth in relevant data protection instruments of the Council of Europe, which 
prohibit the collection or use by law enforcement of data on individuals solely on 
the basis that they have a particular ethnic origin or religious conviction, except 
where “absolutely necessary for the purposes of a particular inquiry.”13 Among 
other safeguards, they must make clear that intrusive processing of sensitive per-
sonal data is permissible only when strictly necessary, for example when: a) such 
data are contained in an individual suspect description; or b) they are based on 
timely, concrete, and trustworthy intelligence that is specific to a place, time, and 
crime or crime pattern. Data mining should be limited to a specific inquiry, with 
access given on a case-by-case basis. 
• Support gathering of statistics on ethnicity and law enforcement practices. The Work-
ing Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Per-
sonal Data (Article 29 Working Party) should issue an opinion providing guidance 
1 4    E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  A N D  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
to member states which makes clear that the collection of anonymous statistical 
data on ethnicity and law enforcement is consistent with European data protec-
tion norms. When used properly and with appropriate safeguards, ethnic data are 
essential to detect, monitor, and address ethnic profiling practices.
• Fund collaboration between police and minority communities. The European Com-
mission should provide financial support for pilot projects, research, and dissemi-
nation of best practices to address ethnic profiling and enhance law enforcement 
effectiveness. Such work may be conducted by national and local law enforcement 
authorities, civil society, academic bodies, and European regional entities such as 
the Fundamental Rights Agency. Collaborative projects between law enforcement 
and civil society groups, particularly those representing minority communities, 
have proven to be especially valuable in reducing ethnic profiling while increasing 
police efficiency. 
• Refine the EU’s radicalization policy. To combat radicalization, the European Union 
should continue to explore root causes of violent radicalization, including discrim-
ination, exclusion, and racism; refrain from categorizations that rely on ethnic, 
racial, or religious stereotypes; avoid conflating nonviolent conservative reli-
gious practices with radicalization processes; and urge member states to pursue 
similar policies. 
To National Elected Authorities and Policymaking Bodies: 
• Modify national legislation to incorporate an express prohibition against ethnic profiling. 
Anti-discrimination legislation in most EU member states requires amendment 
to make clear that ethnic profiling is unlawful. In addition, laws and operational 
guidelines for law enforcement officers should expressly prohibit ethnic profiling 
and establish clearly the limited circumstances under which sensitive personal 
factors such as ethnicity and religion may be used in policing, including data 
mining: where there is either a specific suspect description or clear and reliable 
intelligence. 
• Establish a requirement of reasonable suspicion for all police stops. National laws and 
police guidelines should set out clear and precise standards for initiating stops 
and making identity checks and searches based upon a reasonable suspicion 
standard. This legal standard should be supported with guidance and training 
that explicitly prohibit the use of ethnicity as a basis for identity checks and stop 
and searches. 
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• Speak out against discrimination and ethnic profiling. Make it clear that ethnic profil-
ing is not an effective tactic in the fight against either terrorism or common crime 
and that, as a policy matter, it will not be tolerated. 
• Gather data on law enforcement and ethnicity. Establish systems for gathering—with 
safeguards sufficient to comply with European data protection norms—statistical 
data on law enforcement and ethnicity that can determine whether, where, and 
why ethnic profiling is occurring and support measures to address it. Detecting 
and monitoring ethnic profiling require anonymized ethnic statistics (as opposed 
to ethnic data that can be traced to individual persons) that allow for comparison 
of minority and majority groups’ experiences of law enforcement. Where ethnic 
profiling is found to be widespread, conduct a full audit of policy and practice to 
determine and correct the factors driving or permitting such profiling. 
• Establish clear oversight mechanisms. Where they do not already exist, put into 
place judicial oversight and other supervisory mechanisms (such as parliamentary 
oversight) to assess the evidentiary basis for antiterrorism and investigative mea-
sures such as raids, surveillance and monitoring, and arrests. Charge oversight 
authorities with the duty to assure that all law enforcement measures under scru-
tiny meet tests of necessity and proportionality, and comply fully with European 
antidiscrimination norms. 
• Establish accessible complaints mechanisms. Assure that civilians have information 
about and access to complaints mechanisms that are capable of investigating alle-
gations of ethnic profiling, through examining individual complaints and analyz-
ing patterns of complaints. Effective, independent accountability mechanisms are 
essential in all areas of security and law enforcement, including for intelligence 
agencies and counterterrorism operations. 
• Promote police outreach to minority communities. Initiate policies to support police 
outreach to minority ethnic and religious communities and enhance mutual 
understanding and trust. 
• Avoid statements linking ethnicity, national origin, race, or religion to terrorism or crim-
inal behavior. Information provided to the media about law enforcement actions 
should refer to the ethnicity of the persons involved only when it is directly rel-
evant and necessary to the public interest. 
• Improve legal and institutional tools to address hate crime. Develop a clear definition 
of hate crimes, an accessible system for members of minority groups to report 
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hate crimes, investigative capacity to address hate crimes, and a rapid response 
capacity for serious hate crimes. 
To Law Enforcement Managers:
• Assess the impact of law enforcement. Establish measures to evaluate all anticrime 
and counterterrorism measures for both their law enforcement effectiveness and 
their impact on local communities. Assessments should consider both quantita-
tive outputs and qualitative outcomes such as public satisfaction and police-com-
munity relations. 
• Monitor and supervise the use of discretionary powers such as identity checks and stops 
and searches. Implement systems to monitor both the number and nature (quality) 
of officers’ encounters with members of the public for use in discussions with 
local authorities and residents, and for police training and performance evaluation. 
• Implement strategies known to reduce ethnic profiling. Ethnic profiling can be 
addressed through reducing officer discretion in the selection of individuals to 
stop. This can be achieved through increased supervision of patrol officers and 
scrutiny of stops and their outcomes, and increased reliance on intelligence and 
behavioral factors to direct the use of stop powers.
• Provide clear and detailed operational guidelines and training for all law enforce-
ment officers on the correct conduct of identity checks, stops, and searches. This train-
ing should be practical, should address ethnic profiling, and should include 
managers, and, where possible, members of minority communities in design 
and delivery.
• Base all antiterrorism measures—including raids, monitoring, and arrest—on factual 
evidence rather than religious or ethnic stereotypes. When interrogating terror sus-
pects, focus on material evidence of their involvement in the criminal acts under 
investigation and not on their religious beliefs or practices. Ensure that all law 
enforcement and counterterrorism actions fully respect religious and cultural 
practices as well as religious objects and places. 
• Require respectful treatment of all members of the public during encounters with law 
enforcement. Establish explicit equal treatment standards in police codes of ethics, 
including a requirement that officers explain the reason for an identity check, 
stop, or search, and establish clear consequences for infractions. 
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• Schedule regular meetings between police and community members. Increase officers’ 
accountability to the communities they are policing by holding meetings between 
police and community members, particularly those from minority or disadvan-
taged sections of the population. Take community concerns seriously and respond 
to them directly or by referring them to appropriate authorities or agencies. 
• Be transparent. Provide information on the evidentiary basis for crime prevention 
and counterterrorism measures to the ethnic and religious minority communities 
that are affected, in order to allay perceptions of discriminatory targeting, while 
maintaining necessary investigative confidentiality and respecting personal pri-
vacy and judicial procedures. 
• Establish policies to recruit and retain minority law enforcement officers and staff. 
Ideally, law enforcement agencies should look like the communities they serve. 
At a minimum, all police officers should have an understanding of the diverse 
communities in which they work.
To Civil Society:
• Contribute to the movement away from ethnic profiling. Advance knowledge and 
encourage good practice by researching, monitoring, and reporting on ethnic 
profiling and the policing of minority communities. 
• Conduct public education campaigns on rights and responsibilities in police-community 
relations. Just as the police need to reach out to minority communities, communi-
ties may also need training and support to understand the law, the police and their 
powers, and the rights and responsibilities of community members. 
• Participate in and support police-community outreach efforts and community policing 
campaigns. Support the capacity of local minority communities to organize and 
participate in dialogue and partnership with police.
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II. Ethnic Profiling: What Is It 
 and When Is It Unlawful?
A.  Ethnic Profiling Defined and Described
“Ethnic profiling” is defined in this report as the use of generalizations grounded in 
ethnicity, race, national origin, or religion—rather than objective evidence or individual 
behavior—as the basis for making law enforcement and/or investigative decisions about 
who has been or may be involved in criminal activity. (Throughout this report, the 
term “ethnic profiling” is used to refer to profiling on any or all of these four grounds.) 
As used in this report, “ethnic profiling” refers to situations in which ethnicity, race, 
national origin, or religion is a determining criterion for law enforcement decisions—
even if it is not the sole basis for such decisions.14
By its nature, ethnic profiling departs from a basic principle of the rule of law: 
that law enforcement determinations should be based on individual conduct, not on 
membership in an ethnic, racial, national, or religious group. Ethnic profiling uses and 
perpetuates stereotypes about criminal offenders and minority groups that are suppos-
edly more prone to offend, effectively basing investigative decisions on group attributes 
rather than a potential suspect’s behavior. 
While ethnic profiling is inherently problematic, it has roots in widely used prac-
tices that are not racist or irrational, including actuarial risk-assessment methods and 
other ways to statistically categorize people according to identifiable group characteris-
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tics. Insurance companies, hospitals, and government agencies commonly base man-
agement and other decisions on data showing, for example, that individuals over the 
age of 60 are more likely than younger people to be susceptible to certain illnesses. 
Such generalizations can help save time, apportion resources appropriately, and inform 
management decisions. 
Similar considerations apply to policing. Particularly in view of limited resources, 
police rightly seek to maximize their effectiveness in preventing, detecting, and inves-
tigating crime. The development of various types of profiles to support investigations 
is an accepted and permissible law enforcement strategy—provided the profiles do not 
cross the line that separates legitimate policing from discriminatory practices.
Ethnic Profiling Compared to Other Types of Profiling by Police
Accepted law enforcement tools include what is sometimes called “criminal profiling” or 
“offender profiling.” A criminal profile is constructed by analyzing a crime—the nature 
of the offense and the manner in which it was committed—to develop guidance to help 
police identify an unknown perpetrator. The underlying theory is that certain types of 
crime can be studied and common factors analyzed to build an offender profile of some 
predictive value to aid police investigations. The serial killer profile is a classic example 
(and indeed, some trace the roots of profiling back to police attempts to identify the 
serial killer known as Jack the Ripper in Victorian London). In contrast to ethnic profil-
ing, criminal profiling has not provoked public controversy15 despite the considerable 
debate among criminologists as to its efficacy.16 
Ethnicity is also frequently and validly used by police in compiling an individual 
suspect description, on the basis of victim or witness reports, in connection with a 
specific crime. Personal appearance, which almost invariably includes racial or ethnic 
characteristics, is a core component of a suspect description. For example, a suspect 
description might state that the suspect was a white male about six feet tall with a heavy 
build, that he was wearing a leather jacket, and had brown hair and blue eyes.
While a suspect description typically includes a valid, indeed necessary, use of 
ethnicity, it can be and has been used in ways that over-target individuals who appear to 
share the perpetrator’s ethnicity. When a description is so vague that a large percentage 
of a given category of people fits it—a familiar example is “young, black men in athletic 
clothing”—police risk perpetuating stereotypes, alienating large numbers of individuals, 
and undermining their investigations. In Austria, following a series of brutal robberies 
committed by two dark-skinned men, the Vienna police were ordered to stop all black 
Africans traveling in pairs for identity checks; only when this provoked an outcry did 
they refine the suspect description to focus on black men, about 25 years old and 170 
cm. tall, who had a slim build and were wearing light down jackets.17 When police 
receive an overly general suspect description that features race, ethnicity, or similar 
E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  T H E  E U R O P E A N  U N I O N    2 1
characteristics, they should seek further specific operational intelligence to guide their 
investigations.18 Otherwise, an overall general suspect description can cross the line 
into ethnic profiling.
Police may also legitimately use ethnicity and other personal factors when they 
have specific, concrete intelligence regarding future crimes “involving a particular group 
of potential suspects at a specific location, for a short, specified duration of time.”19 It is 
fairly common for police and criminal justice officials to create special, temporary task 
forces to address crime organizations with ties to people of a certain national origin 
or ethnicity. Immigration officers, customs officials, and border guards make similar 
use of profiles that include ethnicity and national origin in their efforts to detect drug 
smuggling and other forms of organized crime.20
Targeting an ethnic gang or nationality-based crime ring risks perpetuating harm-
ful stereotypes while undermining police efficacy. Criminals often adapt to law enforce-
ment practices in order to avoid detection; this is particularly easy to do when law 
enforcement is known to focus on specific groups. Thus when ethnicity is part of a 
profile of transnational or organized crime groups, it is critical that the profile be based 
on concrete, trustworthy and timely intelligence that is time- and/or place-specific, not 
deep-rooted stereotypes. 
While there are few serious evaluations of how much police efficiency is enhanced 
through the use of organized crime profiles, in at least one case the U.S. Customs 
Service (now called the Customs and Border Protection Agency) found that the rate at 
which officers detected drugs doubled after they abandoned a “drug mule” profile that 
had focused on Caribbean and Latin American women.21 Research conducted for this 
report shows that ethnic profiling is similarly likely to undermine rather than advance 
law enforcement efficiency.
Ethnic Profiling Practices
Ethnic profiling is used across a range of police operations and tactics, including stop-
and-search tactics,22 identity checks, and other exercises of police investigative powers 
used to detect or prevent crime.23 As this report will explore, additional tactics—includ-
ing raids, surveillance and monitoring practices, data mining, and arrests—may also 
be used in a discriminatory manner indicative of ethnic profiling.
Profiling can take many forms—some explicit, others indirect or even uninten-
tional. Establishing that ethnic profiling has been used is straightforward when the 
practice is undertaken pursuant to explicit orders, as sometimes occurs with airport 
searches. But profiling frequently results from the cumulative effect of decisions by 
individual officers, some of whom may hold racist views but many of whom may be 
unaware of the degree to which generalizations and ethnic stereotypes are driving their 
subjective decision-making about which individuals to stop and check. 
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While racist individuals in law-enforcement institutions certainly contribute to 
ethnic profiling, the practice remains pervasive precisely because it is often the result 
of widely accepted, if not adequately acknowledged, negative stereotypes about racial 
or ethnic groups.24 Ethnic profiling may result from institutional policies targeting cer-
tain forms of crime and/or certain areas without consideration of the disproportionate 
impact such policies and resource allocation have on the targeted communities. 
Many of these practices would not be captured by a narrow definition of ethnic 
profiling as the use of ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality as the only basis for tar-
geting suspicion. In practice, law enforcement decisions are rarely based on just one 
factor. Accordingly, this report defines ethnic profiling to encompass situations where 
ethnicity, race, national origin, or religion is a determining, even if not the exclusive, 
basis for making law enforcement and/or investigative decisions about persons who are 
believed to be or to have been involved in criminal activity.
B.  Is Ethnic Profiling Legal?
The conceptual framework for this report’s analysis of ethnic profiling derives from 
international and regional law, with a particular focus on the antidiscrimination guar-
antees set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights.25 Article 14 prohibits 
discrimination in the enjoyment of rights protected by the Convention.26 Convention 
rights that are particularly relevant to the practices addressed in this report include the 
rights to liberty and security of the person (Article 5(1)); fair trial rights associated with 
“the determination of [an individual’s] civil rights” and of “any criminal charge against 
him” (Article 6(1)); the right to respect for privacy, family life, correspondence, and 
home (Article 8); freedom of religion (Article 9) and assembly (Article 11); and freedom 
of movement (Article 2, Protocol No. 4). 
Protocol No. 12 broadens the European Convention’s protections against discrimi-
nation by, among other things, prohibiting discrimination on any ground in respect of 
any right set forth in national law “by any public authority” (Article 1).27 The Explanatory 
Report to Protocol No. 12 makes clear that this prohibition applies to discrimination “by 
a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power,”28 which would include identity 
checks, stops and searches, and surveillance activities by law enforcement officers.
While the legal norm against discrimination is universal and fundamental, not 
all distinctions or differences in treatment by public authorities, including law-enforce-
ment personnel, constitute discrimination. The European Court of Human Rights has 
ruled as follows: “A differential treatment of persons in relevant, similar situations, 
without an objective and reasonable justification, constitutes discrimination.”29 
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The court has set forth the following test for determining when a distinction or 
difference in treatment amounts to discrimination: 
  [T]he principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and 
reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to 
the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles 
which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of treatment in the exercise 
of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 
is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.30
Applying this test to ethnic profiling as a tool of policing, there can be little doubt 
that the distinctions employed by police in their law enforcement activities pursue a 
“legitimate aim.” Preventing, detecting, and investigating terrorism and ordinary crime 
are not only legitimate aims but core functions of the state. However, given its reliance 
on ethnic or racial criteria, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to show that ethnic profiling 
is objectively and reasonably justified. It cannot be said that a “reasonable relationship 
of proportionality” exists between the use of ethnic profiling and the fight against crime 
and terrorism. 
In assessing the relationship between means and ends in respect of ethnic pro-
filing three factors are paramount (several additional considerations, examined below, 
may also come into play):
• Effectiveness: In general, this report’s analysis of specific ethnic profiling practices 
will consider a practice to be effective when it is based on an objective statistical 
link between the ethnic criteria employed and the probability that persons cap-
tured by the practice committed or planned to commit the offense in question. 
A high probability that the profiling criteria are capable of identifying criminals, 
including terrorists—beyond a general statistical link—is essential for ethnic pro-
filing to be demonstrably effective as a means of preventing terrorist or other 
crimes.31
• Proportionality: It must be shown that the benefits derived from using ethnic 
profiling in terms of increasing law enforcement efficiency outweigh the harm 
done through the real or perceived discriminatory impacts of ethnic profiling on 
the targeted individuals or groups.32 
• Necessity: The use of ethnic profiling is unnecessary if the same law enforce-
ment results could have been achieved through an alternative, nondifferentiating 
approach.33
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The practice of ethnic profiling has received its most intensive consideration by 
the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Timishev v. Russia.34 The applicant 
had challenged Russian police officers’ action in barring him from crossing an inter-
nal administrative boundary because of his Chechen ethnicity35 pursuant to an official 
policy of excluding Chechens from that area.36 Building on prior case law making clear 
that discriminatory treatment by law enforcement authorities can violate Article 14 of 
the ECHR,37 the court held that the applicant had been subjected to different treatment 
in relation to his right to liberty of movement “solely” due to his ethnic origin and that 
the difference in treatment was not justified. Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 
14 of the ECHR in conjunction with a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (liberty of 
movement).38 Notably, the court found that
  … no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s 
ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society.
  ...[S]ince the applicant’s right to liberty of movement was restricted solely on the ground of 
his ethnic origin, that difference in treatment constituted racial discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 14 of the Convention.39
Thus, if ethnicity constitutes an “exclusive” or “decisive” basis for law enforcement 
action, it almost certainly constitutes discrimination—and is therefore a violation 
of Article 14 of the European Convention. In other cases, the court has held that 
distinctions based on differences in religion or nationality will not generally survive 
judicial scrutiny.40 
Domestic European jurisprudence makes clear that, in many cases, ethnic profil-
ing is, as in Timishev, a form of direct discrimination that cannot be objectively justified.41 
Thus, in striking down the disproportionate denial of permission to enter the U.K. for 
prospective Roma visitors,42 the House of Lords explained that singling out Roma for 
invidious treatment was unlawful, even though “there was good reason” to suspect that 
more Roma would be seeking asylum in the U.K. than non-Roma:
  How did the immigration officers know to treat [the Roma] more sceptically? Because they 
were Roma. That is acting on racial grounds. If a person acts on racial grounds, the reason 
why he does so is irrelevant…. The person may be acting on belief or assumptions about 
members of the … racial group involved which are often true and which if true would provide 
a good reason for the less favourable treatment in question. But “what may be true of a group 
may not be true of a significant number of individuals within that group.” The object of the 
[U.K. Race Relations Act] is to ensure that each person is treated as an individual and not 
assumed to be like other members of the group.43
While Chechen ethnicity was the sole basis for the discriminatory practices found 
to violate the ECHR in Timishev, it is not always easy to disentangle ethnicity from 
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other possible motivations for law enforcement action. Indeed, it is rare that ethnicity is 
explicitly articulated as a reason for a stop. Police more commonly give reasons such as: 
the person stopped was carrying something suspicious, tried to hide something, tried 
to avoid the officer, appeared nervous, or seemed out of place. It is often only when a 
pattern of identity checks or stops and searches is examined over time that a dispropor-
tionate focus on members of a particular group clearly emerges.44
The European court has recently recognized that, even in the absence of an offi-
cial reliance on race or ethnicity, broad patterns of differential treatment, established 
by statistical evidence and reports by human rights groups, may constitute proof of 
discrimination.45 In D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic,46 the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court affirmed that patterns of discriminatory impact resulting from a policy 
that is not necessarily designed with discriminatory intent are a form of “indirect dis-
crimination” prohibited by Article 14.47 
Although D.H did not involve police action,48 the concept of indirect discrimina-
tion is equally relevant to patterns of discriminatory stops stemming from ethnic profil-
ing by police. Thus even when ethnic profiling is established through inferences derived 
from broad patterns of police behavior and regardless of whether it can be proven to 
result from intentionally racist policies, it will amount to unlawful discrimination if 
shown to be neither proportionate nor necessary.49 
Policy Guidance Clearly Prohibits Ethnic Profiling
While there have been few European Court of Human Rights judgments applying the 
legal framework outlined above to law enforcement profiling practices, several national 
guidelines and nonbinding European regional standards provide clear guidance on law 
enforcement practices that cross the line into impermissible ethnic profiling. Notably, 
official policy guidance in the United Kingdom and the United States prohibits not 
only ethnic profiling when ethnicity is the sole or explicit basis for targeting suspects, 
but also when it is a significant but not exclusive factor. In the United States, federal 
guidance on profiling provides the following:
  In making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as ordinary traffic stops, 
Federal law enforcement officers may not use race or ethnicity to any degree, except that 
officers may rely on race and ethnicity in a specific suspect description. This prohibition 
applies even where the use of race or ethnicity might otherwise be lawful.
  In conducting activities in connection with a specific investigation, Federal law enforcement 
officers may consider race and ethnicity only to the extent that there is trustworthy informa-
tion, relevant to the locality or time frame, that links persons of a particular race or ethnicity 
to an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization. This standard applies even where 
the use of race or ethnicity might otherwise be lawful.50
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The United Kingdom’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 is 
similarly clear: 
 
  Reasonable suspicion can never be supported on the basis of personal factors alone without 
reliable supporting intelligence or information or some specific behavior by the person con-
cerned. For example, a person’s age, race, appearance, or the fact that a person is known to 
have a previous conviction, cannot be used alone or in combination with each other as the 
reason for searching that person. Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalizations 
or stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more likely to be involved 
in criminal activity. A person’s religion cannot be considered as reasonable grounds for sus-
picion and should never be considered as a reason to stop or search an individual.51
In line with the approach taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, 
many criminal justice experts argue that ethnicity and race are such powerful mark-
ers that they will almost always predominate in law enforcement decision-making and 
should never be incorporated into a profile.52 Even legitimate uses of ethnicity may have 
spill-over effects and, wittingly or not, generate broader patterns of ethnic profiling that 
depart from a basis in specific intelligence.
Similar concerns led the European Union Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights, a body established by the European Commission, to conclude that 
ethnic profiling should “in principle” be considered unlawful in any circumstance:
  [T]he consequences of treating individuals similarly situated differently according to their 
supposed “race” or to their ethnicity has so far-reaching consequences in creating divisive-
ness and resentment, in feeding into stereotypes, and in leading to the over-criminalization 
of certain categories of persons in turn reinforcing such stereotypical associations between 
crime and ethnicity, that differential treatment on this ground should in principle be consid-
ered unlawful under any circumstances.53
The Legality of Ethnic Profiling in the Context of Counterterrorism
International jurisprudence has settled that non-discrimination is a customary norm of 
international law.54 Non-discrimination is not one of the rights not subject to derogation 
during a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence 
of which is officially proclaimed.”55 Nonetheless, any derogating measures must “not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or 
social origin.”56 
The fundamental nature of the non-discrimination requirement has been reaf-
firmed since 9/11. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
has observed:
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  The principle of nondiscrimination must always be respected and special effort made to safe-
guard the rights of vulnerable groups. Counterterrorism measures targeting specific ethnic 
or religious groups are contrary to human rights and would carry the additional risk of an 
upsurge of discrimination and racism.57 
The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism has underscored 
the obligation of states to “ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism 
do not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin.”58
European regional bodies have affirmed that “[a]ll measures taken by states to 
fight terrorism must … exclude any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory 
or racist treatment….”59 ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation 8 on Combating Racism 
while Fighting Terrorism (2004) recommends that states ensure that:
• “national legislation expressly includes the right not to be subject to racial dis-
crimination among the rights from which no derogation may be made even in 
time of emergency;”
• legislation and regulations “adopted in connection with the fight against terrorism 
are implemented at national and local levels in a manner that does not discrimi-
nate … on grounds of actual or supposed race, color, language, religion, national-
ity, national or ethnic origin;” 
• “no discrimination ensues from legislation and regulations—or their implemen-
tation—notably governing … checks carried out by law-enforcement officials … 
and by border control personnel.”
In considering the lawfulness of counterterrorism measures prior to 9/11, the 
European Court of Human Rights found that terrorism increased states’ “margin of 
appreciation,”60 and noted that in cases of counterterrorism “‘reasonableness’ [ … ] can-
not always be judged according to the same standards as are applied in dealing with 
conventional crime.”61 The court has recognized the need of a state to use secret surveil-
lance of subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction62 and the importance of 
confidential information in combating terrorist violence.63 
Yet, the court has taken pains to note that “[c]ontracting States may not, in the 
name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they 
deem appropriate.”64 Likewise, “the exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot 
justify stretching the notion of ‘reasonableness’ to the point where the essence of the 
safeguard secured by Article 5 para. 1 (c) … is impaired.”65 In assessing a state’s margin 
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of appreciation, the court has applied the test of the necessity of a measure and the 
proportionality of the measure relative to its aim.66 Finally, the court has clearly stated 
that the domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision.67 
The court has yet to rule on these issues in the wake of post-9/11 terrorism in Europe. 
European domestic courts have made clear that counterterrorist measures may 
not single out particular groups on the basis of ethnicity, religion or noncitizen status. 
The United Kingdom House of Lords has ruled that non-citizens may not be singled 
out for detention under counterterrorism efforts.68 In May 2006, Germany’s highest 
court ruled that invasions of privacy through data mining using a terrorist profile that 
included nationality, religion, and ethnic origin, would be warranted only in specific 
cases of concrete danger, and that the “general threat situation of the kind that has 
existed in regard to terrorist attacks continuously since Sept. 11, 2001, or foreign policy 
tensions, is not sufficient.”69
UNCERD emphasized that, as the prohibition against racial discrimination is a 
peremptory—hence, nonderogable—norm, states must ensure that counterterrorism 
programs do “not discriminate in purpose or effect on grounds of race, colour, descent 
or national or ethnic origin and that non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic 
profiling or stereotyping.70 UNCERD has also urged states to “take the necessary steps to 
prevent questioning, arrests and searches which are in reality based solely on the physi-
cal appearance of a person, that person’s colour or features or membership of a racial or 
ethnic group, or any profiling which exposes him or her to greater suspicion.”71 
These factors weigh heavily when judging the reasonableness and proportionality 
of ethnic profiling in counterterrorism efforts. Given that, as the Strasbourg organs have 
repeatedly underscored, “a special importance should be attached to discrimination 
based on race,”72 ethnic profiling in the context of counterterrorism is not likely, if ever, 
to survive judicial scrutiny absent a clear demonstration that it has few negative effects, 
it is demonstrably effective, and no adequate alternatives exist. 
Beyond Discrimination
Although this report’s analysis of ethnic profiling relies principally on the discrimi-
nation framework outlined above, it is important to recognize that many of the law 
enforcement practices examined in this report may violate the European Convention 
on Human Rights (as well as other treaties) even without establishing a violation of 
Article 14 (nondiscrimination).73 As noted earlier, for example, many of the police prac-
tices examined in this report implicate Article 5 of the ECHR, which ensures “the right 
to liberty and security of person.” Among other protections, Article 5 provides for the 
“arrest or detention of a person affected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offense” 
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(Article 5(1)(c)). Interpreting this provision, the European Court of Human Rights has 
emphasized reasonable suspicion: 
  The requirement that the suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds forms an essential 
part of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention. The fact that a suspicion is held 
in good faith is insufficient. The words “reasonable suspicion” mean the existence of facts or 
information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have 
committed the offense.74
The court has recognized that “[w]hat may be regarded as ‘reasonable’ will ... 
depend upon all the circumstances” and that, “[i]n this respect, terrorist crime falls 
into a special category.” “Nevertheless,” it has cautioned, “the exigencies of dealing 
with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the notion of ‘reasonableness’ to the point 
where the essence of the safeguard ... is impaired.”75 Accordingly, it has found a breach 
of Article 5 when the sole basis for arresting and briefly detaining three suspects was 
their past convictions for terrorist crimes.76
The succeeding chapters of this report examine police practices involving ethnic 
profiling that are common in many European countries. Chapter III describes various 
ethnic profiling practices that arise in the context of daily policing and applies the 
legal framework set forth in this chapter to those practices. Chapter IV turns to ethnic 
profiling practices used in the specific context of counterterrorism—a context that has 
assumed special significance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (referred 
to throughout this report by the global shorthand, “9/11”). Chapter IV describes 
key practices of concern and sets forth a preliminary assessment of whether those 
practices—which by their nature involve differential treatment and pursue a legitimate 
aim—appear to be effective and proportionate law enforcement tools. Chapter IV 
also analyzes whether these practices are compatible with the ECHR, focusing 
on the question of whether the harm caused by their use outweighs possible law 
enforcement benefits. 
Finally, Chapter V considers whether alternative methods of policing are more 
effective than the use of ethnic profiling. If so, even otherwise effective ethnic profiling 
practices fail the ECHR test of necessity—and are likely to violate the ECHR if used in 
a way that implicates a substantive violation of the convention in additon to Artcle 14.
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III. Ethnic Profiling 
 in Ordinary Policing
Ethnic profiling existed long before the 9/11 terror attacks. Police across Europe have 
long targeted minorities for heightened attention and suspicion. Paris police chief Mau-
rice Papon adopted an explicit policy of ethnic profiling in 1961, when he issued “a 
directive to limit the freedom of movement of these [Algerian] French Muslims, remind-
ing officers that Muslims could be detected by their facial features.”77 Although it is 
difficult to document with precision, evidence summarized in this chapter indicates 
that police throughout Europe have made extensive use of ethnic profiling in their daily 
efforts to detect, investigate, and prevent common crime. 
These patterns are not surprising. Public opinion across Europe tends to support 
ethnic profiling and has done so for many years. A 2005 national survey conducted 
in Hungary, for example, found high levels of public support for ethnic profiling and 
aggressive use of police stops. Some 60 percent of respondents agreed that Roma 
should be stopped and searched more often than other people and 57 percent agreed 
that Arabs should be stopped more often.78
While those polled doubtless believe that ethnic profiling enhances police effi-
ciency, studies summarized in this chapter indicate that the opposite is true: police 
are more likely to identify criminals when they eschew the use of ethnic profiling and 
instead rely on behavior-based profiles. Equally important, throughout Europe ethnic 
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profiling has had a deleterious effect on the lives of minorities, who are disproportion-
ately targeted for police attention, routinely face rude and racist treatment, and are 
frequent victims of intrusive and violent police tactics. 
A.  Existing Reporting of Ethnic Profiling in Europe
International and regional organizations as well as nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have long raised concerns about routine ethnic profiling in Europe. The most 
systematic documentation appears in the regular country reports of the European Com-
mission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which in recent years has expressed 
concern about ethnic profiling in Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.79 In addition, reports 
by a range of organizations, including the United Nations Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Amnesty International, OSI’s EU Monitoring and 
Advocacy Project (EUMAP), the European Roma Rights Centre, and the International 
Helsinki Committee, have raised similar concerns about police discrimination in these 
and other countries. For example:
• In 2003, Belgian antiracism NGOs reported that Muslims and immigrants were 
discriminated against during their interactions with police. Reports pointed to 
police abuse of people of foreign origin, including physical violence, xenophobic 
and offensive language, arbitrary identity checks, and refusal to intervene when 
police assistance is sought by members of certain ethnic groups.80
• In its 1994 concluding observations concerning France’s compliance with the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CERD 
observed that France should “ensure that preventive identity checks were not 
being carried out in a discriminatory manner by the police.”81 Five years later, 
ECRI noted that “[ f ]oreigners and people of immigrant background … complain 
that they are subject to discriminatory checks” in France.82 As discussed in detail 
below, minority complaints of police abuse in France, often associated with iden-
tity checks, continue to this day.
• In Germany, EUMAP raised concerns about ethnic profiling in 2002.83 In 2003, 
ECRI expressed concern that members of “visible, notably black, minority groups” 
are “disproportionately subject to checks carried out by the police and dispropor-
tionately singled out for controls in railway stations and in airports.”84 
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• In its 1999 report on Greece, ECRI noted practices of discrimination against 
minorities and immigrants in police checks. ECRI also found discrimination 
in 1998 and 1999 in deportations of Albanian immigrants.85 More recently, 
the Greek ombudsman’s office has also reported on arbitrary and discrimina-
tory police identity checks, insulting language, threats of force, and public body 
searches.86 
• In a 1997 report on Hungary, ECRI raised concerns about police discrimination 
against Roma and noncitizens, which it repeated in 2004. In both reports ECRI 
noted the Hungarian government’s failure to abolish a law allowing police to 
enter noncitizens’ homes without a warrant to check their identity documents.87 
• ECRI’s 2002 report on Italy expressed concern over “discriminatory checks” by 
Italian police directed against foreigners, Roma, and other ethnic minorities.88 
In May 2008, the Italian government adopted an open policy of ethnic profil-
ing of Roma, by enacting a decree declaring a state of emergency with regard to 
“nomad community settlements” in three regions and granting state and local 
officials extraordinary powers to deal with the settlements.89 Subsequent ordi-
nances implementing the decree empowered commissioners to take a census, 
fingerprint and photograph inhabitants of the camps, including children—a clear 
singling out of an ethnic group for differential and prejudicial treatment. Leading 
politicians issued public statements calling for these measures, and court rulings 
upheld them. The Court of Cassation, Italy’s highest appeals court, issued a ruling 
stating in part that “all the gypsies were thieves.”90 
• ECRI’s 2003 report on Spain noted allegations of “misconduct among the police 
forces towards vulnerable groups in Spanish society,”91 including increased and 
ongoing reports of discriminatory checks.92 These checks targeted Roma, foreign-
ers, and Spanish citizens of immigrant background. In 2002, Amnesty Interna-
tional reported that police discrimination against ethnic minorities is systematic 
in Spain, including ethnic profiling in discriminatory identity checks.93 
The repetitive nature of this reporting indicates that ethnic profiling in Europe is 
and has been a persistent problem. As discussed in the next section, the quantitative 
data that is available tends to confirm this.
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B.  Quantitative Data on Ethnic Profiling 
  in Stop-and-Search Practices 
It is difficult to measure with any precision the extent of ethnic profiling in Europe. 
The United Kingdom, whose 43 police forces gather data on the use of stops and 
searches,94 publishes information compiled by the Ministry of Justice annually.95 
But no other European country systematically gathers data on policing and ethnicity.96
Ministry of Justice data on stop-and-search practices in England and Wales show 
significant disparities in the rates at which police stop different ethnic groups. The most 
recent data, covering April 1, 2007 through March 31, 2008, show that black people 
were 7.4 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people and that Asian 
people were 2.3 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people.97 
While these data reflect overall stops and searches nationally, there is an even 
greater disparity between whites and minorities when the data are disaggregated to show 
stops and searches under different provisions of U.K. law. Stops conducted pursuant to 
Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 must be based on a rea-
sonable suspicion that the individual stopped is likely to be involved in criminal activity. 
In contrast, stops conducted under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 do not have to be based on a reasonable suspicion.98 Data for 2006–2007 
show that when U.K. police exercised their authority under Section 60, black people 
were 16.9 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people, while Asian 
people were 3.4 times more likely to be stopped and searched than whites.99 
It is not hard to determine why stops and searches conducted under the Section 
60 authority result in an even higher rate of stops of blacks and Asians relative to whites 
than the already high disproportionality of Section 1 stops and searches. Professor Ben 
Bowling has noted the relationship between discretion and discrimination:
  Wherever officers have the broadest discretion is where you find the greatest disproportion-
ality and discrimination. Under Section 60, police have the widest discretion, using their 
own beliefs about who is involved in crime, using their own stereotypes about who is worth 
stopping—that’s where the problems in police culture affect the decisions that are taken .… 
A power that was intended for narrow purposes is being used much more extensively against 
black and Asian communities.100 
Data on arrest rates show that disproportionate stopping and searching of minori-
ties under Section 60 is the result of ethnic profiling rather than individualized suspi-
cion. In 2007–2008, only 4 percent of stops and searches conducted under Section 60 
led to an arrest—significantly lower than the 12 percent arrest rate for stops conducted 
pursuant to the “reasonable suspicion” standard mandated by PACE.101
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Beyond the United Kingdom, 2005 survey data from Bulgaria and Hungary found 
clear evidence of profiling. Roma pedestrians in both countries were three times more 
likely to be stopped by police than majority ethnic Bulgarians and Hungarians despite 
the fact that Roma constitute only 5 to 10 percent of Bulgaria’s population and 6 percent 
of Hungary’s population.102
In interviews conducted during the same study, a number of Hungarian and 
Bulgarian police officers (though by no means all) cited as the basis for their stops 
the perception that Roma are heavily involved in crime. One Bulgarian police officer 
said, “You can’t really tell who [among the Roma] steals and who doesn’t. They almost 
all do.”103
Half of the Hungarian police officers interviewed stated that some of their col-
leagues stop members of certain ethnic groups more than members of the majority, 
primarily mentioning Roma in the first category. A Hungarian officer put it this way: 
  One has to pay more attention to the gypsies. There is a greater chance that I catch some-
one off the wanted list … I therefore assume that we should check them more closely, more 
frequently.104
Police in a number of countries have admitted to stopping people who look for-
eign, both for immigration enforcement and also because of their belief that people 
of certain ethnicities are associated with crime—even particular types of crime. The 
following responses to interviews with Spanish police officers reflect commonplace 
perceptions:
  All murders are related to immigrants (as are) 90 percent of drug crimes and gender 
violence. 
  
  Foreigners are arrested more for drugs; maybe 90 percent are South Americans. The 
dangerous criminals are foreigners: Colombians, Poles, or Romanians are more dangerous 
than Bulgarians.105 
These are personal perspectives, and not all the Spanish officers interviewed 
shared these views. Some officers expressed uncertainty about the effectiveness of eth-
nic profiling, even while describing their own certainty about the correlation between 
crime and particular ethnic groups. One Spanish police officer said that ethnic profiling 
helps people feel secure:
  The majority of arrests and immigrants are “Gitanos” (Roma); the majority of robberies 
with violence are committed by Maghrebis and South Americans. There are problems 
with immigrant kids in the schools, lots of violence. The majority of Muslims—no, about 
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100 percent—are Islamists. Since the 11 of March [bombing in the Atocha train station in 
Madrid in 2004] the police might stop a lot of Moroccans. I don’t think this is counter-
productive [because] the majority relate terrorists with Muslims and if we stop Muslims 
that gives more security to people. It might be counter-productive, but this is what society 
demands. Profiles are good.106 
C.  Disparate Treatment and Abusive Conduct 
  during Stops of Minorities
Considerable evidence indicates that members of minority ethnic groups dispropor-
tionately suffer police abuse in the course of investigations, arrests, and detention. 
As the reports summarized below make clear, this occurs in a broad range of European 
countries. Worse, it appears that the comparatively high rate of police abuse suffered 
by members of minority groups is related to disproportionate police targeting of 
minorities. 
Before examining patterns of abuse in specific countries, it is important to note 
the limitations inherent in available data. The reports that form the basis of the analysis 
in this section provide only a partial picture of police abuse, because typically only the 
most serious incidents reach the attention of official complaints mechanisms or civil 
society organizations. 
It is also important to recognize that the comparatively high levels of police abuse 
endured by members of minority groups do not necessarily mean that ethnic profil-
ing is present. Even if members of minority and majority populations were stopped by 
police at the same rate one might see higher levels of police abuse of those minority 
group members who were stopped. Such a pattern might point to police propensity 
toward racial violence or ill-treatment but not racial profiling.
 Another possible explanation for the high rates of police abuse suffered by mem-
bers of minority groups is that they complain more often. One could posit that police 
arrest them at the same rate they arrest members of the majority group, and police treat 
all groups equally, but members of minority groups are more vociferous. This possibil-
ity is highly unlikely, however, as organizations that work with victims of police abuse 
frequently find minorities are less likely to complain of police treatment due to fear of 
retaliation (and deportation in the case of illegal migrants), insufficient awareness of 
their rights, and inadequate access to legal assistance. In a 2002 report, ECRI noted 
that in Italy most acts of racism, discrimination, and violence by police officers did not 
result in a complaint by the victim, and investigations were inadequate and lacking 
transparency. Indeed, police have frequently threatened to bring or have brought coun-
ter-charges against people who said that they intend to lodge a complaint.107 
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While the data on complaints of police abuse do not provide incontrovertible 
proof of ethnic profiling, numerous studies have concluded that the disproportionately 
high rate of police abuse suffered by minorities reflects more widespread targeting of 
minorities by the police. A 2004 Amnesty International report on Germany found that 
“[t]he consistency and regularity of the reports Amnesty International had received led 
it to the conclusion that the problem of police ill-treatment was not one of a few isolated 
incidents, but rather a clear pattern of police ill-treatment of foreigners and members 
of ethnic minorities in Germany.”108 ECRI has raised concerns that police brutality dis-
proportionately affects minority groups in Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, France, Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Switzerland and Ukraine.109 Amnesty International has reported on 
similar dynamics in France and Spain, noting that “[t]here is a high correlation in Spain 
between these identity checks and ill-treatment by police.”110 
The link between police abuse and ethnic profiling has been borne out in Justice 
Initiative research. Surveys in Bulgaria and Hungary in 2005 found profound qualitative 
differences in the way Roma and non-Roma experienced police stops: in both countries, 
Roma were more likely to report unpleasant experiences.111 In Hungary, 9 percent of 
all Roma were likely to experience a stop they described as disrespectful, compared to 3 
percent of the non-Roma population.112 In addition, Roma pedestrians in Hungary and 
Bulgaria were stopped in disproportionate numbers, far more than majority pedestrians 
were stopped.
Bulgaria
Survey data collected in Bulgaria in 2005 showed that 20 percent of Roma who were 
stopped by police reported experiencing insults, 14 percent reported being threatened, 
and 5 percent reported the use of force by police. For ethnic Bulgarians the respective 
rates were 3 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent. The following experience appears all too 
typical for Bulgarian Roma: 
  I was once stopped by the police for drugs … I was like “Wait a minute, why don’t you go and 
catch someone with drugs. Why do you check me?” I was almost about to cry, but the police 
said “Lift up your sleeves and don’t talk too much, you dirty gypsy [otherwise] I’ll put you in 
the trunk [of the police car].”113
Other Bulgarian studies have found greater frequency of police abuse of Roma 
compared to ethnic Bulgarians.114 The 2002 Bulgarian Helsinki Committee annual 
report, which cites survey data collected in four Bulgarian prisons,115 found similar 
discrepancies in abuse in detention centers where 77 percent of Roma reported being 
abused, compared to 27 percent of ethnic Bulgarians.116 
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Spain
Several reports on Spain have linked police abuse of minorities directly to disproportion-
ate and discriminatory identity checks. In a 2002 report, Amnesty International noted 
that when members of minority groups were stopped by Spanish police, “they may be 
abused and assaulted and end up in the hospital, sometimes with serious injuries.”117 
In 1998, the Ombudsman’s Office of the Basque Autonomous Region of Spain issued 
a report on ethnic profiling after receiving numerous complaints about police treatment 
of immigrants in the San Francisco neighborhood of Bilbao.118 The report was based on 
extensive interviews with police and residents (immigrants and Spaniards) and analy-
sis of 47 police operations during 1997, with a primary focus on stop and search. It 
concluded as follows:
  The activity of the police towards foreign immigrants demonstrates clear violations of the 
rights of these persons. … These activities demonstrate a disproportion between the reality 
and the objectives pursued and the results obtained. These actions have not been corrected 
by the legally established procedures.119
More recent reports suggest that these patterns have continued. In a 2005 inter-
view, the Spanish National Ombudsman’s Office stated that it was receiving regular 
complaints about improper police treatment and detentions of foreigners, and agreed 
that ethnic profiling of foreigners was probably commonplace.120 In 2006, the Spanish 
antidiscrimination organization SOS Racismo reported that police officers were respon-
sible for one in three reported incidents of racist violence.121 
Greece
In 2004, the United Nations Committee against Torture (UNCAT) raised concerns about 
excessive use of force against members of racial and ethnic minorities and foreigners by 
Greek police.122 Common targets included Roma, Albanians, and (other) immigrants. 
Roma in particular frequently have been reported to be victims of ill-treatment, verbal 
abuse, excessive use of force, and even lethal force.123 Greece’s 2004 report to the UN 
Human Rights Committee, the body that supervises compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, included statistics on complaints of police abuse 
disaggregated by citizenship status and Roma ethnicity (see box), but the government 
argued that “these cases reflect isolated incidents and in no way can constitute a basis 
for maintaining that there is a general pattern of police ill-treatment in Greece.”124 The 
government’s submission continued: “the investigation of the relevant incidents has so 
far proven that [police officers] did not have a racist or xenophobic motive.”125 The UN 
Human Rights Committee, however, saw the figures as showing that “police and border 
guards continue to use excessive force in carrying out their duties, in particular when 
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dealing with ethnic minorities and foreigners.” In its view, these patterns included “the 
subjection of the Roma to police violence and sweeping arrests.”126
TABLE 1.
Greece: Police Abuse Cases127 
Year Total Foreigners Roma
2001 57 19 7
2002 60 23 4
2003 47 12 0
Italy
In 2000, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), an NGO, reported a pattern of 
police verbal and physical abuse of Roma in Italy. Its report described frequent beatings 
by Italian police of beggars whom they believe to be Roma, and reported that male police 
officers subjected Roma women whom they had arrested to invasive body searches.128 
Police reportedly “single[d] out old cars in bad repair for control on the road, because it 
[was] assumed that such cars [were] owned by immigrants,”129 and asked whether the 
occupants were “gypsies” or, in the case of dark-complexioned persons, assumed Roma 
ethnicity. According to ECRI’s 2002 report on Italy, Roma there reported unprovoked 
attacks by police130 and a greater likelihood of police use of force, including firearms, 
against them as compared to non-Roma.131 
The ethnically-targeted emergency measures adopted in May 2008, which many 
observers compared to the ethnic registration practices of the World War II era, were 
accompanied by a marked increase in police abuse against Roma both in the camps 
and in public settings in towns.132 In addition to official actions, private citizens attacked 
camps and set them on fire with gasoline bombs.133 
Immigrants in Italy have also faced greater risk of police abuse than ethnic Ital-
ians. ECRI’s 1999 country report on Italy found that police subjected foreigners, Ital-
ians of immigrant background, and ethnic minorities to “insulting and abusive speech, 
ill-treatment and violence”134 and that prison guards reportedly did likewise.135 Immi-
grants’ associations reported, in an analysis covering 2000–2002, that the police and 
Carabinieri used violence during searches of immigrants in their homes or in public 
spaces.136 In 2004, Amnesty International expressed concern over police ill-treatment 
of ethnic minorities, including “allegations of excessive force and physical assault … in 
the context of police operations surrounding demonstrations.”137
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France
Various studies provide a detailed picture of police misconduct in France over a 
sustained period, finding consistently disproportionate abuse of immigrants and 
minorities, in some cases directly related to discriminatory identity checks and stop 
and search practices. 
In 1994, Amnesty International found that a high proportion of victims of police 
abuse in France were of non-European ethnic origin, mostly from the Maghreb, the 
Middle East, and Central and West Africa.138 In 1996, the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee, reporting on France, noted its serious concern “at the number and serious nature of 
the allegations it has received of ill-treatment by law enforcement officials of detainees 
and other persons who clash with them, including unnecessary use of firearms result-
ing in a number of deaths, the risk of such ill-treatment being much greater in the case 
of foreigners and immigrants.”139 In 1998, ECRI stated that a high proportion of cases 
of ill-treatment by law enforcement officers involved detainees of non-European ethnic 
origin.140 While taking note of French efforts to combat discriminatory attitudes among 
police and other public officials, ECRI expressed concern at “allegations of persistent 
discriminatory behavior toward the members of certain ethnic groups.”141 
Four years later, official statistics for the Paris area showed that complaints of 
police ill-treatment had doubled from 216 in 1997 to 432 in 2002.142 (This time period 
corresponds to the transition in ruling party from the government of President François 
Mitterrand to President Jacques Chirac and the abandonment of a form of community 
policing—the police de proximité—in favor of a more traditional social order approach.) 
In 2005, the Commission Nationale de Déontologie de la Sécurité (CNDS), the official 
national body that reviews police conduct issues, stated that it was “[s]truck by the color 
of the skin and the statistical frequency of foreign persons, or persons having foreign 
sounding names,” among victims of police ill-treatment, noting the over-representation 
of young North African (Maghreb countries) and African males.143 The report added that 
these incidents frequently arose from: “identity checks on a purely preventive basis.”144 
A review of 50 individual cases of police abuse between 2002 and 2004 found that 60 
percent of the victims were immigrants and the remaining 40 percent had names or 
physical appearance that gave the impression of immigrant origin.145 Amnesty Inter-
national’s 2003 annual report noted the same dynamic of increasing complaints of 
abuse, the disproportionate number of minority victims, and the link to discriminatory 
identity checks.146 
Amnesty International’s 2003 report presented the finding of French lawyers’ 
associations that identity checks tended to occur in urban areas with large populations 
of young people of non-European ethnic origin147 and that these identity checks have led 
to increasing numbers of people being charged by police with “insulting behavior” or 
“rebellion.”148 French human rights groups and academics have also noted an increased 
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number of stops that end with police pressing charges against the persons stopped—
“insulting an officer,” “rebellion,” or “violence”—with disproportionate numbers of 
minority youths among those charged. These charges are similar to a charge of resist-
ing arrest (sometimes termed the “contempt of cop” charge). In cities in the United 
States that have developed early warning systems to detect problem officers,149 an officer 
pressing repeated charges of “resisting arrest” is a “red flag” indicator that triggers an 
investigation into the officer’s conduct of stops. The high rate of these charges in com-
bination with the persistent complaints of abuse targeting minorities raises concerns 
that these may reflect a pattern of counter-charges by police designed to avoid or trump 
citizen complaints of police abuse.150
A detailed academic study of court case files from 1965 to 2003 showed increasing 
hostility in encounters between minority youths and the French police, stemming from 
disproportionate policing of those groups. The study focused on specific offenses com-
mitted against police officers as noted above (“outrages,” “rebellion,” and “violence”).151 
People of North African (Maghreb) origin constituted 38 percent of all those charged, 
a significant over-representation in relation to their percentage of the population.152 
Maghrebis were also more likely than white French people to be charged and convicted 
of the more severe offenses (“contempt and obstruction”) and more likely than oth-
ers charged with similar offenses to be incarcerated: 27 percent of people of Maghreb 
descent were convicted versus 11 percent of white French individuals charged with the 
same offense. 
Ethnic profiling and the increasing hostility it engendered underlay the riots 
that erupted in France in November 2005. These were triggered by the death of 
two boys, one of Maghrebi and the other of sub-Saharan African descent, who were 
electrocuted while attempting to evade a police identity check by hiding in an 
electrical substation. Protests over the boys’ deaths met with denials of police wrong-
doing from then Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy. Following an incident at 
the boys’ funeral, officers launched tear gas into a mosque, Sarkozy again defended 
the police action, and three weeks of riots erupted in the mostly minority suburbs of 
Paris and other towns across France.153
In the absence of any policy change to address this environment, the situation 
in France remains tense and, by some accounts, continues to deteriorate. In 2005, the 
CNDS reported that complaints of police misconduct had increased by 10 percent in 
2005 over the prior year, and that many incidents were related to minors, asylum seek-
ers, and immigrants.154 The internal police disciplinary body reported a 14.5 percent 
increase in the number of officers sanctioned for abusive behavior in 2005 compared 
to the year before.155 While this is a positive development, policing authorities have not 
examined or changed operational practices that target French minorities for dispropor-
tionate police attention and generate mistrust and hostility. The refusal to recognize 
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ethnic profiling as a problem has costs for the police as well as for minority youths. In 
an alarming incident in late 2006, a group of youths ambushed two police officers and 
severely beat them;156 and in November 2007, following an incident in which a police 
car struck and killed two minority teenagers, riots erupted, shots were fired at police, 
and 130 officers were injured, some seriously.157 
D.  Police Raids Targeting Ethnic Minorities
Raids are perhaps the most intrusive police tactic. They involve a sudden invasion of 
a building or area, often timed to maximize the element of surprise. Unlike routine 
police contacts, which typically take place in public spaces such as streets or highways, 
raids frequently involve an intrusion into private spaces such as homes, places of wor-
ship or association, or work places.158 They may target individual addresses or whole 
neighborhoods. 
Raids can be a proper exercise of police power and, for certain purposes—par-
ticularly when surprise is required—an important law enforcement tactic. Legitimate 
objectives of raids include: apprehending wanted offenders, obtaining evidence of ille-
gal activity, recovering property, preventing commission of a crime, or confiscating 
contraband.
Raids move into the category of impermissible ethnic profiling, however, when 
police determine targets based on stereotypes associating ethnic or religious groups 
with crime, or when raids target entire communities based on evidence related to the 
criminal activities of one or two residents. In practice, some police raids appear to stray 
from legitimate objectives and constitute the illegal harassment of minority communi-
ties. Such harassment is particularly clear in raids on Roma communities.
Roma camps have been the targets of police raids in many countries and Roma 
rights advocates view raids as an “egregious form of ethnic profiling” that subject entire 
communities to a form of collective guilt.159 In some cases, raids on Roma communi-
ties have been prompted by the suspected criminal behavior of one or a few suspects; 
in other cases they are undertaken on the assumption that Roma as a group engage 
in crime. Raids have also been used to induce entire Roma communities to leave their 
settlements. 
Several common characteristics emerge from a review of police raids on Roma 
settlements in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, France, and Italy during the period 2002–
2005:160 
• Raids extend across whole Roma neighborhoods, even when police are searching 
for a small number of suspects or even a single suspect.
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• Police often do not explain the purpose of the raid or show warrants. 
• Raids often involve damage to property. 
• Raids are often accompanied by verbal racist abuse. 
• Raids are often characterized by excessive use of force, including lethal force.
Italy
A 2000 report of the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), based on an extensive 
investigation into life in 30 Roma camps throughout Italy, found that Italian police 
regularly targeted Roma settlements for raids.161 
  Police typically enter a camp in numbers ranging from four to twenty, with exceptional large-
scale actions carried out by over one hundred officers. Authorities raid most frequently late 
at night or early in the morning. The inhabitants of the camp receive no warning of the raid. 
Authorities generally proceed from dwelling to dwelling. In some instances, officers order all 
persons temporarily to vacate dwellings. Since many of the authorized camps have one group 
address, police empowered to search for one individual may effectively enter any dwelling in 
a camp at will. In many instances authorities have evicted Roma and destroyed their property. 
In raids not aimed at eviction, according to Roma victims, police do not inform camp inhabit-
ants of why they have come. Moreover, when Roma request to know the purpose or grounds 
of the raid, officers usually act offended and either give no answer at all, or answer by being 
aggressive or using abusive or racist speech towards the individual seeking information. 
Although the ERRC conducted extensive interviews with eyewitnesses of police raids, not a 
single person recalled having been shown written authorizations by police officers.162
Raids on Roma camps in Italy have frequently taken place without valid judicial 
authorization.163 A 2000 ERRC report included numerous cases of Italian police raid-
ing Roma camps without warrants, forcing the Roma inhabitants to leave while they 
searched the camps, subjecting residents to verbal and physical abuse, and destroying 
their property.164 Police have often forced Roma women to undress for searches.165 In 
2000, the International Helsinki Federation (IHF) also expressed specific concerns 
about Italian Carabinieri entering and searching Roma camps without producing search 
warrants.166 In 2003, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted that raids 
have produced “allegations of instances of ill-treatment by law enforcement officers 
against children and the prevalence of abuse, in particular against foreign and Roma 
children.”167
Greece
Greek police have often raided Roma settlements to search for suspects, drugs, or weap-
ons. Rather than target particular houses or individuals, police frequently search every 
4 4    E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  O R D I N A R Y  P O L I C I N G
house and check the identity documents of everyone in the community.168 Furthermore, 
these raids have often been characterized by physical and verbal abuse of the Roma 
inhabitants and failure to follow legal requirements such as showing a warrant. ERRC 
and the Greek Helsinki Monitor have monitored numerous raids and have found a clear 
pattern of ethnic profiling by the Greek police directed against Roma.169 In May 2001, 
a senior police officer representing Greece before the UN Committee against Torture 
(CAT) reflected on the use of ethnic profiling in raids: 
  Roma often reside in isolated camps where drug and weapon trafficking takes place, or other 
crimes are committed. This fact obliges the police to intervene according to a plan—with the 
use of special forces, depending on the danger that police personnel face each time.170
A committee member responded that this appeared to be “a sweeping reference 
to an ethnic group.” The Greek delegation stated that no discrimination was intended 
and the statement reflected risk-assessment considerations, but the committee member 
wondered “whether [the delegation’s comments] might not be akin to the racial profiling 
that had received so much attention in the United States recently.”171 
Germany
German police have carried out raids against Roma and immigrants, especially 
Muslims.172 EUMAP has reported German police raids against Roma and Sinti groups, 
including the following 2001 incident: 
  On 11 October 2001, at six in the morning 15 police officers in full combat gear raided the 
house of a Sinti family in Niedererbach, Rhineland-Palatinate, on suspicion of robbery of a 
petrol station where the family had been seen the previous day. The fifty-two-year-old, I.L, 
and her forty-nine-year-old husband G.L. were pulled out of bed, ordered to the ground, and 
held at gunpoint while officers searched the house. The incident was later acknowledged as 
an “embarrassing mistake.”173
Spain
Spanish police have conducted raids on Roma and migrant areas in operations that 
appear to deliberately target minorities. A 2004 raid in one such area, called Poligono 
Sur in Seville, involved nearly 100 local and national police, who occupied the area for 
over 20 hours. After conducting over 150 identity checks, one person was arrested for 
an outstanding warrant, and another for suspicion of driving a stolen car.174 There is 
no indication that raids by Spanish police are based on solid intelligence.175 Residents 
complained that the raids have no crime prevention results and are undertaken to get 
media attention. 
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Spanish police also raid bars, discos, and restaurants frequented by immigrants. 
On November 24, 2003, in Coslada, police entered bars and announced “Spaniards can 
leave without being bothered.”176 On October 26, 2003, police carried out a series of 
raids in the Madrid neighborhoods of Usera and Arganzuela, checking identity papers 
and searching hundreds of people, most of whom were South American. Forty-nine 
arrests resulted, but it is unclear how many arrests were for immigration violations 
and how many for criminal offenses. A police chief later said that the raids were neces-
sary because a person had been murdered in the neighborhood a month earlier.177 On 
November 13, 2003, in Alcorcon, police checked the identity documents of 1,050 per-
sons, and searched many of them, in discotheques popular with immigrants; 50 people 
were arrested (again, there is no information on the charges and how many were for 
immigration offenses). 
E.  Immigration Enforcement
European law stipulates that “border guards border guards shall not discriminate 
against persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation.”178 Immigration enforcement powers are established in EU 
member state laws and vary by country, but many states grant police broad powers to 
stop persons on immigration grounds within set distances of national borders and/
or allow police stops on immigration grounds throughout the country. In France, for 
example, immigration law requires foreigners to carry documents and allows police 
stops to verify this proof of legal stay at any time,179 and courts have attempted to create 
some guiding criteria for when police can reasonably assume that an individual is of 
foreign origin.180 A 1993 French Constitutional Council judgment stated that skin color 
cannot be grounds for an immigration stop181—in contrast to the Spanish Constitutional 
Court which allowed the use of skin color as an indicator of probable non-Spanish 
nationality.182 Other French courts have stipulated that police officers must always base 
their stops on the particular circumstances,183 yet in recent years French police have 
been tasked with rounding up and deporting foreigners in order to meet nationally set 
targets.184 Similarly, in 2008, the Spanish national police in Madrid were ordered to 
meet set quotas for arrests of foreigners, with an explicit preference for Moroccans due 
to the low cost of repatriation from Spain to Morocco.185 
It is extremely difficult to assess the impact of immigration enforcement on eth-
nic minority nationals and legal residents because police in most European countries do 
not record and/or review their stops unless they produce a concrete outcome. In many 
cases, it may indeed be hard to determine if a police action is conducted for immigra-
tion or law enforcement pruposes. Immigration law and police policies, guidance, and 
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training need to be reviewed and non-discrimination provisions strengthened in order 
to better reflect the challenges of policing crime, terrorism, and immigration in multi-
ethnic societies.186 
When domestic immigration enforcement is conducted by police (as opposed 
to immigration controls at borders), ethnic profiling often results. Indeed, immigra-
tion law may provide a façade of legality for ethnic profiling in criminal investigations 
unrelated to immigration. A police officer who may not have sufficient grounds for 
stopping someone on suspicion of committing an ordinary crime can make the stop on 
immigration grounds, and then conduct a search of the person leading to the discovery 
of evidence of a crime. Ethnic minorities are particularly susceptible to such manipula-
tion, given that, in historically more homogenous European societies, physical appear-
ance has traditionally been—even if it no longer is—a common indicator of noncitizen 
status. A French police officer explained it this way:
  If you consider different levels of trafficking it is obviously done by blacks and Arabs, 
and tightly linked to type of immigration.…If you are on the road and see a black man or a 
man with Arabic features you say to yourself, he doesn’t look French, and then you might 
stop him to see if he has papers. While he is stopped you can search him and may find drugs 
or guns.187
Several factors have contributed to heightened use of ethnic profiling in the con-
text of immigration control practices. Political authorities can demand clampdowns and 
strict enforcement of national immigration laws, including proactive police efforts to 
seek out illegal immigrants. Under these circumstances, police are especially likely to 
stop people who “look foreign”—even as the number of persons of minority appearance 
who are in fact naturalized or native-born citizens has significantly increased.
Management tools which conflate arrests for ordinary crime with arrests for 
immigration violations provide a powerful incentive for police to use ethnic profiling 
to single out foreigners, and thus increase the number of arrests. 
German studies of the use of discretionary stop-and-search powers for purposes 
of border control (control of transborder crime such as trafficking in drugs and stolen 
vehicles, illegal entry, and illegal residence) have found that these stops massively tar-
geted migrants, rather than ordinary criminals. While German authorities have at times 
claimed “sensational hit rates,” the actual results appear limited at best, the primary 
outcome being the arrest of legal asylum seekers for minor infractions of residency 
requirements.188 (The “hit rate” is the percentage of stops resulting in a positive law 
enforcement outcome, such as an arrest.) An eight month study of discretionary police 
controls on trains in Bavaria under “Investigation Concept Schiene” carried out in 1997-
98 claimed a healthy 16 percent hit rate.189 However, about 75 percent of the arrests 
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were for violations of travel restrictions by asylum seekers and people with temporary 
residence permits. Eighty-two percent of those stopped were migrants or refugees—a 
clear indication of ethnic profiling.190 The operation did little to address transnational 
crime; barely three percent of those arrested had outstanding warrants, and the quanti-
ties of drugs seized did not exceed legal personal consumption allowances. A six month 
evaluation of discretionary controls in Western Munich found similar results: more 
than half of the 22.6 percent hit rate was made up of infringements of the Aliens Act 
or asylum procedure law.191
In 2002, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior launched a broad crime prevention 
initiative in Madrid called “Operation Focus.” Over four months, police carried out 
20,901 identity checks. The checks produced 2,382 arrests: 267 of Spaniards and 2,115 
of foreigners, most of the latter for immigration violations.192
Some police have openly used ethnic profiling in the exercise of immigration 
powers, basing their judgments of nationality on appearance. A 2004 study of police 
internal controls of foreigners in Sweden found that both the legal framework and 
police practices were generating ethnic discrimination.193 Officers acknowledged com-
monly using ethnic profiling and intuition—rather than more objective criteria—as the 
basis for discretionary searches for illegal immigrants.194
Despite the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits the 
collective expulsion of foreigners,195 French authorities have ordered police to target 
specific minority groups to detect illegal migrants in order to fill chartered deporta-
tion flights to specific countries.196 In 2006, reporters witnessed police on the Paris 
Metro singling out all Asian passengers and removing those without identity papers. 
When asked why they did this, the police responded that they “already had enough 
blacks.”197 A deportation flight from France to China was scheduled for departure 
six days later. French NGOs monitoring immigrants’ rights believe that this happens 
routinely; according to a French Roma rights group, data from the Ministry of Interior 
show that 480 Romanians were expelled on eight charter flights between May and 
November 2006.198 
This trend has not abated. Despite the May 2007 creation of a new French Min-
istry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development, the number 
of deportation orders rose from 45,500 in 2004 to nearly 70,000 in 2007 and 73,000 
in 2008.199 The French police and gendarmerie have massively increased their immi-
gration enforcement, reporting an increase in immigration-related procedures of 72.5 
percent for the gendarmerie and 21.7 percent for the national police during the first six 
months of 2008 compared to the same period in 2007.200
Such actions are facilitated by outdated immigration laws that have not kept up 
with a changing Europe. As Europe becomes increasingly multiethnic—with large 
numbers of French nationals who are of Maghrebi or black African origin, Germans 
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of Turkish origin, and Britons of South Asian and West Indian origin—police enforce-
ment of immigration law through identity checks and stops imposes an undue burden 
on minority group members, including long-standing citizens. 
In an atmosphere of politically charged immigration debates, the use of immi-
grant profiling as a pretext for ethnic profiling is bad enough. Worse still is the tendency 
of some law enforcement authorities to disclose publicly statistics that fail to distinguish 
between immigration control and crime prevention. This is at best misleading and at 
worse feeds a distorted public image of widespread criminality among foreigners and 
migrants. 
F.  Negative Consequences of Ethnic Profiling 
  in Ordinary Policing 
Ethnic profiling in ordinary policing affects individuals, communities, the criminal 
justice system, policing institutions, and public opinion. The first casualty of ethnic 
profiling is the individual being profiled. Even relatively benign encounters with police 
can produce harmful effects when they occur repeatedly and are prompted by one’s 
ethnic identity. Ethnic profiling has been described as a “frightening, humiliating or 
even traumatic” practice.201 The American Psychological Association notes that effects 
on victims include “post-traumatic stress disorder and other forms of stress-related 
disorders, perceptions of race-related threats, and failure to use available community 
resources.”202 Focus groups in Spain reflected these anxieties among minority youths: 
  I worry when I go on the street that they will stop me and ask me for my papers because of 
the color of my skin, by my tone of skin, by my way of walking.203 
  The police always come and in the end the kids think [of themselves as] guilty. They feel bad, 
they feel insecure, they feel like criminals.204
Police controls in Lyons, France, are described by those who have experienced 
them as a public humiliation, arbitrary and often brutal, involving being pushed against 
a wall or made to lie on the ground. In 2004, a Lyons-based antidiscrimination group 
declared: “Police controls make life impossible for any foreigner in the country without 
papers, or anyone who is too black, too Arab, too tan, too stereotype, too young, too 
poor.”205 
To assume that criminality correlates with certain ethnicities is to stigmatize 
entire groups of people. This stigmatization has distinct negative impacts on minorities. 
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Law professor Bernard Harcourt, an expert on criminology, describes what he terms the 
“ratchet effect” produced by ethnic profiling in the United States: 
  The ratchet effect disproportionately distributes criminal records and criminal justice con-
tacts, with numerous secondary implications. Disproportionate criminal supervision and 
incarceration reduces work opportunities, breaks down families and communities, and dis-
rupts education. It contributes to the exaggerated general perception in the public imagina-
tion and among police officers of “black criminality.” … This in turn further undermines the 
ability of African-Americans to obtain employment or pursue educational opportunities. It 
has a delegitimizing effect on the criminal justice system that may encourage disaffected 
youth to commit crime. It may also corrode police-community relations, hampering law 
enforcement efforts as minority community members become less willing to report crime, 
to testify, and to convict. And, to make matters worse, a feedback mechanism aggravates 
these tendencies. Given the paucity of reliable information on natural offending rates, the 
police may rely on their own prior arrest and supervision statistics in deciding how to allocate 
resources. This, in turn, accelerates the imbalance in the prison population and the growing 
correlation between race and criminality.206 
The stigmatizing effect of ethnic profiling is exacerbated by media coverage of 
minorities and crime. An analysis of Flemish media published in 2004 found that 46.4 
percent of newspaper coverage and 51.6 percent of television coverage of minorities 
focused on issues of crime and justice.207 Earlier research showed that Flemish news 
coverage about ethnic minorities was not only largely focused on crime and conflicts but 
also cast in excessively broad terms, with many generalizations portraying minorities as 
perpetrators of crime.208 A Belgian runner of Moroccan origin, Mohammed Mourhit, 
was described by media outlets as “Belgian” when he won many races but as “Moroc-
can” when he was caught with drugs some time later.209 Insensitive media coverage 
functions as an echo chamber for bias, justifying and reinforcing public perceptions of 
immigrants as criminals. 
Ethnic profiling also has a direct impact on relations between minority com-
munities and the police, with resulting effects on both safety and police effectiveness. 
Research in the United States and the United Kingdom shows that unsatisfactory con-
tacts between the police and the public can have a negative effect on public confidence 
in the police, not only for the individual directly involved, but also for his or her family, 
friends, and associates.210 This creates profound mistrust among entire communities 
toward the police and reduces cooperation with law enforcement.211 A Spanish Roma 
described his mistrust succinctly: 
  You (the police) have accused me of everything and I have done nothing. I will no longer 
permit you to tell me anything. Not anything.212 
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Lack of public trust and cooperation are likely to reduce police effectiveness. Polic-
ing is profoundly dependent on the cooperation of the general public; police need the 
public to report crimes, and to provide suspect descriptions and witness testimony. 
Without public cooperation, police rarely identify or apprehend suspects, or obtain con-
victions. A study in the United Kingdom found that less than 15 percent of recorded 
crime was solved by police working alone,213 and the number of crimes solved using 
only forensic evidence was less than 5 percent.214
Ethnic profiling has also been found to lead to increased hostility in street encoun-
ters with minorities, increasing the likelihood that these encounters will escalate into 
the type of conflict that presents safety concerns for officers and community members.215 
If unchecked, profiling may foster civil unrest. In the United Kingdom, the Scarman 
Report, which sought to explain the causes of the 1981 Brixton riots in London, criti-
cized the policing of Brixton, particularly Operation Swamp 81, in which more than 
120 officers patrolled the area with instructions to stop and search anyone who looked 
“suspicious.”216 Over four days, 943 people were stopped and 118 arrested, more than 
half of whom were black.217 Noting the centrality of public “consent” in securing legiti-
macy for policing,218 Lord Scarman saw the Brixton riots as “essentially an outburst of 
anger and resentment by young black people against the police” following Swamp 81. 
 Similar dynamics factored into the French riots of 2005.219 There is a clear con-
nection between the riots and heavy-handed policing that relied on constant identity 
checks and stops and searches targeting the minority French youths who live in impov-
erished suburban apartment blocks. As one young resident said, “relations with the 
police have become intolerable. When they come into the apartment buildings, they 
just grab everyone.”220
In Denmark, abusive stops and searches conducted in areas with large minority 
populations have also provoked riots. In February 2008, the alleged mistreatment by 
Danish police of an elderly man of Palestinian origin sparked rioting in the Nørrebro 
district of Copenhagen.221 Danish media reports indicate that, while triggered by this 
event, the riots had deeper roots in the routine use of stop-and-search tactics to single 
out and harass minorities. Ali Haseki of Gadepulsen, a government-supported organi-
zation that runs youth clubs, said that stop-and-search practices were an underlying 
cause of the unrest: “Our perception is that this has a lot to do with local youths’ dis-
satisfaction over how the police act in the stop-and-search zones. They hassle and annoy 
young people, who in turn feel harassed.”222 On February 22, 2008, a Danish television 
station reported on an internal e-mail written by Deputy Chief of Police Claus Olsen 
acknowledging that stop-and-search practices were one of the principal causes of the 
riots. The report stated that as a result, the Copenhagen Police were planning to change 
these practices.223
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G.  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Ethnic Profiling 
  in Ordinary Policing
Ethnic profiling produces substantial harm to the individuals profiled, the communities 
they come from, and police relations with those communities. In addition, in relying 
upon ethnic criteria, the use of ethnic profiling undercuts a long-standing principle 
of European law rooted in history. By themselves, these harms cast doubt on the exis-
tence of an “objective and reasonable” justification for ethnic profiling. In addition, the 
available evidence suggests that ethnic profiling does not demonstrably increase police 
efficiency in preventing crime and detecting criminals. 
A key issue in determining whether ethnic profiling constitutes illegal discrim-
ination is whether there is in fact a valid statistical link between ethnicity and the 
probability of offending.224 Put another way, can it be objectively demonstrated that pro-
filing is an effective tool of law enforcement? Does singling people out for police atten-
tion on the basis of ethnicity produce a larger number of legitimate arrests and more 
effective crime control than would result if ethnically neutral criteria were used to 
target suspects? 
In some contexts, criminal justice statistics have shown a correlation between 
crime and ethnicity, although these statistics may themselves reflect biased law enforce-
ment patterns. In the United States, there is clear evidence that offending rates for dif-
ferent types of crime vary with ethnicity. Both victim reports and arrest statistics show 
that African-Americans, who constituted roughly 13 percent of the U.S. population, 
committed over 40 percent of the reported robberies in the United States in 1999, and 
about half of the homicides committed that year.225 U.S. studies of illegal drug use have 
produced mixed findings, with some showing considerably lower use of drugs among 
minority groups but also considerable variation among whites, blacks, and Latinos, 
depending upon the type of drug use surveyed.226 U.K. studies based on self-reported 
drug-related offending point to comparable overall rates of offending among black and 
white people, though with differences in the types of drug-related crimes committed by 
each group, and lower rates for ethnic Asians.227 
Proponents of ethnic profiling commonly cite figures on the number of minorities 
convicted for certain crimes—Roma women pickpockets, or Latin American women 
“drug mules,” for example—as statistical evidence of a greater propensity of those 
groups to commit certain crimes. In the United Kingdom, the over-representation of 
people of African and Caribbean origin in arrest and imprisonment rates has sometimes 
been taken as indicative of greater criminality among these populations.228 However, 
criminal justice statistics must be used with great caution. These figures reflect the 
activities of the criminal justice system, and are not a precise representation of the actual 
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number of crimes being committed.229 Figures for arrests, prosecutions, sentencing, 
and incarcerations reflect not just rates of offending but also the results of bias in the 
criminal justice system.230
It is quite plausible that in particular societies, ethnic groups have distinct offend-
ing profiles structured by factors such as social and economic status.231 However, evi-
dence suggests that police work driven by ethnic profiling responds more to stereotypes 
than to real differences in offending rates among ethnic groups, and that disparities in 
stops and searches cannot be explained by actual offending rates.232 As the examples 
below indicate, disparities in police treatment of minority and majority groups are com-
mon, but disparities in rates of offending are not.
Self-report surveys in the United Kingdom show similar levels of drug use by 
black and white people, and lower levels for ethnic Asians.233 Yet drug searches account 
for a larger proportion of stops and searches of minorities. In 2006–2007, the search 
for illegal drugs in the United Kingdom accounted for 40 percent of stops and searches 
of whites, compared with 47 percent of stops and searches of blacks and 57 percent of 
stop and searches of Asians.234 Stops and searches for drugs are generally high-discre-
tion actions, initiated by the officer on the basis if his or her perception rather than on 
the basis of intelligence or information from the public. As noted above, greater discre-
tion permits the greater influence of stereotypes and the resulting increased focus on 
minorities even when the stereotype is clearly inaccurate, as in the case of race and drug 
use in the United Kingdom.235
Similar disproportionality has been found in U.S. police practices. In New York 
City, a 1999 study examined the controversial use of aggressive stop-and-search prac-
tices aimed at offenses relating to drugs and guns. The study, which examined 175,000 
stops and searches by the New York City Police Department, found that although the 
Latino population of New York City was about 22 percent, Latinos made up about 33 
percent of all of those stopped and searched. While New York City’s black population 
was approximately 24 percent of the total, blacks constituted about 52 percent of those 
stopped and searched. By contrast, the city’s 40 percent white population only made 
up about 10 percent of all of those stopped and searched.236 Yet the productivity rate, 
or “hit rate,” was higher for whites than minorities. The hit rate was 12.6 percent for 
searches of whites, 11.5 percent for Latinos, and 10.5 percent for blacks. Thus while 
blacks and Latinos were targeted at higher rates than whites, the hit rates do not reflect 
a higher propensity of these groups to commit offenses. Profiling expert David Harris 
goes further:
  The data do not support the profiling assumption—that using racial or ethnic appearance to 
target law enforcement efforts will make for more efficient, more accurate policing, or for 
the arrest of more criminals. In fact, the opposite is true. Using race does not cause hit rates 
to go up; instead, the hit rate actually drops.237
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Very few studies of ethnicity and police efficiency have been conducted in Europe, 
but those that exist have found that high-discretion stops are not effective and have a 
disproportionate impact on minorities. A 2005 Dutch study of the efficiency of preven-
tive searches for weapons in eight cities over a two-year period found that the searches 
disproportionately targeted minorities and that the hit rate was only 2.5 percent—that is 
for every 1,000 people searched, 25 weapons were detected—and this figure was inflated 
by the inclusion of items such as penknives.238 Not only is this a low hit rate compared 
to U.K. or U.S. data, but the cost in terms of police man-hours was extremely high—for 
example, 54 operations in Amsterdam took nearly 12,000 hours of police time.239 The 
Dutch example shows that stops and searches not directed by specific intelligence have 
a disproportionate impact on minorities while failing to enhance efficiency.240 
A Swedish study of discrimination in the judicial system, which examined the 
use of stops and searches to detect drugs, similarly found that people with a non-Euro-
pean background were searched more often than Swedes and white Europeans.241 The 
researchers concluded that police do not have good criteria for reasonable suspicion 
when searching minorities for drugs,242 whereas their judgment was sound for suspi-
cious behaviors or appearances in the case of white Swedes. With minorities, police 
officers had difficulties distinguishing law-abiding from disorderly immigrants. In 
interviews, Swedish police said that they use stereotypes to maximize efficiency—yet 
their use of stereotypes in fact reduced their efficiency.243
There is evidence that removing race or ethnicity from a criminal profile (in this 
case a drug courier profile) and mandating that officers look at specific nonethnic cri-
teria can help avoid discrimination and improve efficiency. In a rare instance in which 
an ethnic profile was replaced by a behavioral profile, law enforcement effectiveness 
increased. In 1998, 43 percent of searches performed by U.S. Customs Service officers 
were directed at blacks and Latinos, although these groups accounted for a much lower 
proportion of all travelers. A particularly large number of searches—including inva-
sive x-rays and strip searches—were carried out on Latina and black women suspected 
of being “drug mules.” The hit rates for these searches were relatively low across all 
groups—5.8 percent for whites, 5.9 percent for blacks, and 1.4 percent for Latinos244—
and were particularly low for black and Latina women, who were in fact the least likely 
to be carrying drugs on or in their bodies.245 In 1999, the Customs Service changed its 
procedures, removing ethnicity from factors to consider in making stops; introducing 
observational techniques focused on behavior such as nervousness or inconsistencies 
in passengers’ interviews; using more intelligence information; and requiring closer 
supervision of stop-and-search decisions.246 As a result of this change, the racial dis-
parities in Customs Service searches had nearly disappeared by 2000, and the hit rate 
improved from just under 5 percent to over 13 percent and became almost even for all 
ethnic groups.247 
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The experience of the U.S. Customs Service is mirrored in a recent pilot project 
in Spain. In 2007 and 2008, partnering with the Open Society Justice Initiative, the 
municipal police of Fuenlabrada, Spain, both reduced disproportionality and increased 
the effectiveness of police stops. The project introduced stop forms to gather data on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of stops and searches. When data showed certain opera-
tions disproportionately targeted members of minority groups but did not improve law 
enforcement productivity, police practices were changed. Using new data-driven prac-
tices, greater supervision of officers’ stops, and monthly consultations with community 
representatives, Fuenlabrada police improved the efficiency of their stops. Over the 
course of six months, the use of stops declined from 958 in the first month of monitor-
ing to 253 in the final month, while the hit rate increased from 6 percent to 17 percent. 
Disproportionality was also reduced for all groups, with the greatest reduction occurring 
in stops of Moroccans. At the start of the project Moroccans were 9.6 times more likely 
to be stopped than ethnic Spaniards, and six months later Moroccans were 3.4 times 
more likely to be stopped, largely as the result of abandoning a fruitless counterterror-
ism operation conducting stops at the local train station.248
As the Fuenlabrada example shows, there are relatively simple ways to increase 
the efficiency of stop-and-search practices by reducing the influence of negative stereo-
types about minorities. As noted earlier, a critical factor driving ethnic profiling is the 
degree of officer discretion involved in deciding whom to stop and search. U.K. research 
indicates that “where levels of discretion are highest … generalizations and negative 
stereotypes about likely offenders play a role.”249 When, instead, officers are required 
to justify or articulate grounds for suspicion before stopping citizens, they appear to 
increase their consideration of behavioral factors and consequently increase their hit 
rate. U.K. hit rates for stops and searches conducted under Section 1 of PACE—which 
requires reasonable suspicion—ranged between 10 and 13 percent for the 1997/98 to 
2007/08 period.250 This is much higher than the hit rate for Section 60 public order 
stops and searches or Section 44 counterterrorism stops and searches,251 neither of 
which has a reasonable suspicion requirement. Many countries in Europe have no 
reasonable suspicion requirement, although it is recommended by the European Code 
of Police Ethics.252 Indeed, the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental 
Rights has raised concerns about the lawfulness of excessively broad police powers in 
many European countries.253 The introduction of a clear standard for reasonable sus-
picion, accompanied by police training in how to determine suspicion, would be an 
important step forward. 
Studies indicate that in order to be effective, police should make their stops based 
on factors including up-to-date intelligence on current crime patterns, observations of 
objectively suspicious behavior, and police-community dialogue.254 A recent study of 
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police practices in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain found no meaningful oversight or 
assessment of procedures used by individual officers in deciding whom to stop, and 
points to considerable waste of police time and resources involved in stops based on 
ethnic profiling. It is unclear what police performance measures are used in many 
European countries or whether the use of stop-and-search tactics is assessed at all.255
One area in which ethnic profiling may not be so inefficient is the detection of 
illegal migrants. Here, the use of appearance to determine who may not be of majority 
national origin is commonplace, and, for the time being at least, has a greater prob-
ability of effectiveness than ethnic profiling in the detection of crime. However, as the 
percentage of European citizens and legal residents of minority ethnic origin continues 
to increase, the assumption that a member of an ethnic minority group is likely to be 
an immigrant becomes inappropriate.256 In an increasingly ethnically diverse Europe, 
the use of ethnic profiling for immigration enforcement imposes an undue burden on 
minority citizens, and in effect creates a dual standard in the enjoyment of basic citizen-
ship rights that violates the principle of equal treatment. 
In sum, the evidence examined in this section raises serious doubts about the 
effectiveness of ethnic profiling—even when there is valid data on higher rates of minor-
ity offending. Particularly in view of the substantial harm produced by it, police use of 
ethnic profiling generally fails the proportionality test developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights to determine whether differential treatment constitutes discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, there are reforms that police can and should undertake to improve 
their productivity and to avoid profiling, as Chapter V makes clear. 
First, however, it is worth examining recent developments in law enforcement 
practices in response to new terror threats. In this first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, ethnic profiling has taken on a new dimension as police and other law enforcement 
agencies across Europe confront new terror threats. As discussed in the next chapter, 
ethnic profiling appears to have increased, and Europe’s diverse Muslim communities 
are the prime target. 
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IV. Ethnic Profiling 
 in Counterterrorism Since 9/11
The use of ethnic profiling in Europe, while long a staple of police practices, has intensi-
fied in the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States 
and in response to subsequent terrorist bombings in Madrid in March 2004,257 in London 
in July 2005,258 and the attempted bombings in London and Glasgow in June 2007.259 
Counterterrorism aims above all to prevent and detect potential terrorists or plan-
ning for acts of terrorism before they occur. Domestic and foreign intelligence services 
and the police conduct counterterrorism activities governed by counterterrorism leg-
islation and criminal law. While there is some overlap in the functions of police and 
intelligence services, there are critical differences regarding their functions and thus 
in the degree of oversight to which they are generally subjected. Intelligence services 
are concerned with generating and maintaining a flow of information on threats to 
the state, and secrecy is deemed essential to enable and protect their work and, unlike 
police, they face no requirement to demonstrate the grounds for their suspicion. Intel-
ligence information is generally passed to the police forces when it is sufficiently timely 
and precise as to support a law enforcement action (this is termed “actionable intel-
ligence”). At that point, the police undertake the enforcement action and subsequent 
steps toward criminal prosecution. 
In most cases, the police action—be it a raid on a premises or the arrest of a 
suspected terrorist—will require judicial authorization. Similarly, judicial oversight and 
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authorization is commonly required for both police and intelligence agencies to under-
take surveillance when this involves intrusive covert techniques such as wiretaps and 
hidden cameras. A deeply troubling tendency in the aftermath of 9/11 is the expansion 
of intelligence agency powers, the reduction of oversight, and an erosion in the stand-
ard of suspicion required—with religion and national origin taking on undue weight 
in the practices documented in this report.260 In some cases, such as France and Spain, 
powerful counterterrorism legislation was introduced in response to domestic terror 
threats that predate 9/11 but which have been used with increasing vigor since then, as 
documented in this report and by other rights organizations.261 A further trend is the 
use of counterterrorism powers that were originally designed to be exceptional meas-
ures on an ongoing basis for other policing objectives. This trend is discussed below in 
regard to the counterterrorism stop-and-search powers used on a permanent basis in 
London since February 2001.262 
Governments and law enforcement authorities face tremendous public pressure 
to do all they can to prevent terror attacks, including using counterterrorism profiles. 
The principal objective of counterterrorism profiling is to use police resources as effi-
ciently as possible to identify suspected perpetrators and prevent attacks. The aim of 
such profiles is to help dismantle terrorist networks, cells, and operations before they 
can strike, or at the very least impede terrorist groups and reduce their chances of car-
rying out a successful attack.263
Religion—and particularly, Islam—figures prominently in contemporary coun-
terterrorism profiling.264 Current counterterrorism profiling265 generally targets indi-
viduals—usually men—presumed to be Muslim or originating from a country with a 
majority Muslim population. 
The use of information about religion (or ethnicity, race, or national origin) in 
assembling a profile is legitimate when linked to solid, timely, and specific intelligence 
concerning individuals’ participation in terrorist activities. However, evidence from 
Europe indicates that police and intelligence agencies are using generalized assump-
tions about certain religious or ethnic groups’ involvement in terrorism, thus crossing 
the line from legitimate counterterrorism profiling into discriminatory ethnic profiling. 
When police target mosques, Muslim organizations, and businesses serving Muslim 
communities—based on generalized suspicion rather than specific intelligence—they 
are engaging in ethnic profiling. 
In part because ethnic profiling is not monitored in most European countries, it 
is difficult to chart its use with any precision. But there are many recent examples of 
people being singled out for discriminatory counterterrorism related law enforcement 
practices solely or principally because of their religion. Stops and searches of Britons 
of South Asian descent increased fivefold after the July 2007 attempted bombings in 
London and Glasgow. Similarly, from late 2001 to early 2003, Germany undertook a 
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massive data mining exercise that trawled through the sensitive personal data of 8.3 
million people on the basis of a broad profile that relied primarily on religion and ethnic 
origin—without finding a single terrorist. 
Other instances of ethnic profiling aimed at identifying terrorism suspects are 
harder to establish, because any particular police action may be driven not solely by 
ethnicity or religion, but also by circumstantial evidence that would seem to justify 
some level of suspicion. Only when cases are examined closely does it become clear 
that the circumstantial evidence cited is viewed as significant only because the person 
in question is Muslim or practices a certain form of Islam. As this chapter documents, 
ethnicity, religious practice, or national origin is often the deciding factor: circumstan-
tial evidence that would not ordinarily lead to police action comes to be viewed as sig-
nificant when that evidence is linked to individuals or groups of a specific religious or 
ethnic background.266
Reliance on generalizations about ethnicity and religion in counterterrorism pro-
filing is especially pronounced in the context of early prevention efforts—that is, efforts 
to detect persons thought to be at risk of sympathizing with or turning toward terror-
ism, before they have actually taken steps to plan an attack. Examples of ethnic profiling 
described in this chapter include the abuse of France’s terrorist association law, raids by 
“regional centers to combat radical Islam” in France, and the selection of surveillance 
targets in Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. 
Increasingly, these early prevention efforts are driven by theories of “radicaliza-
tion,” which emerged in response to the phenomenon of so-called home-grown ter-
rorists in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and other countries. According to these 
theories, certain types of Islam can be linked to the radicalization process. Police and 
intelligence services, therefore, target practitioners of these types of Islam, even when 
there is no evidence that individual practitioners are involved in terrorism.
This chapter describes a range of post-9/11 law enforcement practices involving 
the use of ethnic profiling in counterterrorism efforts—some influenced by radicaliza-
tion theories, others not. These include stop-and-search operations and identity checks, 
often used in mass checks of people in public places; data mining; raids on mosques 
and other institutions associated with Muslims; arrest and imprisonment of presumed 
terrorists; and surveillance activities. 
The nature of ethnic profiling in these activities varies. More overt ethnic profil-
ing can be seen in the explicit use of ethnic profiles to conduct data mining, targeting 
persons perceived to be Muslim or of particular ethnic or national origin for identity 
checks and stop-and-search actions, and arresting Muslims on the basis of circumstan-
tial evidence that would not lead to the detention of similarly situated non-Muslims. 
In some cases, people or places identified through data mining or efforts to detect 
radicalization are then subjected to more intrusive operations such as surveillance or 
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raids. The common factor connecting these activities is law enforcement’s reliance on 
ethnicity and/or religion in deciding to target individuals, institutions and, at times, 
whole communities for suspicion.
This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of these practices. As noted earlier, the 
question of effectiveness has a significant bearing on whether the profiling practices 
examined here can withstand legal scrutiny under European human rights standards
A.  Ethnic Profiling in Mass Controls 
  and Stop-and-Search Practices
Since 9/11, law enforcement officers in many European countries have made extensive 
use of their preventive powers to target persons they presume to be Muslim for identity 
controls—that is, spot checks of identity documents—and for stops and searches in 
public places. Muslims are frequently targeted for identity checks or searches in places 
considered to be likely terrorist targets, such as metro systems, trains and train stations, 
and commercial centers; or in places associated with Muslims, including predominantly 
Muslim neighborhoods, telephone calling centers, halal restaurants, and mosques. 
In some cases, these are mass operations that have involved checking hundreds of 
people over many hours, primarily based on the targets’ presumed religious affiliation. 
Mass controls are highly visible, which aggravates the humiliation and stigmatization 
felt by those targeted. 
United Kingdom
Data published by the United Kingdom Ministry of Justice267 demonstrate that U.K. 
stop-and-search practices have targeted persons perceived to be Muslim since 9/11, and 
that this pattern intensified following the London Underground bombings of July 7, 
2005 and the Haymarket and Glasgow International Airport bombings of June 29–30, 
2007.268 As noted in Chapter III, discriminatory stop-and-search practices in the United 
Kingdom have been facilitated by a statute adopted just before the terrorist attacks of 
9/11: under Sections 44(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000,269 police officers, when 
given authorization by the secretary of state, can stop and search vehicles and pedestri-
ans for articles that could be used for terrorism even without reasonable suspicion that 
such articles are present.270 
In 2007–2008, police forces across England and Wales conducted a total of 
117,278 Section 44 stops and searches on vehicles and pedestrians—an overall increase 
of 215 percent from the previous year.271 Stops and searches increased for all ethnic 
groups, but the biggest rise—of 322 percent—was for black people, followed by a 185 
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percent increase for  “Asian” people  (a category that includes the United Kingdom’s 
substantial South Asian community of persons of Bangladeshi, Indian, and Pakistani 
origin, and persons most likely to be Muslims), and lastly a 185 increase in stops of 
white people.272
The surge in terrorism-related stop-and-search practices during 2005–06 and 
2007–2008 is doubtless largely attributable to the July 2005 and June 2007 London 
bombings. But an analysis of publicly available data suggests that the higher rates of 
stops and searches of minorities, and in particular of persons classified as “Asian,” were 
driven largely by ethnic stereotypes rather than relevant grounds for suspicion, and that 
these practices were ineffective in identifying terrorist suspects. 
Contemporaneous official comments acknowledged and defended the use of eth-
nic profiling. In March 2005, for example, U.K. Home Office Minister Hazel Blears 
said: “If a threat is from a particular place then our action is going to be targeted at that 
area…. It means that some of our counterterrorism powers will be disproportionately 
experienced by the Muslim community.”273 Her remarks were echoed by Ian Johnston, 
the chief constable of the British Transport Police, who told his officers to concentrate 
on particular ethnic minority groups and not “waste their time searching old white 
ladies.”274 
Not surprisingly, London saw a marked rise in stops and searches in the months 
following the July 2005 terrorist attacks, and individuals classified as Asian figured 
prominently in this rise.275 According to London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
figures, 2,405 Asian and black people were stopped while walking in the three months 
following the July 2005 bombings, compared with 196 the previous year.276 Section 44 
stops of vehicles rose by 86 percent for white drivers, by 108 percent for black drivers 
and by 193 percent for Asian drivers.
Commenting on these figures, Peter Herbert, a member of the Metropolitan 
Police Authority, the body that oversees the London MPS, observed:
  [I]ntelligence cannot lead to a 1,100 percent increase; this is just random stop and search. 
This means the police are not using their information properly, because they are too busy 
making random stops, which deters no one and which alienates large numbers of people 
and wastes time and resources.277
Essentially the same pattern held true for the following one-year period. From 
October 2005 through September 2006, the MPS conducted 22,672 Section 44 stops 
and searches.278 These resulted in 27 arrests for alleged terrorism offenses and 242 
arrests for other offenses. None of the arrests resulted in terrorism-related charges 
being filed.279 
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During public hearings convened in 2005–2006 by the Metropolitan Police 
Authority to examine the counterterrorism response in London, many Londoners 
expressed the belief that the police were exercising their authority on grounds of eth-
nicity and that this was unacceptable. 
And yet, while police statistics clearly show rapidly expanding use of Section 44 
stop-and-search powers in London and nationally during this period, to date none of 
these searches has resulted in an arrest or charge related to terrorism.280 Of the 44,543 
stops and searches registered by the Home Office for 2005–06, only 105 resulted 
in arrests. In other words, only one of every 400 people stopped and searched was 
arrested.281 Similarly, of the 117,278 stops and searches registered by the Home Office 
for 2007–2008, only 72 people were arrested in relation to terrorism related offenses, 
a success rate of 0.061 percent.282  None of these resulted in a conviction for a terror-
ism offense.283
In short, while there is abundant evidence that U.K. police powers to stop and 
search individuals have been misused, there is scant if any evidence that police use of 
these powers has been effective in detecting individuals involved in terrorist activities. 
Perhaps in response, the grounds cited by law enforcement authorities in support of 
stop-and-search powers has evolved somewhat.
Although the Terrorism Act 2000 states that the purpose of Section 44 stops 
is to search for articles that may be used in an act of terrorism,284 and early remarks 
by Blears and other officials suggested that police stops were undertaken to identify 
potential bombers, security officials have increasingly argued that there is little or no 
expectation that police would actually be able to detect a terrorist through an identity 
check.285 Instead, senior U.K. police have argued that the value of Section 44 stop-and-
search powers lies in the ability to disrupt terrorists.286 Under this argument, the arrest 
rate is not a relevant indicator of efficiency.287 Hazel Blears concurred in an October 
7, 2005 letter to the Guardian newspaper, arguing that Section 44 stops and searches 
help to deter terrorist activity “by creating a hostile environment for would-be terrorists 
to operate in.”288 
Official positions defending stop-and-search powers have increasingly empha-
sized their value in disrupting and deterring terrorists during the communication, plan-
ning, and reconnaissance of possible attacks.289 It is practically impossible to determine 
the deterrence value of Section 44 stops, but senior police officers believe that by being 
open and transparent with the public and by involving the community in the review and 
monitoring of the ongoing use of these powers, they will negate some of the concerns 
about their disproportionate, inappropriate, or excessive application, and reassure the 
public that Section 44 is being applied appropriately.290 
A review of the Terrorism Act 2000 conducted by Lord Carlile in 2006 concluded 
that Section 44 powers have not been effective in either deterring terrorism in general, 
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or in identifying specific terrorists or thwarting specific attacks. Lord Carlile’s report 
found that “there is little or no evidence that the use of s44 has the potential to prevent 
an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers of stop and search.”291 
Carlile’s report argued that these powers should be used sparingly, because misuse 
would be poorly regarded by the courts and could fuel demands for the repeal of Section 
44. In December 2006, Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman 
questioned the value of Section 44 stop-and-search powers, saying it was “very unlikely 
that a terrorist is going to be carrying bomb-making equipment around with them in 
the street.”292 Hayman went on to say that he was “not sure what purpose it serves, 
especially as it upsets so many people, with some sections of our community feeling 
unfairly targeted. It seems a big price to pay.” 
In his most recent report, looking at the conduct of Section 44 powers in 2007, 
Lord Carlile continued to express concern about the increasing use of the power. The 
report argues that given the dearth of evidence of the power’s preventing a terrorist 
attack, Section 44 stops and searches should be used less.293 In response to the latest 
figures released, Lord Carlile added “it [Section 44 stop and search] catches no or almost 
no terrorism materials, it has never caught a terrorist and therefore it should be used 
conservatively.”294 He draws particular attention to the wide variations in the numbers 
of Section 44 stops and searches being used between different police services across the 
United Kingdom, stating, “I find it hard to understand why Section 44 authorizations 
are perceived to be needed in some forces areas, and in relation to some sites, but not 
others with strikingly similar risk profiles.”295 It is clear that there is a growing reliance 
across the U.K. on the routine use of Section 44 powers, with little apparent relation to 
potential terror threats.
The London MPS conducted a full review of its use of Section 44 stop-and-search 
powers in 2007. Using a range of assessment methods,296 the review found that, on 
balance, the powers are “necessary,”297 and MPS police chiefs have again emphasized 
that the powers will be used to “deter, disrupt and prevent terrorist activity.”298 
In 2007, the MPS revised Standard Operating Procedures for Section 44, and now 
provides the following guidance for officers on how to determine whom to stop:
  The profile of people being searched should reflect the profile of the people in that area. 
Terrorists come from all ethnic groups and all walks of life. Actions define a terrorist, not 
ethnicity, race or religion.
  Terrorists may come from a wide variety of backgrounds and may attempt to change their 
behavior to disguise their criminal intentions and blend into their surroundings.
  Officers must never use stereotypical images of “terrorists” when deciding to use their pow-
ers of stop and search, to do so could lead to:
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• Targeting of certain community; 
• Disproportionality; 
• Discrimination; 
• Terrorists avoiding detection whilst carrying out their objective.299
This is a welcome caution, although it appears to have had little impact on the 
MPS’s use of Section 44 powers. The significant increase in the number of Section 44 
stops and searches made nationally in 2007–2008 largely reflects increases in the use 
of the power by the MPS in London. In 2007–2008 the MPS was responsible for 87 
percent of all searches nationally under this power. The MPS used Section 44 stops 
and searches on 76,496 more occasions than the previous year, an increase of 303 
percent.300  In the United Kingdom as a whole, the latest official figures show high levels 
of disproportionality persist.301
In October 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced a review of existing 
guidance for police officers on Section 44 counterterrorism stop-and-search powers, 
in order to assure they are being used appropriately and proportionately. The review 
resulted in new guidelines titled “Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Ter-
rorism,” issued by the U.K. National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in Novem-
ber 2008.302 The document defines racial profiling as the following:
  The use of racial, ethnic, religious or other stereotypes, rather than individual behavior or 
specific intelligence, as a basis for making operational or investigative decisions about who 
may be involved in criminal activity. Officers should take great care to avoid any form of racial 
or religious profiling when selecting people for searching using Section 44 powers. Profiling 
in this way may amount to an act of unlawful discrimination as would discrimination on the 
grounds of age, gender, sexuality or disability.
The document notes that terrorists can come from any background and there is 
no profile for what a terrorist looks like. It gives these instructions:
  Great care should be taken to ensure that the selection of people is not based solely on ethnic 
background, perceived religion or other personal criteria. A person’s appearance or ethnic 
background will sometimes be a factor, but an officer’s decision to search them under sec-
tion 44 should be made only if it is a result of evaluated intelligence. Profiling people from 
certain ethnicities or religious backgrounds may also lose the confidence of communities. 
An effective way of protecting against this is to compare the numbers of people searched in 
proportion to the demographic make-up of the area where searches take place.
 
If these guidelines are indeed heeded in practice, future statistics on stop-and-
search practices should demonstrate more targeted and less disproportionate use of 
Section 44 powers.
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As noted earlier, in most of Europe there is no data of the sort produced by the 
U.K. Home Office. But the data that are available reflect the same pattern found in the 
United Kingdom: mass identity checks identify the occasional person with an outstand-
ing warrant for petty offenses but primarily serve to detect individuals in irregular 
immigration status, while generating enormous insecurity and resentment in Muslim 
communities. While the following sections examining the use of stops in Germany, 
France, and Italy cannot give as full a picture as is provided by U.K. statistics, the pat-
terns that emerge provide no reason to believe that the dynamics are significantly dif-
ferent nor the results any better than in the United Kingdom. 
Germany
In Germany, police intensified their reliance on identity checks targeting Muslims fol-
lowing the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the discovery that some of the 9/11 terrorists—a 
group known as the “Hamburg cell”—had planned their attack while in Germany. Ger-
man police have carried out mass identity checks outside of mosques, frequently after 
Friday prayers when the largest number of worshippers is present. Since 9/11, police 
have conducted mass identity checks on numerous occasions outside 25 to 30 mosques, 
including those with the largest attendance in Germany.303 The operations appeared 
particularly common in Germany’s southern states.304
These checks have often been conducted in an intimidating manner: German ana-
lysts say that police—sometimes dressed in riot gear—typically surround the mosque 
and check the identity documents of every person leaving the building during opera-
tions that can take hours when there are thousands of people to review.305 Individuals 
without valid identification have been taken to police stations and held for several hours 
until their status is verified.306 
The months immediately following the July 2005 London bombings saw a surge 
in identity checks targeting Muslims in Germany. In early August 2005, hundreds of 
police officers carried out identity checks in front of mosques in the cities of Aalen, 
Balingen, Biberach, Esslingen, Freiburg, Friedrichshafen, Heilbronn, Karlsruhe, Lör-
rach, Ludwigsburg, Mannheim, Pforzheim, Ravensburg, Reutlingen, Sigmaringen, 
Stuttgart, Tübingen, Ulm, and Waiblingen. Approximately 900 people were checked. 
In September 2005, 500 German police undertook a state-wide sweep of 20 cities 
in Hessen, including Frankfurt. The actions focused on shops, restaurants, and bars 
in the vicinity of mosques, and some streets were shut down during sweeps. Police 
checked 1,260 people307 and arrested 38 men. The state’s interior minister, Volker 
Bouffier, said 33 of those arrested lacked valid residence permits and three had been 
sought in connection with other offenses. Bouffier stated that the action was intended 
to preemptively combat “criminal Islamic structures.”308
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It is not clear what information was gathered through these exercises or what if 
any value they had in preventing terrorism in Germany. Whatever their intelligence 
value, these measures produced no significant law enforcement outcome; the only 
charges resulting from the checks were for minor offenses, primarily immigration 
violations.309 
Baden-Wurttemberg Interior Minister Heribert Rech said that the August 2005 
operations had a specific aim:
  [O]btain further information about Islamic extremists and terrorists in order to react quickly 
to any Islamist threat and to destroy terrorist structures. … [P]olice need to obtain compre-
hensive information about Islamists. … It must be made clear to the extremists that we will 
deal most forcibly with any religiously motivated claims to absolute power, intolerance and 
disregard for human rights.310
The operations described above appear designed to serve several different func-
tions: they may be broad intelligence-gathering exercises; they may be public relations 
efforts to display the government’s determination to combat terrorism; they may have 
some deterrent effect through “target hardening;” and there may be real or perceived 
collateral benefits, primarily in immigration enforcement outcomes. A German coun-
terterrorism officer gave these goals: 
  We do not really expect to find people who are terrorists or supporters. To reach this goal 
other methods are used. Preventive identity controls are instead used on top of other meth-
ods. The main goal of these controls is to find people who are living in Germany illegally or 
[engaged in] other related crime. We also want to show that the police are there, that we are 
doing something about terrorism; this increases pressure on persons involved in terrorist 
activities.”311 
The effectiveness of German control operations in achieving these aims is by its 
nature difficult to assess, but their impact on targets is clear. These highly visible and 
intrusive operations have directly affected thousands of people, publicly marking Mus-
lims as suspicious solely on the grounds of their religion. 
More recent developments in Germany suggest law enforcement authorities have 
learned that mass controls are not effective. Since mid-2006, the use of mass control 
operations appears to have declined. Political leaders and press reports no longer trum-
pet large-scale identity checks as measures to combat terrorism. Only in the state of 
Niedersachsen do Muslims continue to report that police regularly arrive in large num-
bers after prayers and check the documents of persons leaving the mosque.312 In other 
areas of Germany, there has been a shift in the law enforcement approach to Muslim 
communities, and police have established “dialogue forums” in a number of states and 
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at the federal level, with the goal of opening channels of communication between the 
police and representatives of Muslim communities. 
Italy
Like Germany, Italy does not collect ethnic data. In Italy, too, law enforcement offi-
cials have used their identity-check powers in mass controls of tens of thousands of 
Muslims and immigrants since 9/11. These checks often occur during highly pub-
licized raids targeting mosques and Muslim- and immigrant-owned businesses. 
Others take place during large-scale control operations in public places. According 
to individuals interviewed in 2006, Italian police single out those they presume to 
be Muslim for identity checks during these large-scale operations. While these are 
ostensibly counterterrorism operations, the primary result has been to identify illegal 
immigrants. 
On July 9, 2005, following the London Underground bombings two days ear-
lier, approximately 2,000 Italian police officers were deployed across the Lombardy 
region,313 where they patrolled train stations, subways, commercial centers, and other 
sensitive sites.314 Police reports indicate that most of the 142 persons arrested during 
this operation were accused of drug, petty theft, or immigration-related charges; 84 of 
those arrested were immigrants, 52 of whom were issued deportation orders.315 The July 
9 operation produced significant immigration control impacts, but had no discernible 
effect in detecting actual terrorists. Italian authorities frequently conflate immigration 
with the threat of terrorism, describing all Muslim immigrants as potential terrorists. 
This attitude drives the ethnic profiling of persons who appear to be immigrants and/or 
Muslims. 
Identity checks outside mosques are reported to be common in Italy since 9/11. 
A Muslim who attends a mosque in Desio in northern Italy said during a May 2006 
interview that, on two occasions in the previous few years, police had turned up at the 
mosque during prayer time and checked identity documents of people who had come 
to pray.316 A Muslim from Turin stated that police frequently station themselves on a 
main road just outside the local mosque on Fridays around prayer time in order to 
check worshippers’ identity documents.317 In the view of the president of the Pakistani 
community in Italy, this is a widespread practice.318 
Such practices continue, particularly in the north of Italy. According to Italian 
non-discrimination experts, authorities no longer rely explicitly on antiterrorism powers 
to target mosques, Muslim businesses, or Muslim individuals for controls, searches, 
raids, and arrests. Instead, they use general security or immigration powers as a frame-
work for these actions.319 
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France
As in Germany and Italy, the French government does not collect data on police stops 
broken down by ethnicity, making it impossible to measure the existence or extent of 
ethnic profiling in France. Yet members of France’s Muslim and North African com-
munities are convinced that French police have increased their focus on these commu-
nities in recent years. In the aftermath of the July 2005 bombings in London and the 
March 2004 bombing in Madrid, French North Africans reported a noticeable increase 
in police check-points on trains, in the Metro, and on the streets.320 Many Muslims and 
North Africans in France report that they are stopped, questioned, and searched by 
police, in their view solely because of their appearance.321 
It is not clear whether these checks are conducted on the basis of antiterror-
ism powers322 or whether they are a byproduct of a general climate of suspicion which 
leads police to use their regular discretionary powers to target people who “look 
Muslim.”323 Nor is it clear that such stop-and-search practices have had any effect in 
detecting or deterring acts of terrorism; the primary law enforcement outcome of 
these checks is an increase in the number of illegal immigrants detained and awaiting 
deportation.324 
B.  Data Mining
Explicit ethnic profiling lay at the heart of a massive—and ultimately unsuccessful—
data mining effort in Germany aimed at identifying terrorists. Despite its failure, data 
mining based on ethnic profiling continues to attract European authorities. 
In this practice, large databases of personal information,325 such as immigration 
or student records, health and housing information, are subjected to computerized 
searches based on a specific profile.326 Ethnicity, national origin, and religion often fig-
ure heavily in these profiles. These database searches are used to identify individuals 
thought to merit further investigation. 
After it was discovered that several of the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
had lived and studied in Hamburg, German officials sought to identify other potential 
terrorist cells. To this end, from 2001 until early 2003 the German federal government 
tasked the state governments to collect and process personal data in a massive data min-
ing operation (known as Rasterfahndung in German).327 German state police collected 
sensitive personal data328 from approximately 8.3 million persons, who were selected 
using three broad criteria, including national origin.329 Their data was then “trawled”
—that is, searched using a computer program that identified pertinent information 
from the database, using a profile based upon common characteristics of members of 
the “Hamburg cell.”330 These traits included: being 18–40 years old, being male, being 
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a current or former student, being Muslim, and being from one of 26 countries with a 
predominantly Muslim population.
Given the sheer number of German males between 18 and 40 who were or are 
students, it is clear that the key criteria in this search were religion, and national ori-
gin. Furthermore, the search was based on generalizations, not concrete intelligence 
concerning recent or potential terrorist attacks. The final database of potential sleeper 
cell members contained almost 32,000 entries.331 In response, German authorities col-
lected additional data from 96 different sources.332 The supplementary data amounted 
to more than four million entries that the Federal Criminal Police Authotity (Bun-
deskriminalamt, or BKA)  began to process on March 8, 2002, six months after the 
data trawling operation began. Computerized cross-referencing ultimately winnowed 
the list down—after another year’s work—to 1,689 persons who were then “individually 
examined by regional police forces.”333 
Regional police investigated these persons through traditional methods, summon-
ing some for interrogation; questioning relatives and employers; and, in some cases, 
using wiretaps and other forms of surveillance.334 But while Germany’s data mining 
exercise consumed enormous resources, it appears that not a single terrorist suspect 
was identified.335 In 2006, Sebastien Müller of German Institute for Human Rights 
summarized what the police told him: 
  I was just at a conference with the federal police. They said that they did not find any terror-
ist suspects in the Rasterfahndung operation. They only found information relating to petty 
crimes—one or two thefts … also people without legal status in Germany or “immigration 
crimes.” None were linked to any kind of terrorist activities whatsoever.336
Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information Alexander 
Dix summarized the results of the data mining operation as follows:
  Rasterfahndung was without result. No arrests or conviction resulted from this ... Two people 
were arrested in Hamburg soon after 9/11, but they were not caught by Rasterfahndung. They 
were caught using conventional methods, such as telephone tapping.... Rasterfahndung took 
up an enormous amount of manpower and time within the police force…. It was an exercise 
in wasting their time. If this had had any visible success, I am sure that politicians and the 
police would have published it. One can only gather that the exercise was without result.337 
In the United States, which has also used extensive data mining, the results 
were much the same. Following 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) used 
immigration records to identify Arab and Muslim foreign nationals in the United 
States. On this basis, 80,000 individuals were required to register in the search for 
terrorists; another 8,000 were called in for FBI interviews; and more than 5,000 were 
locked up in preventive detention. Assessing the success of this effort, Georgetown 
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University law professor David Cole wrote, “In what has surely been the most aggres-
sive national campaign of ethnic profiling since World War II, the government’s record 
is 0 for 93,000.”338 The data mining did not produce a single conviction for a terrorist 
offense. 
The German Rasterfahndung database was reportedly erased in June and July 
2003,339 but only after effectively branding millions of people as inherently suspicious 
and potential “terrorists in disguise.”340 
On May 23, 2006, by a vote of 6 to 2, the Constitutional Court of Germany ruled 
that data mining is illegal in the absence of a “concrete danger” to security or lives.341 
The court expressed concern that the screening focused on a particular religious com-
munity (Muslims) and was therefore likely to have a “stigmatizing impact” on those con-
cerned and to “increase the risk of being discriminated against in working and everyday 
life.”342 In the court’s view, a general threat situation of the kind that has existed continu-
ously since 9/11 is not sufficient to warrant intrusions of this sort on personal data and 
privacy.343 Instead, the court held, “The assumptions and conclusions which form the 
basis for establishing the risk must moreover be based on further concrete facts, which 
point to the preparation or commission of terrorist attacks.”344 
In 2008, the German Bundestag adopted new legislation authorizing the federal 
German police to conduct data mining operations directly instead of relying on the 
police and legal authority at the state level (as occurred with the 2001–2003 data mining 
described above). Although there is no indication that German authorities propose to 
undertake further data mining of this sort, the new legislation enables federal authori-
ties to do so. By authorizing the federal authorities to carry out data mining on their 
own initiative, the 2008 law simultaneously concentrates all judicial scrutiny of data 
mining at the First Instance Court in Wiesbaden, thus depriving each state court of the 
power to exercise judicial review.345
Exploration of Data Mining by European Union Authorities and Agencies
In 2002 and again in 2004, German authorities proposed that data mining in the fight 
against terrorism be adopted across the European Union.346 Counterterrorism officials 
from a number of other EU member states reportedly opposed the proposal based on 
their judgment that data mining is ineffective.347 Nevertheless, in November 2002 the 
Council of the European Union—the EU’s supreme law-making body—issued a draft 
recommendation calling for enhanced cooperation in developing profiles to assist in 
the identification of terrorists, although it did not specify how the profiles might be 
applied.348 The recommendation stated that the terrorist profiles would be based on 
“a set of physical, psychological or behavioral variables, which have been identified, as 
typical of persons involved in terrorist activities and which may have some predictive 
value in that respect.”349
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The European Union Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights 
warned that the proposed terrorist profiles presented a major risk of discrimination. 
According to the Network of Independent Experts, “The development of these profiles 
for operational purposes can only be accepted in the presence of a fair, statistically 
significant demonstration of the relations between these characteristics and the risk 
of terrorism, a demonstration that has not been made at this time.”350 In response, the 
European Council informed parliamentarians in July 2003 that the development of ter-
rorist profiles would only be pursued at the EU level if there were a proven statistical 
link between the defined characteristics and the risk of terrorism.351
European civil liberties advocates are concerned about the trend of granting law 
enforcement authorities broad access to rapidly expanding EU databases, and worry 
that this is taking place without adequate protection of sensitive personal data.352 Major 
EU databases include the Visa Information System (VIS),353 the Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS I and SIS II),354 and Eurodac, an asylum database.355 EU authorities 
are proposing to create operational links between the VIS, SIS II, and Eurodac,356 and 
the European Commission recently presented proposals for the development of a new 
entry/exit system.357 Still pending but anticipated is a commission call for the creation 
of a European Union database of residence permits and passports. In June 2008, the 
European Council adopted a Council Decision allowing law enforcement access to VIS 
records for the prevention, detection, and investigation of terrorist offenses and other 
serious crime.358 
The European Parliament, and its Committee on Civil Liberties (LIBE) in particu-
lar, have consistently raised concerns about privacy rights and dangers of discrimination 
in the use and potential abuse of European databases. As the European community 
presses for full availability of data for law enforcement and the fight against terrorism, 
the LIBE Committee has made a series of recommendations on the need for clear and 
consistent data protection,359 which, among other things, would protect databases from 
being used in data mining exercises. 
Similarly, European Data Protection Supervisor Peter Hustinx has expressed 
concern at the breadth of the law enforcement exemption to protections of sensitive 
personal data.360 Hustinx raised serious concerns that a proposal for a Council Frame-
work Decision on the protection of personal data “significantly weakens” protections 
of personal data of European citizens.361 On November 27, 2008, the council adopted 
the Framework Decision, despite charges that it continues a “trend toward the lowest 
common data protection denominator” in law enforcement matters.362 The activities of 
security services and the police in matters of national security are excluded from the 
decision and thus from any effective regional data protection guarantees.363 Finally, still 
pending is a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name 
Records (PNR) for law enforcement purposes.364
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It is important to note that, while the systematic mining of data focused on ethnic 
or racial criteria amounts to ethnic profiling and is to be discouraged, this in no way 
undermines the need for the authorities to gather anonymous data for the purposes 
of documenting whether ethnic profiling is occurring. Despite widespread misunder-
standing, such documentation is consistent with prevailing European data protection 
norms, which: a) distinguish between individual, identifiable data (which, when refer-
ring to sensitive criteria such as race or religion, are properly restricted) and collective, 
anonymous data; and b) do not impede the good-faith collection and dissemination of 
racial or religious statistics for legitimate public interest objectives such as the tracking 
and redress of ethnic discrimination, including ethnic profiling.365
C.  Raids on Muslim Institutions and Harassment 
  of Muslim Businesses 
Just as raids in the context of ordinary crime prevention and detection appear to be used 
with fewer restrictions and greater aggression against minorities, highly publicized and 
aggressive counterterrorism raids targeting Muslims and immigrants are being used 
in many European countries. These raids single out Muslim- and immigrant-owned 
businesses, mosques and Muslim prayer halls, and the homes and offices of Mus-
lims— often with the broad aim of disrupting the support base and “breeding ground” 
for terrorism, rather than of arresting specific perpetrators or preempting an attack. 
This is not to say that raids themselves are an inappropriate tool of counterterror-
ism policing. When based on concrete and specific intelligence, raids are a central and 
important tool of counterterrorism operations. A surprise police intervention is often 
necessary to seize criminal suspects, evidence, contraband, or materials that may be 
used in an attack. Such raids are often used, appropriately, in the culmination of terror 
investigations. A raid based on concrete and specific information linking a particular 
individual to support for terrorism constitutes intelligence-based policing, not ethnic 
profiling. If, for example, officials have concrete evidence that weapons are being stored 
in a particular prayer room, raiding this site would not involve stereotypes, even though 
the target may be a mosque.
On the other hand, if a business is raided based on generalizations about the 
supposed religious beliefs, national origin, or ethnicity of those who own or frequent 
the business, ethnic profiling is involved. When driven by ethnic profiling, counterter-
rorism raids risk violating the rights of targeted communities while, correspondingly, 
undermining their underlying law-enforcement aims. The overwhelming majority of 
counterterrorism raids examined for this study appear to have been based on stereotypes 
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linking Muslims or immigrants to terrorism. They have no apparent effect in detecting 
terrorists. While authorities claim these raids disrupt possible terrorist networks, it is 
equally if not more likely that they simply anger and alienate Muslim communities and, 
if anything, reduce the likelihood that they will cooperate with police in counterterror-
ism investigations. The high visibility of and publicity accompanying many raids has 
spurred criticism by Muslim communities and civil liberties advocates that they are 
done for political effect rather than operational necessity.
Recently, Italian and German authorities have moved away from the use of large-
scale counterterrorism raids based on ethnic profiles. In Italy, law enforcement authori-
ties appear to rely increasingly on administrative measures and immigration law rather 
than explicit counterterrorism measures in their preventive actions. However, these 
actions are harder to track, as they are less transparent and provide fewer due process 
guarantees than counterterrorism measures undertaken under criminal law.  
France: Raids by “Regional Centers to Combat Radical Islam”
In France, Muslim-owned businesses and mosques have been subject to frequent raids, 
ostensibly aimed at disrupting the support base of “radical Islam” rather than at arrest-
ing actual terrorist suspects or preempting specific attacks. These have exacted a heavy 
toll on targeted communities while yielding no discernible law enforcement value.
The raids are coordinated by “regional centers to combat radical Islam” (pôles 
régionaux de lutte contre l’Islam radical)366 established by the French Ministry of the 
Interior in 2005 in each of France’s 22 metropolitan regions. Each center is headed by a 
representative of the Central Directorate of General Information (Direction Centrales des 
Renseignements Généraux, or RG) and works with representatives of a wide range of gov-
ernment agencies including police, public hygiene, public safety, revenue and taxation, 
and labor. The centers’ mandate is broad—to monitor, disrupt, and cut off the support 
base of “radical Islam” in France. In addition to raids and surveillance activities,367 the 
centers use administrative powers such as health or business regulations to impede and 
disturb businesses where “radical Islamists” are thought to meet or that are suspected 
of providing financial support to “radical Islamist networks.”368
Common targets of raids include fast food restaurants, cafes, call centers, book-
stores, security companies, and clothing stores. The raids typically involve officials of 
multiple government agencies as well as police and intelligence officials. In a typical 
raid, representatives of health, safety, tax, and labor agencies check a business’s compli-
ance with safety, health, and tax regulations, while police search the premises and check 
identity documents of everyone present. Anyone who cannot produce proof of identity 
is taken to the police station for verification. Individuals who cannot demonstrate legal 
residency face deportation. Businesses often face judicial or administrative penalties, 
in some cases resulting in their closure. 
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Raids by French authorities have adversely affected large numbers of people with 
no demonstrable counterterrorism results. According to official figures, in 2005 the 
regional centers conducted checks of 47 mosques and prayer halls, 473 businesses, and 
85 cafes and call centers. These resulted in 276 judicial penalties (reportedly unrelated 
to terrorism) and 310 administrative penalties.369 In 2005, in the greater Paris region 
alone, 88 raids were carried out involving 1,173 people, 185 of whom were taken into 
custody and 8 of whom were charged with judicial or administrative sanctions.370 Activi-
ties increased in the Paris region in 2006, with 93 raids carried out between January 1 
and May 15, 2006.371 
While these raids have yielded scant discernible benefit in countering terrorism, 
they have had a corrosive effect on the daily lives of French Muslims. Samy Debah, 
president of the nongovernmental organization Collective against Islamophobia in 
France (CCIF), described a typical raid: 
  In practice, they [French officials] arrive with numerous vehicles. They come at peak 
business hours. Some officials have uniforms; others wear ordinary clothes. They enter 
the business—health, customs, fraud, police … They don’t show their badges, they 
don’t identify themselves. If any officials show their badges it is the health and hygiene 
inspectors.372 
Debah also described a raid he witnessed at a friend’s halal take-out restaurant in a 
town on the outskirts of Paris. According to Debah, “the owner of the restaurant is a prac-
ticing Muslim who has a beard and prays daily, but has absolutely nothing to do with any 
sort of ‘radical movement.’”373 Debah recalled the evening the restaurant was raided:
  The manager called me when the officials arrived and I came immediately. There were six 
or eight cars and at least 10 officials. It was around 8:00 p.m., a busy time. I observed the 
manner that they behaved and I asked them questions. I saw that there were two officials 
from the intelligence services. I could identify them as they did not respond when I asked 
where they worked. The telephone rang; the employee wanted to answer the phone. One of 
the intelligence officials said, “No, turn off your phone and close down the shop.” I watched 
him [as] he went to the back of the restaurant. I asked what he was doing there. “Shut up,” 
he responded … The other intelligence official said, “Now, you keep quiet or we’ll shut down 
your business permanently.” I was torn between [wanting to protest] the illegal nature of their 
words and [my desire not to endanger] my friend. I said nothing further. The police asked 
everyone inside the restaurant to produce their identity documents. Those who didn’t have 
their documents with them were handcuffed and taken to the police station.374 
The raid concluded with an order requiring renovations to comply fully with 
health standards—and closing the restaurant until the renovations were completed. 
In this particular case, the burden was limited as the owner, having witnessed raids on 
dozens of local Muslim-owned businesses, had already started renovation work. 
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As their name suggests, the mandate of the “regional centers to combat radical 
Islam” is to target “radical Islam,” although the term is quite vague. Any place where 
officials believe “radical Islam” may be supported or spread becomes a legitimate site for 
surveillance and “disruption,” including raids. Official statements indicate that “radical 
Islam” is not limited to those who sympathize with the perspectives of terrorist organi-
zations, but is defined so broadly as to include moderate Muslims.375 
French officials argue that this is not the case. A senior French counterterrorism 
official said that only an extreme fringe of the Muslim population is targeted: 
  It is the fringe from which the terrorists of tomorrow are recruited. … There is a fringe of the 
population that can be tempted by violent radicalization. So we will show them that we are 
strong, that the state has the right to go everywhere. The idea is that they open halal butcher 
shops, call centers—and most are honest businesses—but some serve to support the cause, 
for instance in Algeria, or hire illegal workers. In that case, we are there.376
This official insisted that the “regional centers” do not base their work on 
stereotypes: 
  The goals of these regional centers are defined one or two months in advance. They decide in 
advance that they will check a particular halal butcher shop, a particular mosque, a particular 
call center. It is the RG that takes the lead in this, but they need to justify their goals. I receive 
memos about these goals and I have never seen one that says simply, “We are going to check 
that business because the owner has a beard.” It might say “the owner has contacts with other 
suspicious Salafists,” but never just because the person is a Salafist Muslim. There is always 
something else.377 
Many French Muslims are deeply skeptical of these claims and believe that their 
religious beliefs alone make them potential targets of the regional centers. Represen-
tatives of various Muslim organizations shared the view that the “regional centers” 
target not only practicing Muslims but also non-practicing Muslims. Boualam Aza-
houm, a spokesperson of Divercité, a human rights organization based in the Lyon 
area, expressed this view: 
  How can they see who is “Islamist?” They cannot. So who do they check? All Muslims. How 
can they tell the difference? They basically spend their time checking fast food restaurants 
and call centers in the poor suburbs.
Muslim-run businesses make up a large portion of commercial activity in Lyon’s 
poor suburbs, and many of them have been raided and have closed down as a result.378 
The clear perception in the community is that they are targeted solely on the basis of 
their religion, as the representative of one Muslim organization noted: 
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  In reality the notion of “radical Islam” is very broad. Praying, wearing a beard or a veil suffice 
to define you as radical. People are discriminated against because they are Muslims; officials 
check their businesses because they are Muslims.379 
This perception is widespread. At a July 2006 meeting of some twenty Islamic 
organizations from the Paris suburbs, representatives expressed their frustration and 
anger at the actions of the “regional centers.” One participant voiced the opinion of 
the group:
  People are saying that there’s no point in trying to do business…. Each time there’s a control—
either a tax audit, or labor, or health—you feel that Muslims are being singled out.380 
Italy
While more sporadic than in France, raids are also a key component of so-called “pre-
ventive antiterrorism” practices in Italy. Large-scale raids are typically conducted in the 
wake of terrorist attacks or during periods of heightened alert after bombings in other 
European countries. While heightened law enforcement activity is to be expected in 
this setting, the raids that ensue have been driven by stereotypes instead of legitimate 
intelligence, targeting Muslim- and immigrant-owned businesses, Muslim prayer halls, 
offices, and homes. These raids have resulted in the identification, round-up, and expul-
sion of illegal migrants. In combination with other counterterrorism tactics, such as 
frequent police checks and new regulations, they have also resulted in the closure of 
many Muslim- and immigrant-owned businesses—but there is scant if any indication 
that they have contributed to countering terrorism.
A nationwide series of raids on August 10, 2006 exemplifies the pattern. Imme-
diately after British officials announced that they had thwarted a plot to detonate “liquid 
bombs” on trans-Atlantic flights out of British airports on August 9, 2006,381 Italian 
police conducted a massive operation involving raids of mosques and informal Muslim 
prayer halls, Internet cafes, money-transfer offices, and call centers.382 The Italian Inte-
rior Ministry announced that the operations targeted “Islamic gathering places” and that 
this was “an extraordinary operation that followed the British anti-terror operation.”383 
The prime minister’s office announced that in the course of the day police raided a total 
of 1,272 locations and checked the identification of 4,178 individuals with the follow-
ing results: 114 individuals were issued deportation orders; 103 businesses were fined 
for administrative irregularities such as health or safety regulations; 111 people were 
reported for various crimes—none apparently involving terrorism; and 40 individuals 
were arrested—28 for immigration violations and 12 for unspecified “crimes against 
property.”384 Summing up the impact and results of these operations, Dacia Valent, 
spokeswoman of Italy’s Islamic Anti-Defamation League, protested that “[m]ore than 
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4,000 people were stopped and humiliated to allow police to arrest 12 chicken thieves 
and 28 clandestine immigrants.”385 
One year earlier, on August 12–13, 2005, raids targeting similar sites were con-
ducted across Italy a few weeks after terrorist bombing attacks on the London Under-
ground. Targets included Muslim-associated Internet cafes, money-transfer offices, 
call centers, and halal butcher shops. On that occasion also, the Ministry of Interior 
announced that the raids were targeting “Islamic meeting places.”386 According to the 
Interior Ministry, over the course of the two days, police checked 7,318 locations and 
interrogated over 32,000 people.387 These raids produced 701 deportation proceedings388 
and 141 arrests, two for having false documents and the rest for petty offenses.389 None 
of those arrested was charged with terrorist activity.390 
Italian officials have also carried out large-scale coordinated raids on the homes 
and offices of Muslims. On July 13, 2005—five days after the coordinated bombings on 
London subways—Italian newspaper headlines announced the detention of 174 people 
in a “nationwide sweep” aimed at suspected “Islamic militants.”391 The Interior Ministry 
announced, “The operation has been prepared for some time and confirms Italy has 
never lowered its guard in the face of terrorist risks.”392 Police raided 201 locations, 
with warrants to search for weapons and explosives. According to press reports, 423 
people were detained, over half of whom were released following an identity check 
and questioning.393 It is not clear what happened to the rest but a statement by Interior 
Minister Giuseppe Pisanu indicated that they were not charged with terrorist activity: 
“I’m not saying that we have seized terrorists. It is a preventive operation in high-risk 
environments.”394 
Italian officials have also reportedly conducted smaller-scale checks against immi-
grant-owned call centers and Internet cafes. These may not constitute raids per se, but 
represent a high degree of law enforcement attention that appears to be targeting not 
only Muslims, but also immigrants more broadly. The Pakistani owner of a telecom-
munications shop in Desio, in northern Italy, told Justice Initiative researchers that 
his store is checked two or three times a month by police officers. “When the police 
come here, they check all the Pakistani shops,” he said. “Actually, they check all of the 
immigrant businesses,” his colleague added.395 At another Muslim-owned telecommu-
nications shop in Milan, the owner said that every month or two the police arrive and 
check the identity documents of everyone in the shop. “People are afraid to come here,” 
he commented.396 
Italian law enforcement in the Lombardy region has also targeted Muslim-
owned businesses for aggressive enforcement of new business regulations that apply 
specifically to small telecommunications businesses, many of which are Muslim-owned. 
S.M. Arshad, president of an umbrella organization representing 33 Pakistani commu-
nity associations, said:
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  Five to six percent of the Pakistani community in Italy owns small businesses, mostly tele-
communication, some grocery stores, some import-export. Officials have raided a lot of these 
businesses. They have also created complications for them. If you have a small telecommuni-
cations shop, you need 12 square meters for people to wait. They also want these businesses 
to have two bathrooms … Those who don’t have the twelve square meters and a certain 
distance between telephone cables—they have to close.397
Another Muslim in Italy, identified as N.R., also expressed his frustration over 
these regulations: 
  We have to build a new bathroom. Only telephone and Internet businesses have to do this. 
These are for the most part immigrant-owned businesses. In Milan there must be about 850 
telecommunications shops and maybe 50 are not immigrant-owned. We have a year to make 
the changes, and if we are unable to do so, we have to shut down. The cost of a bathroom is 
€5,000. I will have to sell my shop.398 
N.R. pointed out that between these regulations and new regulations requiring 
businesses to ask customers for personal documents, it is very difficult to operate. 
“Many businesses are closing. There are about 12 shops in this neighborhood, and four 
or five have closed in the last few months.”399 One Muslim representative who monitors 
this issue estimates that as many as 80 percent of small telecommunications businesses 
have closed down in the last years.400
It appears that large-scale raids have been used less in Italy in recent years: no 
such raids were reported in 2007 or 2008. But large-scale identity checks targeting 
Muslims under general security measures and immigration law continue, and Italian 
authorities also continue to use administrative measures targeting immigrant-owned 
businesses, with an ongoing pattern of inspections of immigrant-owned call centers and 
Internet cafes, and the closing down of those businesses that do not comply with the 
regulations. However, on October 22, 2008, the Constitutional Court of Italy repealed 
the regulations pertaining specifically to call centers, on the grounds that the regula-
tions violated a number of constitutional provisions.401 The practical effect of this ruling 
on Muslim- and immigrant-owned businesses remains to be seen.
Administrative measures and new laws are also targeting mosques, closing 
down some existing mosques and impeding the construction of new ones.402 In July 
2008, authorities closed a large mosque in central Milan. Interior Minister Roberto 
Maroni reportedly stated that the decision to close the mosque was based on public 
order concerns, as worshippers regularly spilled out onto the street.403 Worshippers 
are temporarily being allowed to pray in a local stadium, where they are charged 
for entry.404 
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In September 2008, the Northern League submitted a bill to parliament that 
would limit the construction of new mosques and Islamic cultural centers.405 The law 
would require any new worship site to be authorized by the local county government, 
following a public consultation. In addition, any new mosque would need to be built 
or established at a distance of more than one kilometer from an existing church or 
synagogue. In December 2008, following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, and 
the subsequent arrest in Italy of two Moroccan men on terrorism-related charges, Ital-
ian politicians from the Northern League publicly announced that they would propose 
legislation to freeze the building of all new mosques in an effort to curb terrorism.406 
Germany
Since 9/11 German police have conducted regular and often massive raids of 
mosques, and Muslim organizations and businesses. German officials note that a judi-
cial warrant is required before a raid can be conducted and say that that every raid has 
a case-specific evidentiary basis, linking it to ongoing investigations of specific persons 
or organizations suspected of involvement in terrorist activities or of supporting such 
activities.407 Nonetheless, in some cases the weakness of the factual basis and the choice 
of a raid as the appropriate response raise concerns about whether stereotypes linking 
Islam, or certain streams of Islamic practice, to terrorism influenced the selection of 
targets and tactics and crossed the line from intelligence-based law enforcement into 
ethnic profiling.
A raid on an Islamic center in July 2004 exemplifies these ambiguities and the 
concerns they raise. On July 11, 2004, some 120 policemen raided the Islamic Center 
Mosque in Frankfurt searching for violent videos. German officials say the raid was 
ordered after a nine-year-old claimed that she and other children had been shown vio-
lent videos calling for “a holy war against non-believers.” One of the videos, she said, 
showed a beheading.408 During the raid officials seized computer hard-drives, discs, 
videos, and documents, and shortly afterwards told the press that they found a video 
showing a beheading.409 Authorities later acknowledged, however, that the seized mate-
rials had no link to terrorism.410 
While the nine-year-old’s report merited follow-up by the police, it seems doubtful 
that the testimony of a single child would prompt such an intrusive response were it 
not for stereotypes linking Islam to terrorism. In the view of some Muslims, a simple 
visit and questioning by police would serve to confirm or allay suspicions without the 
impact on the mosque entailed in the raid. Mosque members saw the raid as highly 
discriminatory, and told journalists that it was an insult and an overreaction to an 
unconfirmed allegation. A member of the mosque’s executive board said the action 
was too aggressive:411 
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  Probably at the moment, every Muslim is under suspicion. It is the right of the police to 
search but not to overdo it in such an aggressive way. Somebody hears something from a 
child and then the police arrive with 200 men. There were other ways of finding out if some-
thing like that was shown or not.412
Additional raids took place during 2005. In January, 800 police officers took part 
in raids on 50 locations associated with Muslims, including mosques and Muslim-
owned businesses. The raids resulted in the arrest of 11 people, reportedly for terrorist 
financing and forging documents. However, police told the press that they found no 
evidence of planning for an act of terrorism. It is not clear if any of these 11 indi-
viduals ultimately faced terror-related charges. In September 2005, 500 police officers 
conducted raids at Internet cafes and call centers in 20 cities in the state of Hesse; 
they questioned more than 1,000 persons and arrested 38, none on terror offenses. 
Of those arrested, 33 had no residence permit and three were sought in connection 
with other offenses.413
In 2005, police raided the Milaner Rami Mosque in Berlin, after the mosque was 
visited by a businessman believed to be involved in illegal financial transactions. Burhan 
Kesici, a Muslim leader in Berlin, described the raid:414
  They searched one of our mosques. The search warrant indicated that this businessman had 
been to the mosque and come in with packages. We asked the police if this was really the 
correct reason—it’s normal that a businessman comes to a mosque to sell books if he can. 
But it’s not a reason to send police to check a mosque. They came with 20 or 30 officers. They 
searched the whole mosque, including the kitchen, offices, and toilets. What was interesting 
was that the bookshop wasn’t searched very much.415
Officials have described the purpose of the September 2005 raids as “pre-emp-
tively combating criminal structures.”416 Raids, being highly intrusive and sometimes 
frightening, are an inappropriate tactic for broad-brush efforts to prevent terrorism, 
particularly because they almost inevitably ensnare large numbers of innocent people. 
No charges or convictions for terror-related offenses are reported to have come from 
these actions. 
The 2005 raids stand in contrast with more recent German counterterrorism 
raids, such as the September 5, 2007 raid that detained three persons and seized bomb-
making equipment, following a six-month investigation.417 Here, the use of a raid at the 
culmination of an intelligence-based investigation demonstrates a targeted and correct 
application of police powers. Another raid on 12 locations conducted on November 
25, 2008, was based on an investigation of the Internet activities of the suspects and 
resulted in two arrests.418
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German courts are also scrutinizing police actions and challenging some counter-
terrorism raids. On November 22, 2007, a court in Gelsenkirchen ruled that a January 
16, 2004 raid on a mosque in the town of Bochum had infringed worshippers’ rights 
to freedom of association and religion. During the raid, police detained and interro-
gated 227 persons, some for over seven hours, violating the principle of proportionality 
required of police actions. The court also found that the police action did not adhere 
to judicial norms, and had not demonstrated the presence of a “concrete danger” as 
required by law for this type of action.419 
 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Raids
If the raids described in this section were intended to apprehend terrorist suspects or 
to seize material evidence of terrorist activity, they did not succeed. This is hardly sur-
prising, as raids based on ethnic profiling rarely produce positive results. On the other 
hand, raids based on intelligence often produce arrests and convictions on terrorism 
charges and seizures of evidence for trials. Police actions based on specific intelligence, 
such as Operation Alberich in Germany or Operation Crevice Seven in the United 
Kingdom (described in the next chapter),420 often succeed. Unfortunately, many more 
raids have cast a wide net, targeting religious communities based on little more than 
generalizations. At best, such raids have produced arrests for petty offenses, immigra-
tion violations, and noncompliance with regulatory requirements. 
Although raids have produced few if any measurable counterterrorism results, 
some officials claim they serve a broader aim. According to French officials, raids do 
not necessarily uncover acts of terrorism, but function instead to deter any such activ-
ity in the first place. The harm associated with these raids is recognized and accepted, 
as Alain Chouet, former head of France’s external intelligence agency, indicated in an 
interview with Le Figaro: 
  One cannot quite imagine Anglo-Saxon countries imitating our tactic of harassment, some-
times without real elements of proof. Sometimes it’s a bit border-line, but it upsets the 
networks, prevents them from taking action.421
This type of claim is inherently hard to assess, as it poses the problem of how 
to measure something that did not happen. How can one know if in fact an act of ter-
rorism might have been prevented by a raid on a mosque or Muslim-owned business? 
What is known, however, is that such raids have exacted a terrible toll on Europe’s 
Muslims, who have been collectively branded as a threat to public safety. This has often 
been compounded by the high levels of publicity surrounding many raids. 
Indeed, some critics and certainly many Muslims believe that—as with mass 
identity checks and other highly visible counterterrorism actions—political and police 
8 2    E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M  S I N C E  9 / 1 1
authorities undertake many raids primarily for their effect on public opinion. If this is 
the case, officials are playing on and reinforcing existing social prejudices and stereo-
types. To do so is short-sighted and counter-productive, particularly when there are 
many alternatives to raids that do not carry the same risks of public stigmatization. 
D.  Arrest and Imprisonment
Important arrests of suspected terrorists have been made across Europe since 9/11422 
and the region is without doubt safer as a result. Yet there are substantial grounds 
for concern that vast numbers of other arrests have been based on ethnic profiling 
rather than reliable grounds for suspicion, and that such arrests have not contributed 
to greater security. 
Arrests of Muslims during terror investigations, as well as extended detention 
during ongoing investigations, often appear to rely upon a combination of weak cir-
cumstantial evidence and suspicion based on religious practice, country of origin, or 
ethnicity. In effect, this form of ethnic profiling casts a prima facie presumption of guilt 
on Muslims targeted in terrorism investigations. These persons are required to prove 
their innocence when the case against them relies heavily not on what they did but on 
who they are and on generalizations about their religion.
There is cause for concern that the ethnic profiling described below is becoming 
more prevalent in a number of EU member states. The trend toward a decrease in some 
of the more overt and highly visible forms of ethnic profiling (such as mass controls 
outside of mosques and large-scale raids on Muslim businesses and places of worship), 
does not reflect a decrease in all forms of ethnic profiling. Instead, the trend reflects 
increased reliance on non-judicial procedures to conduct “preventive antiterrorism” 
measures resulting in the detention, and in some cases expulsion, of individuals. In 
many cases, individuals are unaware of the evidence against them and have little oppor-
tunity to challenge the reliance on stereotypes about their religious practice, ethnicity, 
and national origin that in effect substitute for probative evidence. 
France 
In recent years, particularly in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, French authorities 
have made extensive use of broad legal powers423 to detain terrorist suspects based on 
ethnic profiling. The majority of terrorist suspects in France are arrested, detained, and 
sentenced based on a pre-9/11 law (known as AMT or association de malfaiteurs en 
relation avec une enterprise terroriste) that penalizes participation in a group or associa-
tion formed for the purpose of preparing a terrorist act.424 In practice, the law means 
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individuals can be detained without proof of their involvement in the planning of a 
terrorist act or even a precise plan for the execution of a terrorist act.425 
French law enforcement authorities lacking specific evidence of terrorist activity 
thus can fall back on their power to bring AMT charges, and data suggest they have 
readily done so. While the law predates 9/11,426 its use has intensified since then. Offi-
cial statistics indicate that of a total of 358 persons detained in antiterrorism operations 
in September 2005, for example, 300 were charged solely under the terrorist association 
provision of the AMT.427 
AMT counterterrorism investigations typically begin with an extensive mapping 
of networks of individuals suspected on the basis of domestic or foreign intelligence 
information of terrorist activity. Police and intelligence officials identify a suspect’s 
“network” based on information obtained in his or her address book and through sur-
veillance. Anyone who has had contact with the initial suspect is a potential suspect:428 
family members, friends, colleagues, acquaintances, neighbors, those attending the 
same mosque, someone encountered in a bar, someone who has shaken the suspect’s 
hand or exchanged a few words with him in the street.429
While law enforcement officials understandably want to interview people they 
believe possess information about terrorist suspects, in many cases police and investiga-
tive judges have taken law enforcement action implicating fundamental rights—includ-
ing arrests and detention—on tenuous evidentiary grounds.430 Of particular relevance 
to this study, many individuals targeted for law enforcement action are practicing Mus-
lims, and the nature of their religious observance appears to play a determining role 
in their arrest. 
Counterterrorism enforcement actions, including arrests and detention, often 
cast a wide net beyond the initial suspects. Evidence leading to the arrest of “related 
suspects” is based on associations, including praying at a mosque considered to be 
radical or possessing “Islamist” literature. A senior French counterterrorism official 
used a hypothetical example to illustrate how ethnic profiling factors into the pursuit 
of related suspects:
  The first [to consider] is the babysitter, the next is the baker, the next is a Muslim man
—simply an ordinary religious Muslim—and the next is a Muslim who was in Afghanistan. 
The babysitter and baker will be easily eliminated and the Muslim that has also been to 
Afghanistan will be included. It is with respect to the other Muslim that things become 
problematic, and where a possibility of discrimination arises. The investigative judge 
will need to make a decision.431
Another high-ranking police official involved in counterterrorism described the 
process of selecting individuals for follow-up action among all those persons in contact 
with a prime suspect:
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  The vegetable vendor holds little interest. The chemist is more interesting; the electrician is 
interesting; a person who is Muslim or whose family is from Afghanistan is interesting; a 
person who has taken a trip to Pakistan or Syria is interesting. Imagine a ladder of “danger-
ousness:” people start at the bottom and then certain empirical criteria allow them to move 
up a rung.
In his words, criteria for suspicion might include the following: 
  The personal history and skills necessary to carry out a terrorist act [or] certain behaviors that 
differentiate a person from the rest. For example, the fact of going to the mosque every day 
at 5:00 p.m. This is not so common, so this behavior can differentiate a person; even within 
this community, everyone does not go to the mosque every day, not European Muslims. … 
  Operational logic prevents us from keeping everyone under surveillance.… We look who 
the person knows… If they know 15 people who are good Muslims, we don’t care. But if 
someone’s sister and brother are “Tabligh,”432 that is more interesting…We basically watch 
for criteria that differentiate a person, and these criteria include a person’s skills, behavior 
(such as trips to certain countries or going to the mosque every day), and judicial history.433 
While this official spoke of factors that may lead authorities to place an individual 
under surveillance, similar criteria have led to arrest and preventive detention, sometimes 
for extended periods. French defense lawyer William Bourdon described the fact 
pattern of an AMT case he was defending. A young Muslim man had allowed a cousin 
to store a bag at his house while the cousin went to Chechnya to fight. Bourdon’s 
client was intellectually curious about armed Islam, but not a practicing Muslim. 
Despite the lack of any material evidence of terrorist activity, the young man was kept 
in provisional detention for a year before eventually being found innocent of terrorist 
association at trial.434
In another case, Q.C., a young Muslim teacher active in civil society, was surprised 
to find the police at his door one morning, shortly after 9/11. The counterterrorism offi-
cials who interrogated Q.C. told him that the police station of Hauts-de-Seine outside 
Paris had alerted them, and that they had him and three others who were arrested at 
the same time under surveillance.435
  They took me to the station. On the way, when we were on the highway at a turn, they said, 
“You know Zorro, we can wipe you out here. We have all the rights, so if you cause us prob-
lems we’ll take you down and throw you away. We have unlimited powers.” When we got 
to the police station, they put me in the interrogation room. They took my photo and my 
fingerprints. They called me “Zorro.” They said, “Zorro, your friends sold you, they told us 
everything.” They asked me what I did. They brought me my old passports. They said I had 
been to New York. They spoke rudely. They asked questions about my life, my earnings, my 
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rent. They said that I had been under surveillance for some time. They let me go around 
6.00 p.m. the same evening.
Ultimately, Q.C. was able to find out the reasons for his arrest:
  In fact, they had my cousin under surveillance. He had taken a trip to Ukraine. They had 
monitored him upon his return.…I rarely see my cousin, but they have to find a network and 
a link, so they create a relationship from diverse elements that in fact are not related. There 
had been an armed robbery on high security vehicles. They said that this money had gone 
to buy arms in the Ukraine and bring them back to Paris to carry out attacks. They had no 
concrete elements to support this hypothesis. I think the reality is that after 9/11 they wanted 
to show that they were doing something; they have to carry out some arrests.436 
French law enforcement authorities often regard religion or the nature of reli-
gious practice as a critical factor justifying arrest.437 Jacques Debray, an experienced 
defense lawyer in terrorist association cases, commented: 
  They are asked if they are religious, how they practice their religion, how many times they 
pray, whether they follow Ramadan…When you see this, you wonder.…There really is a stig-
matization of Muslims… It is on the edge of a caricature: Muslim equals fanatic equals 
terrorist.438 
Nizar Sassi was detained at the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for two and 
a half years following his arrest in Afghanistan—where he had gone for his summer 
vacation— shortly after 9/11. French police arrested him immediately upon his release 
from Guantanamo and return to France. Sassi was charged with terrorist association 
and imprisoned for 18 months while awaiting trial. Sassi, who says that he is not at all 
religious, described the questions he was asked by French officials: 
  My departure absolutely had to have a religious connotation for them….For them, I simply 
had to be religious to go there [to Afghanistan]. During the investigation they asked me all 
sorts of questions about my religion. Everything was asked. “What stream do you belong to? 
What do you think about this stream, that stream?” But me, I don’t have a stream, I am a 
Muslim by culture.439
Sassi was convicted on terror association (AMT) charges and sentenced to four 
years, but immediately released for time already served.
In another case in 2005, G.H. was arrested with her husband. She was held in 
police cells for the 96-hour maximum period allowed and was repeatedly interrogated, 
with questions focusing primarily on religion:
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  They asked about religion, a lot about religion. What were my impressions of certain pas-
sages in the Koran. Which verses speak about the veil? Does my god tell me to kill people? 
Do I agree with people who do jihad? They said that I could leave my husband, change my 
life. “Look how beautiful you are without your veil,” they said.440 
Religion was also the focus of the interrogations of 17 people arrested in a highly 
publicized raid on June 19, 2006. The raid targeted Dhaou Meskine, imam of the 
mosque of Clichy-sous-Bois, a well-respected figure in Muslim civil society and founder 
of France’s first private Muslim high school. The other detainees were also connected to 
the school and Muslim NGOs. They all were released after four days of detention and 
interrogations.441 One of the detainees described police questioning:
  “Are you Muslim” they asked. The questions were about the faith of each of us. To what 
degree we practice the religion. They asked my wife, “Do you pray five times a day?” Ques-
tions of that sort. “What is your affinity with respect to religion?”442
These accounts of arrest and interrogation in France illustrate authorities’ preoc-
cupation with Islamic religion, reliance on generalizations about religious belief and 
use of AMT in a manner which appears to facilitate ethnic profiling.
Italy 
Since 9/11, Italian police have arrested and detained and subsequently released with-
out charge men from countries with majority Muslim populations, such as Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Morocco, and Egypt, on charges of terrorist-related crimes. Authorities 
have often announced arrests of “terrorist suspects” with considerable fanfare, claiming 
that these demonstrate their success in the fight against terrorism443—only to release 
most of the suspects later for lack of evidence of criminal conduct. 
During the period between 9/11 and early 2006, there were over 200 highly 
publicized arrests of migrants on charges of terrorism444 but only two of these resulted 
in convictions for terrorism-related crimes.445 Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, those arrested on suspicion of terrorism are eventually found not to be terrorists 
but ordinary immigrants, and are quietly released.446
Italian authorities have the responsibility to control migration, including through 
legal detention and deportation, but this should be done on grounds of immigration 
law, not counterterrorism. Counterterrorism charges must be supported with proba-
tive evidence of involvement in terrorism. To imply, with no grounds for the assertion, 
that migrants are potential terrorists, fuels xenophobic and racist public attitudes and 
encourages excessive law enforcement responses.
In May 2002, Italian police arrested three Egyptian fishermen on suspicion of 
plotting to bomb a U.S. Army cemetery south of Rome. One of the arrests was a sen-
sational night operation at sea using helicopters and police boats.447 The three were 
E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  T H E  E U R O P E A N  U N I O N    8 7
charged with “subversive association aimed at international terrorism.”448 Police stated 
that they seized explosives and maps highlighting the cemetery in the men’s apartment 
along with a map of Rome’s Fiumicino airport and maps highlighting the location of 
some McDonald’s restaurants. The men denied the allegations and said that they used 
the explosives for fishing.449 They were detained in a maximum security jail for a year 
and a half before being acquitted by an Italian court.450 According to journalist and 
security expert Carlo Bonini, the men were simply fishermen, and he alleges that the 
case against them was constructed by the Italian secret service.451
On August 19, 2002, four Moroccan factory workers and a retired Italian art his-
torian were arrested in Bologna’s Basilica of St. Petronius. The men, who were being 
watched and wiretapped, reportedly videotaped a fresco and made disparaging remarks 
(in Berber) about Christianity and statements to the effect that the church should be 
“brought down.”452 The fresco is a controversial 15th century work depicting Moham-
med in hell being devoured by demons. On August 22, a judge ordered the release of 
all the men due to insufficient evidence.453 
Illegal migrants trying to reach Italy by boat have been arrested and held as ter-
rorists for extended periods in detention rather than being processed and deported as 
illegal migrants. In early August 2002, 15 Pakistanis traveling on false passports were 
arrested after the coast guard intercepted their boat off the coast of Sicily.454 The men 
were first held for a month in a detention camp for illegal immigrants, before being 
charged with conspiracy to carry out terrorist and subversive acts and imprisoned in the 
city of Caltinisetta, in Sicily.455 The chief of police of Caltanissetta told the media that the 
evidence indicated links to Al Qaeda.456 Media stories also reported that key evidence 
included “coded notation” found on the ship. But after 10 months in jail, a magistrate 
ordered the men’s release finding that they were simply clandestine immigrants with 
no links to Al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization.457 The coded message turned 
out to be the name of their town of origin in Pakistan.458
Italian law enforcement authorities are using powers granted by antiterrorism 
legislation known as the Pisanu Law to preventively expel suspects.459 Expulsion does 
not require a terrorism-related charge or conviction, but is permitted in cases where 
there are well-grounded reasons to believe that the person concerned may favor terror-
ist organizations and activities. Only administrative courts may hear appeals against 
such expulsion orders, and the lodging of an appeal does not suspend the expulsion.460 
Authorities use this procedure in cases where sufficient evidence to press criminal 
charges is lacking. Instead, an individual’s religious practice, ethnic or national ori-
gin, and attendance at certain mosques may play an important role in assessments by 
officials of his support for or involvement in terrorist organizations or activities. This 
reliance on religion and ethnicity provides cause for concern that ethnic profiling may 
form the basis for many actions taken under the Pisanu Law. 
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United Kingdom
Muslim organizations and human rights groups have criticized the British govern-
ment for the excessive use of arrest powers in a counterterrorism campaign that they 
argue stigmatized the entire Muslim community. From 9/11 to mid-2004, more than 
600 people were arrested under antiterrorism legislation, the vast majority of them 
Muslims. As of August 2004, fewer than 100 of those arrested had been charged with 
terrorism offenses and 15 had been convicted.461 A study of 11 of these convictions found 
that only 3 involved Muslims.462 Some 200 of those arrested were charged with offenses 
unrelated to terrorism, while more than half were released without charge.
Based on the discrepancy between the rate of arrests and convictions under anti-
terrorism laws, and the discrepancy between the religious background of those arrested 
and those convicted, British human rights groups have raised serious concerns about 
excessive and discriminatory use of arrest powers against Muslims.463 They raised addi-
tional concerns about the extensive media coverage of terrorist arrests, compared to the 
lack of attention when detainees are subsequently released without charge. The Islamic 
Human Rights Commission argued that a misleading impression was created by gov-
ernment figures that failed to distinguish between convictions of Muslims compared 
to non-Muslims, particularly those convicted for Irish terrorism.464
In April 2004, leaks to the media about police raids in Manchester—the leaks 
apparently came from senior political figures—resulted in widespread coverage of alle-
gations that Iraqi Kurds were planning to bomb high profile targets, including the Old 
Trafford, the football stadium of Manchester United.465 The Greater Manchester Police 
confirmed details of the leaks to reporters, and identified the 10 people detained as Iraqi 
Kurds. All ten detainees were later released without charge, and it emerged that they 
were keen Manchester United fans who kept information about the stadium among 
other football memorabilia in their apartments. The Greater Manchester Police later 
acknowledged that this had done severe damage to their relations with Kurdish and 
other minority communities.466
In May 2009, the U.K. Home Office released new figures on terrorism arrests 
(excluding Northern Ireland). These statistics show that from September 11, 2001 to 
March 31, 2008 there were 1,471 arrests for terrorism (an average of 227 a year since 
2002–2003).467 Fifty six percent (819) of those arrested were released without charge; 
35 percent (521) were charged with an offense; and nine percent (131) faced alternative 
actions such as immigration proceedings. Of the 521 people charged, 65 percent were 
considered to be terror-related, though 222 were charged under terrorism legislation, 
while 118 faced charges under other legislation (such as conspiracy to murder).468 These 
terrorism-related cases had a conviction rate of around 60 percent.469 Both the rate of 
charging and of convictions has remained broadly stable over the period covered by the 
Home Office figures.470 These statistics indicate a fairly targeted use of terror arrests, 
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although the fact that one third of terrorist prisoners were on remand indicates that, 
in this number of cases at least, the implicated persons do not pose any immediate 
threat.471
Assessing the Effectiveness of Arrest and Imprisonment
French officials have defended the arrest and detention of innocent people as side 
effects of a highly effective approach, and regularly point out that despite many threats, 
France has not suffered a terror attack since 1996. A 2006 government white paper 
describes policing based on terrorist association as the cornerstone of a system that 
can “repress structures that support the authors of attacks or accomplices, and also 
prevent attacks that are in preparation.”472 According to this logic, extensive arrests for 
terrorist association help prevent terrorist attacks by disrupting terrorists’ logistical and 
organizational support. This support is believed to come from family, friends, and other 
individuals in the community. Counterterrorism operations aim to “give a good kick to 
the anthill” or “dry out” the milieu in which terrorists may operate.473 A French police 
officer described the reasoning: 
  Above all terrorists need logistical support. Those arrested often are “good guys.” For instance, 
someone whose sister is married to someone who is part of the Tabligh—Mustapha; if Mus-
tapha comes to visit, he needs somewhere to stay. The goal when we want to neutralize is 
to create difficulties in their base of operations. We will hit the logistics. So, we will detain 
Mustapha and then when we release him say, “Take your suitcase and get out of here.” The 
only goal is to get them not to seek problems with the French justice system. Ninety-seven 
percent of Muslims are good citizens. Perhaps he is obliged to house Mustapha, if he doesn’t 
have good reasons to say no. But the next time Mustapha comes, he can say, “Last time 
I spent 6–8 hours in detention,” then there will be a reason not to house him.474
 
French security authorities know that this approach results in the arrest and 
detention of innocent people (although they do not release any statistics), but view it 
as an unfortunate if inevitable consequence of preventive action.475 This assessment 
fails to consider both the damage done to law enforcement relations with Muslim com-
munities in France and the possibility of using other less intrusive measures to obtain 
information prior to arrest. 
Arresting a person is a serious step and, in accordance with European law, it is 
permissible only “on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it 
is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after 
having done so.” (ECHR, Art. 5(1)). Many detainees are released without charge, some 
after only short periods of detention and interrogation. But even a short-term arrest 
causes enormous stress and anxiety, social embarrassment and stigma, and generates 
a police record. In some cases, detainees have been held in pretrial detention for 
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as much as a year and half prior to acquittal and release. In many other cases, those 
detained are illegal migrants who have nothing to do with terrorism, but who are 
deported anyway. 
Furthermore, media coverage of arrests is extensive, while releases generally war-
rant little attention. Too often, the publicity around arrests reinforces generalizations 
equating immigrants or the descendants of immigrants with potential terrorists, and 
frequently this appears to be a deliberate policy. In this way, public perceptions linking 
immigrants with terrorism are created, confirmed, or strengthened. 
Given the serious harm done to those arrested and the paucity of convictions on 
terrorism charges, the use of arrests as an early-phase counterterrorism prevention 
strategy is clearly inappropriate. Arrest is a power that should be grounded in evi-
dence. Arrests of religious or ethnic minorities for the purpose of sending a message or 
purportedly deterring others, and absent reasonable suspicion of involvement in crime, 
is improper. 
However, there is some evidence that the use of arrests may be becoming more 
targeted and efficient over time as police and intelligence authorities in the European 
Union develop greater intelligence on terrorist networks. This should be accompanied 
by a more nuanced and cautious approach to public relations and the sharing of infor-
mation with the media about arrests and releases. The more targeted use of arrests, 
while a welcome development, does not result from the adoption of increased account-
ability mechanisms or greater oversight. Thus, in the event of another serious terrorist 
attack, there is little guarantee that a “wide net” approach in the use of arrest powers 
might not be adopted again.
E.  Identifying Individuals in the Process 
  of Radicalizing 
Much of the ethnic profiling described so far in this report is based on stereotypes asso-
ciated with the 9/11 attackers and those responsible for the 2004 Madrid bombings, 
emphasizing their status as foreign-born Muslim men. Since 2005, however, Euro-
pean authorities have been increasingly concerned about the phenomenon of so-called 
“home-grown terrorists” born in Europe. This has produced a distinctive set of ethnic 
profiling practices, which are the focus of this section. 
In contrast to the Middle Eastern nationals who bombed the World Trade Cen-
ter on 9/11 and the Moroccans who bombed Madrid’s Atocha train station on March 
11, 2004, the London Underground bombers of July 7, 2005 were British nationals, 
as were a majority of those arrested on August 9, 2006, in connection with another 
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attempted terrorist attack in the United Kingdom. Mohammed Bouyeri, the man 
who murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam on November 2, 
2004 in what is perceived as the Netherlands’ first jihadi terrorist attack, was a dual 
Dutch–Moroccan national. 
Increasingly concerned about European nationals who become “radicalized,” anti-
terrorism officials across the EU have been keen to identify and intervene early in the 
process by which an individual comes to sympathize with, support, or actively engage 
with terrorist groups or activities. These early prevention efforts are in some circum-
stances driven by the theory of “radicalization.” 
Radicalization is now a central focus of European Union counterterrorism 
policy.476 In the view of Rik Coolsaet, a Belgian member of the EU’s Network of Inde-
pendent Experts on Fundamental Rights, “It is nowadays a common thread within EU 
counterterrorism thinking and action to single out this radicalization process as the 
main focal point in combating terrorism.”477 
In some respects, the focus on radicalization has brought welcome attention to 
such root causes as discrimination and the failed integration of immigrant and minority 
communities into mainstream society. More problematic, however, are law enforcement 
efforts to identify proximate factors contributing to radicalization which have led to 
a form of ethnic profiling in which the nature of religious practice becomes the pri-
mary criterion in determining suspicion. Indeed, as the concept of radicalization takes 
hold, there is a clear risk that it will lead to increased ethnic profiling of Muslims 
across Europe. 
While the Netherlands and Germany have led the way in articulating theories of 
radicalization, in November 2006 the head of the United Kingdom’s MI5 intelligence 
service, Eliza Manningham-Buller, stated:
 
  We need to be alert to attempts to radicalize and indoctrinate our youth and to seek to counter 
it. Radicalizing elements within communities are trying to exploit grievances for terrorist 
purposes; it is the youth who are being actively targeted, groomed, radicalized and set on a 
path that frighteningly quickly could end in their involvement in mass murder of their fellow 
U.K. citizens, or their early death in a suicide attack or on a foreign battlefield.478
In a welcome note of caution, she went on to warn that a careful approach is needed 
based on an understanding of the “differences between non-Western and Western life-
styles” that should not confuse fundamentalism with terrorism or treat people with 
suspicion simply on the basis of their religion. This caution was exhibited in an internal 
report by MI5’s behavioral science unit which, based on an analysis of hundreds of case 
studies, concluded that there is no single pathway to violent extremism, and that a large 
number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly. In fact, the 
9 2    E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M  S I N C E  9 / 1 1
analysis is reported to state that “a well-established religious identity actually protects 
against violent radicalization.”479
Fortunately, ongoing research and EU policy recommendations have focused on 
the need to address the root causes of violent radicalization rather than resort to eth-
nic profiling. An Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation has been established by the 
European Commission in order to provide policy advice. On May 15, 2008 this group 
submitted a report to the European Commission on “Radicalisation Processes Lead-
ing to Acts of Terrorism.” The report makes a clear distinction between “radical” reli-
gious beliefs and a willingness to resort to violence and recommends that the European 
Commission’s work on radicalization should limit itself to “violent radicalization” or 
“extremism.”480 
Theories of Radicalization and the Slippery Slope into Extremist Violence
In practice, however, radicalization theories demonstrate a dangerous tendency to con-
flate an individual’s adoption of a conservative or “fundamentalist” practice of Islam 
with a willingness to resort to violence. Many radicalization theories rely on a “slippery 
slope” paradigm which posits a radicalization continuum along which individuals are 
believed to slide—gradually or rapidly—from increasing religious devotion, through 
conservative or “fundamentalist” streams of Islam, toward supporting terrorist activities 
and organizations until, in a limited number of cases, they end by directly participat-
ing in terrorist activities and organizations.481 The implication is that all conservative 
Muslims are potential terrorists; this constitutes a broad generalization that stigmatizes 
a group of persons on the basis of their religious beliefs. When such theories are the 
basis for police or other law enforcement operations without reliable supporting intel-
ligence on terrorist threats, it is ethnic profiling. 
This “slippery slope” paradigm of radicalization is widespread in Europe and 
underpins counterterrorism practices of police and intelligence officials in many coun-
tries. A German Interior Ministry publication on “entryways into radicalization” pro-
vides the following pyramid diagram illustrating this theory:482
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Chart 1.
* Islamist organizations have some 30,000 members
The “ring model” of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD) 
provides a similar illustration of this paradigm. The model consists of four rings, one 
inside the other, representing (from the core moving out): terrorists, supporters, sym-
pathizers, society. An AIVD official described the model: 
  The innermost ring [terrorists] represents persons who are able and willing to commit 
attacks. The active supporters of terrorists can be put in the second ring [supporters]. These 
persons can and want to support terrorists, so they are aware of the connection between their 
activities and terrorist attacks. The third ring [sympathizers] represents the people who feel 
some sympathy for the cause and who are susceptible to recruitment. In general, persons 
in this third ring reject the Western, Dutch society. The area outside the third ring [society] 
encompasses the entire Muslim society. The people in this area are in no way involved in 
Islamist extremism, but may fall victim to its actions. In this ring model our focus should 
not only be on the groups to be distinguished, but also on the interaction between the rings. 
Centripetal movements can be designated as radicalization processes.483 
According to this approach, observant Muslims, particularly those practicing con-
servative forms of Islam, are potential terrorists. Behaviors that indicate that an indi-
vidual is becoming increasingly devout or adopting a more conservative form of Islam 
thereby become tell-tale “indicators” of radicalization. Individuals so identified may then 
become the focus of various antiterrorism measures.
Those 
who are ready 
to commit violence
Those who tolerate violence
Islamist organizations*
Moderate Islamists
Muslims who live religiously
Muslims in Germany (3.2 Million)
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This slippery slope paradigm is contested by experts. A French counterterrorism 
official with over two decades of experience recognized the differences: 
  A Muslim who is not radical in his practice, but who incites to violence is dangerous, and 
therefore of interest to us. On the other hand, a Muslim who is radical in his faith, but who 
is above all very pious, is not of interest for us. …[A]s far as Salafists, there are deeply pious 
Salafists who are radical but non-violent. You can compare them to Cistercian or Benedictine 
monks who are very pious, but not violent.484 
Saimir Amghar, a French researcher investigating radicalization processes among 
Muslim youth notes that the term “radicalization” covers several different phenomena, 
and argues that there are really three types of radicalization: (1) nonreligious politi-
cal radicalization; (2) religious radicalization involving orthodox practice of Islam but 
rejecting violence; and (3) political radicalization drawing from religious doctrine that 
manifests primarily through violent jihadism.485 While similar factors may drive indi-
viduals toward each form of radicalization, they are distinct responses. Amghar argues 
that the second and third forms do not represent steps on a continuum but are in fact 
oppositional tendencies that are highly critical of one another. Under this view, the 
nonviolent forms of conservative Islam are in fact a bulwark against terrorism rather 
than a path toward violent jihad. 
A similar perspective underlies the London Metropolitan Police Service’s Muslim 
Contact Unit. This unit works closely with Salafist groups, based on the view that non-
violent Salafists have both the understanding and credibility to reach those most at risk 
of radicalization and to dissuade them from turning to violence. Under this approach, 
Salafist groups are treated as important allies in counterterrorism efforts, rather than 
targets of suspicion based on a theory that sees them as one step on the path toward 
violence.486 (For more information about the work of the Muslim Contact Unit, please 
see the section on alternatives to ethnic profiling in the next chapter.) 
 
The Netherlands: Operationalizing the Theory of Radicalization
The Netherlands has pioneered efforts to put into practice antiradicalization theories 
through a multisectoral approach that uses indicators of radicalization to identify per-
sons who may be in the process of becoming radicalized.487 
The development of these indicators is a component of the Netherlands’ 
“broad-based approach” against radicalism and radicalization,488 an approach that aims 
to “detect radicalization processes at an early stage and to reverse them before they 
lead to punishable offenses.”489 Dutch antiterrorist officials have developed a set of 
“indicators of radicalization” designed to help local actors, such as social workers and 
educators, recognize the outward signs of radicalization.490 The objective is to enable 
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these actors to identify persons or organizations of potential interest to the police and 
intelligence services. 
In 2006, an official from the office of the National Coordinator on Counterterror-
ism, the institution responsible for developing policy and coordinating anti-terrorism 
measures in the Netherlands, explained their approach to profiling: 
  We are also working on some initiatives in Amsterdam and Rotterdam to develop indica-
tors—some kind of criteria of what to look for—that can also be used by people that are 
not specialists in using profiles in a critical way so that they can understand what kind of 
behavior should or would be potentially of our interest...We are refining them and refining 
them—trying to put in an administrative system.491
The city of Rotterdam took the lead with a program called “Join in or get left 
behind,” initiated in February 2005. According to this program, indicators of radicaliza-
tion include particular behavior patterns, such as frequent travel or hosting gatherings 
at one’s home, and changes in behavior, such as a man of Arabic origin who suddenly 
acquires more traditionally religious Muslim approaches to hair style, dress, mosque 
attendance, or physical contact with women in public. Dutch officials have taken pains 
to avoid the inclusion of ethnicity or nationality as suspicious criteria, but the indi-
cators developed nonetheless draw attention to individuals who are becoming more 
orthodox in their practice of Islam. Essentially, a Muslim who shows outward signs 
of more conservative practice would become suspicious. Likewise a non-Muslim who 
outwardly shows signs of Muslim practice, indicating that he is a convert, would also 
become suspicious. 
Those trained to watch for these indicators are reportedly told to watch not just 
for one change in behavior, but several. When they believe someone is radicalizing, 
they are asked to report the individual to the information “switch-point,”492 which veri-
fies the situation and determines the most appropriate follow-up action. According to 
an evaluation report by the information switch-point, the Rotterdam program alerted 
police to 17 cases during 2005.493 Although the numbers to date appear relatively few 
and the consequences of identification benign, the indicators of radicalization clearly 
target Muslims and are likely to stigmatize a far larger number of Muslims than those 
actually identified as at risk of radicalization. 
The indicators of radicalization used in the Netherlands continue to conflate 
orthodox religious practice with a tendency to use violence.494 A government guide for 
companies on detecting radicalization among their employees gives this advice: 
  In determining whether there are radicalized personnel in your employment, a combination 
of factors must be taken into consideration. The following list provides a number of indica-
tors which might signal the presence of radicalized personnel:
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  • Possession of extremist literature, pamphlets, or sound and data recording equipment, 
or the perusal of extremist literature by means of the internet. This can be difficult for 
companies to assess, as such activities are often carried out in another language, such as 
Arabic.
  • Seeming approval of terrorist attacks.
  • Travel to regions or countries in which a terrorist conflict is taking place or in which there 
are terrorist training camps, such as Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq, and Pakistan.
  • A sudden aversion to “Western customs” such as mixed activities (male/female), or drink-
ing alcohol, and requesting specific Islamic meals.
  • Wearing specific clothing and symbols, or a sudden change of clothing style.495
On a more positive note, some Dutch authorities are also distinguishing between 
“extremism” involving support for violence and orthodox religious practice.496 The 
Amsterdam “switch-point on radicalization” has moved away from indicators focused 
on orthodox religious practice, and emphasizes the need to separate religious practice 
from political views—particularly whether an individual supports the use of violence.497 
Rotterdam is also moving away from the use of indicators of radicalization, although 
it remains in a process of flux. Across the Netherlands, there is a shift away from an 
approach that stigmatizes individuals and groups, and toward policies that address root 
causes of radicalization, such as discrimination, exclusion, and social polarization.498
The Effect and Effectiveness of Profiling People in the Process of Radicalization
Notable in discussions of radicalization is the absence of any consideration that counter-
terrorism strategies and operational tactics may themselves contribute to the exclusion 
experienced by Europe’s Muslim communities and validate their grievances. Even as 
the U.K. government undertook a series of consultations with British Muslims, analysts 
following the process noted the unacknowledged consequences of counterterrorism 
strategies:
  It is however astonishing that neither the government, not the [Intelligence and Security 
Committee], acknowledged the potentially damaging effect that counterterrorism measures 
themselves can have in contributing to “radicalization” or in inhibiting community coopera-
tion in identifying suspects.499
Terrorism scholars note that “one major component of the radical subjectivity was 
the feeling of humiliation,”500 and that “joining a terrorist group ultimately revolves 
around a desire for revenge and that this, and the willingness to seek it in violent ways, 
are tied to feelings of self-worth—shame, humiliation, loss of face—retribution and 
deterrence.”501 While experts discuss the impact of foreign policy and the war in Iraq on 
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radicalizing youth, they fail to examine the negative effects of aggressive law enforce-
ment tactics on Muslim communities, even though these tactics could be changed rela-
tively easily. 
It is clear that antiterrorism measures that stigmatize Muslims may themselves be 
an important factor in pushing some individuals toward involvement in terrorist activi-
ties. Commenting on the German pyramid of radicalization, the International Crisis 
Group noted the following:
  [I]t is more accurate to visualize three independent categories: Islamists, those who tolerate 
violence, and those ready to commit violence. It is possible to jump from one category to 
the next but this requires an external shock of some kind. There is a real danger that state 
over-reaction could offer one such jolt.502
Past experience also provides a salutary warning. Paddy Hillyard, an expert on Brit-
ish counterterrorism operations in Northern Ireland, documented the Irish experience 
of being targeted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.503 Hillyard’s extensive study 
examined the personal experiences of those targeted by police for stops and searches, 
preventive imprisonment, and other harsh tactics allowed under the act. Hillyard found 
that the Prevention of Terrorism Act “led to hundreds of young men … joining the IRA 
and creating one of the most efficient insurgency forces in the world.504
F.  Monitoring Mosques, Muslim Organizations, 
  and Their Members
Monitoring and surveillance are basic tools of counterterrorism intelligence gathering. 
A number of covert monitoring and surveillance techniques exist, ranging from the 
use of informers to wiretaps and other forms of sophisticated electronic surveillance. 
As discussed in Chapter V, it is also possible to obtain extensive intelligence through 
overt means that are less adversarial and intrusive, such as contacts with community 
members—what is sometimes termed “community intelligence.” Indeed, most intelli-
gence is gathered this way, according to counterterrorism and law enforcement officials 
in several countries. 
The monitoring of mosques and Muslim organizations does not necessarily 
constitute discriminatory ethnic profiling. When monitoring is based on specific 
intelligence about support for terrorism, it is entirely warranted, as was demonstrably 
the case in the raids on London’s Finsbury Park Mosque.505 However, in some cases, 
surveillance is based on the belief that certain religious views—sometimes termed 
“fundamentalist” or “Salafist”— pose a threat to Western democracy, and, in other cases, 
9 8    E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M  S I N C E  9 / 1 1
it reflects a theory of radicalization that views fundamentalist religious practice as the 
first step on a slippery slope leading to direct support for or even engagement in acts 
of terrorism. 
When police monitor a mosque simply because it is Salafist or practices another 
controversial stream of Islam, rather than based on evidence of involvement in terror-
ism, they are engaging in ethnic profiling. While there are some Salafist leaders and 
mosques that advocate violence, it is a gross generalization to place all Salafist Mus-
lims in this category, as most have no connection to terrorist organizations and activi-
ties. Indeed, some law enforcement officers (admittedly a minority) argue that effective 
counterterrorism requires engagement with Salafist leaders on the grounds that they 
are best positioned to dissuade disaffected young people from turning to violence. 
Research in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands indicates that law 
enforcement authorities in those countries rely heavily on surveillance to prevent terror-
ism. In some cases, specific intelligence or evidence leads officials to place a particular 
mosque under surveillance. But in other cases, mosques and Muslim organizations 
are considered suspicious and placed under surveillance due to their affiliation with 
certain streams of Islam rather than on the basis of specific information about support 
for illegal and violent activities. This has generated a widespread anxiety in the Muslim 
community and contributed to the perception among some Muslims, particularly obser-
vant Muslims, that they are under constant surveillance. Many Muslims are convinced 
that their privacy is threatened by the surveillance and, as a result, that their freedom 
to practice their religion is being constrained. 
For two reasons, it is often difficult to determine whether particular surveillance 
operations are intelligence-based or involve ethnic profiling. First, surveillance practices 
are generally covert and information about their genesis is hard to obtain. Second, a 
decision to conduct surveillance may be based on both evidence and stereotyping, in 
which case scrutiny of the probative evidence would be needed to assure that a reli-
gious stereotype was not the determining factor. Agencies conducting surveillance need 
both an internal review mechanism and external oversight to prevent the use of 
ethnic profiling.
The difficulty in obtaining solid information on the reasons for surveillance makes 
it nearly impossible for civilians to draw firm conclusions on the validity of specific 
surveillance. But the information that does exist raises concerns about whether some 
countries are crossing the line in their surveillance activities, from intelligence-based 
monitoring into discriminatory ethnic profiling. 
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Germany
German authorities increased their surveillance of specific religious groups following 
9/11. The German Office of the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) monitors numer-
ous mosques and conservative Muslim organizations that it considers to be extremist 
and to pose a potential threat. The selection of groups for monitoring is based on the 
belief that certain streams of Islam present a threat to the state even when they do not 
advocate violence.506 
 The exact number of mosques that are monitored by the BfV is unclear. Wolfgang 
Wieland, a member of Germany’s parliament and its national security committee, said 
in an interview:
 
  [B]efore 9/11 the Islamic community was under low surveillance pressure. This has changed 
completely. Today there are a lot of informants. The intelligence services either ask peo-
ple who go to mosques regularly or send their own agents into mosques … Now we have 
mosques, scientologists, and Islamic groups surveilled. These are the only religious groups 
which are monitored by the intelligence services in Germany.507 
In July 2005, shortly after the London underground bombings, Bavaria’s Interior 
Minister Gunther Beckstein told the newspaper Berliner Zeitung: “We have to know 
what’s going on in each and every mosque. […] We have to have an intelligence pres-
ence in places where extremist ideas are being preached.”508 Federal Interior Minister 
Otto Schilly echoed these remarks when he announced, on July 18, 2005, that the gov-
ernment was considering putting all mosques under scrutiny through closed-circuit 
cameras.509 Muslim organizations, as well as a number of political parties, were very 
critical of these statements. 
It is not clear that German authorities are in fact undertaking mosque surveil-
lance as broadly as suggested by these remarks. A 2003 article in der Spiegel magazine 
reported that the BfV had screened all of the country’s estimated 2,500 mosques. Thirty-
nine of those mosques were reportedly viewed as “critical” and placed under surveil-
lance, although only 15 of the 39 were considered “dangerous,” a term used by the BfV 
to indicate that the mosques were used as sites for actively recruiting or radicalizing 
individuals for further indoctrination into violence.510 In a July 2007 interview, repre-
sentatives from the BfV and German Ministry of Interior denied the accuracy of these 
figures, but refused—on grounds of secrecy—to provide alternative data.
 Available evidence indicates that any widespread screening of mosques was 
conducted largely through human sources, including discussions with contacts in the 
mosques and informants. This is appropriate when based on open source informa-
tion or information freely volunteered as a result of outreach and building relations 
between Muslim religious leaders and law enforcement. More intrusive covert tech-
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niques, such as technological surveillance (including the use of hidden microphones and 
cameras) inside mosques, are primarily directed at a small number of mosques 
qualified as “critical.”511 This is a correct response if covert surveillance reflects reliable 
and concrete information about illegal activities in those mosques.
Muslim organizations are particularly concerned with the BfV’s collection of 
information on individuals who attend mosques. A Berlin mosque official said, “The 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution has names and photos of any person going 
regularly to mosque.”512 The official said that he discovered he had been photographed 
when a police officer he knows commented on how photogenic he is. Others have dis-
covered that they were under surveillance when applying for nationalization, as Burhan 
Kesici, vice president of the Islamic Federation of Berlin, explained: 
  When individuals apply for German nationality, they discover that the authorities already 
know that they go to mosque and which mosque they go to. Authorities also know that they 
belong to this and this organization… for this reason many young people stopped going 
to mosques.513 
The BfV has cast a particularly wide net of surveillance over Muslim organizations. 
The BfV makes a distinction between Islam and Islamism: “Islam” is simply a religion, 
while “Islamism” is categorized as a “politically extremist ideological movement” that 
is considered a national security threat.514 The BfV further divides “Islamist” organiza-
tions into three subcategories. Subcategory A refers “to Islamist groups which conduct 
a pan-Islamist jihad (holy war) and threaten worldwide stability through terrorist acts.”515 
Subcategory B is “Islamist organizations which want to change the state and society 
in their countries of origin by violent means [by terrorist acts or by guerrilla-warfare]. 
Members of these organizations have come to Germany mostly as political refugees and 
support armed actions in regions of crisis.”516 Organizations falling into subcategory 
B include Hamas, Hezbollah, and GIA,517 among others. Subcategory C is the broad-
est and includes organizations “which fight for Islamist positions in the context of 
the social life of the Federal Republic or at least try to establish spaces for organized 
Islamist engagement.”518 Among these are the Islamic Community Milli Görüs (IGMG)519 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. Groups in subcategory C are said to be loyal to the 
German Constitution and explicitly refrain from violence as a means of political action, 
but create an “Islamist milieux” which poses a danger of continuing radicalization.520 
Organizations falling under any one of the subcategories can suffer severe conse-
quences, including denial of public funding for the organization, denial of citizenship to 
its members who are not yet German citizens, and even stripping German citizenship 
from members who already are. 
Since 9/11, immigrants who otherwise met every requirement for becoming 
naturalized German citizens have been turned down because they belonged to 
an organization that is classified as working against the German Constitution. 
Naturalization applicants from majority Muslim countries undergo a security check 
against BfV files and, if they are listed as belonging to an Islamist organization, they 
are denied citizenship.521
Kenan Kolat of the Turkischer Bund (an organization representing Turks in Ger-
many) explained that people are obliged to agree to these checks: 
  Suppose I want to be a German citizen. I get a lot of paperwork and on one form there is 
a question: “Do you authorize us to check with the Verfassungsschutz for your personal 
information?” They already make an X on the box indicating “Yes, I do agree.” You have no 
option. You cannot say, “No, I do not want this.” If you say no, then they will say you cannot 
become a German citizen.522 
Deutsche Welle reported a case in which a German court stripped three men of 
their German nationality because they had not disclosed their membership in Milli 
Görüs. The officials told the publication:
  The men should never have been granted German citizenship because Milli Görüs is hostile 
to democratic principles. Naturalization is only available to those who […] offer allegiance to 
the German Constitution.523 
The German Aliens Law permits the expulsion of persons considered a threat to 
the Federal Republic of Germany,524 and German scholars have documented multiple 
cases of permanent residents who are members of Milli Görüs being expelled.525 
Amendments to the German Aliens Law following the 2004 Madrid bombings now 
allow such expulsions to be processed through an administrative procedure at state or 
national level, using the same fact basis.526
Subcategory C organizations listed as under surveillance in the BfV annual 
report suffer considerable public stigmatization as “anti-constitutional” and few 
political actors or other organizations are willing to take part in their activities, even 
though this subcategory is acknowledged as non-violent and not presenting a threat 
to the state.527
 Most of the groups under the BfV’s surveillance fall into subcategory C.528 In 
such cases, surveillance is not strictly linked to counterterrorism efforts. Rather, the BfV 
views surveillance as a necessary response to the long-term challenges that subcategory 
C groups pose “to the free democratic social order.”529 With some 26,500 members 
in Germany, Milli Görüs is the largest of the groups in subcategory C and has been 
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under BfV surveillance for many years. Surveillance increased significantly after 9/11, as 
did the negative repercussions of such surveillance for affected organizations and 
their members.530 
In addition to monitoring organizations, the BfV collects extensive information 
on individual members of organizations. The BfV gathers this information from writ-
ten sources, informants, discussions with organizations’ officials and members, and 
in some number of cases—the exact number of which is unknown—from infiltration 
and technological surveillance.531 Evidence indicates that personal data is kept on file 
and made available by the BfV to other German authorities for security checks and in 
naturalization proceedings. According to a representative of Milli Görüs: 
  Personal data about thousands of Muslims is collected. I can tell you about one case of a man 
who worked at the airport in Munich since about 1995. This man was once a member of a 
Milli Görüs organization. Every few years he has to go through some kind of security check. 
After 9/11 there was a security check on him again. He was told that he was a danger to the 
security of the airport because he was a member of Milli Görüs between 1996 and 1998.532
Muslims in Germany continue to be deeply concerned about surveillance of 
places of worship and Muslim organizations. Mosque representatives are particularly 
concerned that surveillance of places of worship is making individuals afraid to attend 
the mosque. Leaders of the Muslim community say that in addition to being denied 
citizenship, individuals who participate in organizations classified as Islamist by the 
BfV are denied employment at places considered to be sensitive, such as airports or 
information technology firms, on these grounds.533
Tânia Puschnerat, head of the Islamism and Islamist Terrorism Unit of the BfV, 
disputes the suggestion that monitoring of subcategory C Islamist groups involves ste-
reotypes and ethnic profiling. She highlighted the legal basis for the BfV’s work, which 
requires “hard evidence of efforts… directed against the free democratic basic order, the 
existence or the security of the Federation or one of its states or aimed at unlawfully 
hampering constitutional bodies of the Federation or one of its states or their members 
in the performance of their duties.”534 She further justified the monitoring as follows: 
  Practice of religion is not interesting for us. Extremist or radical efforts are, political activities 
and behavior are … Subcategory C organizations are not violence prone, they do not preach 
hatred and violence, but all efforts have one simple and clear direction: to prepare areas of 
Islamic law within German society. Milli Görüs is a constant subject of discussion; but it is 
definitely within the mandate of the BfV, by law.535
Many Muslim organizations and scholars of Islam are highly critical of the dis-
tinction between Islam and Islamist organizations, particularly applying the “Islamist” 
label to organizations that do not advocate violence.536 Werner Schiffauer explained 
the problem: 
  The distinction between real Islam (“religion”) and Islamism (“ideology”) is drawn primarily 
by German politics and the German Verfassungsschutz [BfV]. Muslim authorities are hardly 
referred to when making this distinction. In fact, only Muslims supporting this distinc-
tion are accepted as partners in the debate. Ulema (Muslim scholars) questioning it would 
immediately and by this very act qualify themselves as Islamists and be deemed partisan. 
The self-confidence with which German politicians and intellectuals judge what is or is not 
Islamic is one of the debate’s most striking features.537 
Along similar lines, a 2007 International Crisis Group report on Germany noted 
a related problem:
  [T]he semi-annual Verfassungsschutz [BfV] reports and lawsuits against IGMG preachers 
and officials have sometimes included basic translation errors, defamatory material or unfair 
innuendo and accusations. They may also read too much into IGMG publications and selec-
tive snippets of public statements.538 
Netherlands
According to some representatives of Dutch Muslims, Dutch intelligence services have 
used religion as a basis for monitoring, focusing their attention on Muslim organiza-
tions. Thus, it is alleged, monitoring has sometimes been conducted based on gener-
alizations about the type of Islam that groups practice rather than specific information 
about activities in a particular mosque or organization. Such monitoring, some Muslims 
complain, has targeted even nonviolent streams of Islam, on the theory that they may be 
hotbeds of terrorist radicalization. Dutch authorities assert that surveillance has become 
narrowly targeted. There is wide gap between the perceptions of Dutch Muslims and 
Dutch law enforcement authorities of the scope and impact of surveillance practices. 
Dutch Muslim organizations believe that Dutch intelligence services monitor 
many of the country’s mosques.539 Dutch intelligence services have argued in public 
reports that Salafist and other extreme streams of Islam are very active and in some cases 
are trying to influence or even take over less extreme mosques in the Netherlands.540 
A 2005 Dutch General Intelligence Service (AIVD) report on the links among Saudi 
Arabia, Salafism, radicalization processes, and terrorism in the Netherlands, was based 
on information gathered from monitoring mosques considered radical.541 
In a 2007 interview, Dutch counterterrorism authorities stated that very few 
mosques are under surveillance as “hotbeds of radicalization.” One official explained 
it this way:
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  We are not condemning the general thinking of a group… [T]his concerns less than one 
percent of mosques. It is really a very small number. And all of the mosques surveilled have 
Hofstadt group connections [and] imams who use violent rhetoric…”542
In a June 2007 presentation, Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
Lidewijde Ongering testified before a U.S. Senate committee: 
  A small number of locations in the Netherlands, such as a few Salafist centers and mosques, 
have been identified as potential gateways to radical milieus.…Experience has shown that for 
some young people, non-violent Salafism is a first step towards further radicalization. The 
Dutch authorities keep a close watch on the imams and governing bodies of these institu-
tions and remind them of their social responsibilities. Our message is clear: we will not 
allow them to cross the line and publicly preach intolerance. We also expect them to exclude 
jihadist recruiters and stop young people from opting for violence. If people in or around 
these centers prove to be promoting radicalization or spreading hatred, we do not hesitate to 
prosecute them or deport them as a threat to national security.543
Surveillance is largely conducted through direct contact with mosque authorities 
and individuals who attend mosques, and through established informants. However, in 
an unknown number of cases, intelligence services also tape record sermons, especially 
Friday prayers. A Muslim community leader from Rotterdam, Brahim Bursic, called 
attention to the taping:
  We know that all Friday prayers in mosques are taped. I told the imams not to be afraid; we 
are a democracy and they are not doing anything against the law. I also publicly suggested 
that if the intelligence officials are interested in what is being said in the mosques, the Friday 
prayers could be broadcast on TV.544
A senior Dutch police officer said that such recording only occurs in “very limited, 
specific cases.”545 
In addition to mosques, Dutch intelligence officials monitor Muslim organiza-
tions they believe to be spreading or supporting radical Islam. In a 2004 report, the 
AIVD defined “radical Islam” as “the politico-religious pursuit of establishing—if neces-
sary by extreme means—a society which reflects the perceived values from the original 
sources of Islam as purely as possible.”546 The report commented on the different views 
within “radical Islam”:
  Radical Islam consists of many movements and groups that, although related (in particular 
concerning faith and anti-Western sentiments), may harbor very different views on aims 
and means. This means that various kinds of threats can emanate from radical Islam, one of 
which is terrorism. In addition to radical Islamic organizations and networks which concen-
trate on the jihad (in the sense of armed combat) against the West, there are other groups, 
which principally focus on “Dawa” (the propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology), while 
some groups and networks combine both.547
Both organizations classified as “jihad-focused” and those classified as “Dawa-
focused” fall within what Dutch intelligence sources described as the AIVD’s “profes-
sional interest,”548 and some are kept under surveillance. While the AIVD recognizes 
that only “jihad-focused” groups pose an immediate threat of violence, it believes 
that the “Dawa-focused” groups pose a longer-term threat by feeding processes of 
radicalization.549
The AIVD’s 2006 guide for local authorities explains the Dutch approach of tar-
geting “hotbeds of radicalization”: 
  A hotbed of radicalism is an organization, group or place that serves as a breeding ground 
for activities and views that are instrumental in radicalizing individuals and can ultimately 
result in terrorist activities. …
  Hotbeds of radicalism can also serve as an ideological breeding ground for extremists. They 
can function as a first step on a path that may lead to violence. This danger exists in particu-
lar in the case of organizations that advocate extreme, intolerant isolationism or promote an 
intolerant “us vs. them” mentality. …
  The aim of the approach is to make clear through joint, coordinated government action to 
those in charge of the hotbed of radicalism and to its visitors that activities of a radical nature 
will not be tolerated and that the authorities are monitoring activities closely.550 
It is not clear how often monitoring by intelligence services is founded on intel-
ligence-based evidence and how often generalizations about ethnicity or religion are 
the determining factor. Nor is it clear how often more intrusive monitoring techniques 
are utilized. Certain Muslim places of worship and organizations are clearly viewed as 
suspicious, even without specific evidence indicating involvement in any terrorist activi-
ties or incitement to violence.551 They are instead held to be potentially dangerous due 
to generalizations about the stream of Islam that they practice, albeit peacefully, and the 
theory that such practices represent a first step in the process of radicalization.552 In the 
absence of information about support for terrorism, covert surveillance is inappropriate 
and law enforcement efforts should instead focus on outreach to Muslim communities 
and voluntary information sharing. 
There is a wide gap between the way Dutch intelligence officials describe their 
monitoring and the way it is perceived by Muslim organizations and individuals. Dutch 
authorities claim their practices have become more narrowly targeted over time, but this 
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cannot be independently verified. To this day, many Dutch Muslims believe that dis-
criminatory and profiling-based surveillance is widespread and this perception, accurate 
or not, has negative consequences for policing in the Netherlands. 
Italy
Since 9/11, the monitoring of Muslims in Italy has increased as the fight against terror-
ism moved to the top of the country’s security agenda.553 Interviews with Italian security 
experts indicate that Italy’s security services keep many mosques under close surveil-
lance. The use of intrusive methods such as wiretapping and infiltrating mosques and 
placing cameras outside mosques is reported to be widespread.
Members of immigrant associations of all sorts, including social, cultural, and 
athletic organizations, believe they and their members are monitored and placed under 
surveillance. S.M. Arshad, president of an umbrella organization representing 33 Paki-
stani community associations, commented on the monitoring: 
  All 33 associations are monitored. The main people in them have their phones tapped and 
are watched physically by the intelligence services. For a period, I saw someone watching me 
every day—where I am going, what I am doing. Then when they saw that I have no suspi-
cious activities, they stopped.554
Both Italian experts on security matters555 and representatives of the Muslim com-
munity in Italy believe the surveillance of mosques, Muslim associations, and Mus-
lim-owned businesses is common. These perceptions are supported by recent arrests 
of suspected terrorists in which the evidence relied heavily on extensive and lengthy 
surveillance, particularly wiretapping and monitoring mosque attendance. 
In addition to its use as a basis for arrests, information gained from surveillance 
is reportedly used in residency and citizenship procedures. A security expert stated that 
reliable sources in the security services have confirmed that information about a par-
ticular individual’s membership in certain mosques or Muslim organizations is used in 
assessing his or her immigration application.556 However, Justice Initiative researchers 
were unable to confirm this practice. 
France
The French Central Directorate of General Information (Direction Centrales des 
Renseignements Généraux, or RG) has long monitored Muslim associations.557 Reflecting 
France’s troubled history with its former North African colonies, the RG has an 
extensive and long-standing network that tracks activities in the country’s mosques 
and Muslim communities.558 Intrusive covert surveillance is generally initiated only 
on the basis of specific evidence indicating potentially dangerous situations—which 
falls well within the parameters of appropriate intelligence-based law enforcement. For 
example, in the case of a mosque this specific information could involve recruitment 
into groups supporting violence. More recently, however, some surveillance appears to 
have crossed the boundary into ethnic profiling, reflecting police risk assessments that 
conflate conservative Muslim religious practices with terrorism.
In July 2005, Central Director of the RG Pascal Mailhos told the media that 1,600 
mosques were being observed, of which 80 were considered to be “sensitive,” and that 
40 mosques were “under constant pressure from radical Islamic structures,” of which 
20 were in the hands of radicals.559 Four months later, in November 2005, Mailhos gave 
Le Monde different, though similar, numbers: 
  It is a fact that there are fewer radical sermons. But surveillance of certain places is essential, 
less because of what is said than because of the meetings that are taking place in those loca-
tions. Of 1,700 places of worship listed a year ago, 75 were targets of takeover attempts. Half 
of them resisted, the other half were taken over by radicals. Since October 2003, 31 radical 
activists or preachers have been expelled. Some 10 imams remain under close watch.560
The RG monitors individuals as well as institutions and groups. Yamin Makri, who 
has worked with Muslim nongovernmental organizations for over 20 years, says that: 
“Anyone who is active in an association is in the RG files—that is, an association deemed 
to be “communitarian,” for example, an Arab, Muslim, or Koranic association.”561 
Salafist Muslims are also singled out for surveillance, whether they are active in 
associations or not. In December 2005, French Senator Jean-Patrick Courtois informed 
the French Senate about the Salafists under surveillance: 
  [T]he intelligence services have enumerated approximately 5,000 militant Salafists. Of these, 
500 persons are considered to be dangerous. The fundamentalist ideology or Salafist ideology 
is the only strong link that unites the different terrorist groups more or less collected under 
the Al-Qaeda banner.562
As long as surveillance targets only those 500 considered dangerous for reasons 
other than their religious belief, and is based on reliable intelligence, this targeted 
monitoring also would not constitute ethnic profiling.
Despite France’s already impressive domestic intelligence capacity, in January 
2005 then French Minister of the Interior Dominique de Villepin announced the cre-
ation of new “regional centers to combat radical Islam,” headed by the RG. As their 
name implies, the regional centers specifically and publicly single out Muslims for 
additional surveillance, in theory targeting “radical” individuals in the community. In 
reality, their work appears to view most practicing Muslims as suspicious and potentially 
dangerous. According to Christophe Chaboud, the head of France’s antiterrorist coor-
dination unit (UCLAT), the regional centers “are charged with supervising any places 
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in which proselytizing can occur, such as Salafist prayer rooms, businesses, university 
courses of particular interest to these cells (for example computer science and chem-
istry), and sensitive businesses.”563 In a presentation to the senate during discussions 
of draft legislation related to the fight against terrorism, Senator Jean-Patrick Courtois 
similarly noted that “these regional centers are charged with monitoring certain prayer 
rooms and all other places where fundamentalist or Salafist proselytizing is likely to 
occur.”564 This remained the case at the end of 2008.
Surveillance of Muslims and Muslim organizations in France has increased since 
the creation of the “regional centers to combat radical Islam,” which explicitly target 
persons and places based on religious criteria. To the extent the surveillance is based 
on nothing more concrete than generalizations about Islam and its practitioners, it is 
ethnic profiling.
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Surveillance
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of surveillance, much of which is done covertly. 
Occasionally, evidence presented at a trial clearly demonstrates the value of surveillance. 
But this is of little use in assessing the vast majority of surveillance activities that never 
come to light in a courtroom. It is difficult to know how far surveillance extends, how 
often covert methods are applied, who is targeted and on what basis. 
It is clear that, at times, suspicion is cast on selected Muslim places of worship 
and organizations, even without evidence of involvement in terrorist activities or incite-
ment to violence. In many European countries, law enforcement authorities view certain 
types of Islam as inherently suspect. It is also clear that there is a considerable differ-
ence between Muslims’ perception of the extent and basis of monitoring by intelligence 
services and the accounts given by intelligence officials. Whatever the reality of cur-
rent surveillance practices, it is important to remember that perceptions—including 
inaccurate perceptions—have real effects on behavior. People who feel they are being 
unfairly singled out for law enforcement attention are less likely to cooperate with police. 
While covert intelligence gathering is never a transparent activity, these dynam-
ics call for increased efforts to construct dialogue with Muslim communities, to build 
trust and allay fears. It is critically important for EU member states to have effective 
democratic oversight of intelligence activities, and to ensure said oversight is not con-
strained or eroded in the face of political pressure that demands an aggressive stance 
against terrorism. Both parliamentary committees that overseee intelligence agencies 
and judicial oversight authorities should include explicit consideration of non-discrimi-
nation standards and assess whether measures taken and tactics used comply with 
the principle of proportionality. While the secret nature of intelligence gathering often 
precludes in-depth oversight of ongoing activities, reviews of operations following their 
conclusion should examine the impact these actions have on the target communities. 
G.  Negative Consequences of Ethnic Profiling 
  in Counterterrorism
The use of ethnic profiling in the fight against terrorism both stems from and reinforces 
stereotypes that associate Muslims, foreigners, illegal immigrants, extremism, and ter-
rorism as points along a “continuum of insecurity.”565 Ethnic profiling feeds the logic 
underlying public discrimination against Muslims, and impedes efforts to integrate 
immigrant and minority populations and address racism and xenophobia. Worse, ethnic 
profiling stigmatizes entire communities and makes them less likely to cooperate with 
police. In addition, ethnic profiling has several immediate effects on those subjected to 
it, ranging from deprivation of liberty and invasion of privacy to less visible but equally 
insidious and widespread effects such as increased fear and marginalization. Finally, as 
this chapter discusses, there is little evidence that ethnic profiling has in fact increased 
law enforcement effectiveness in combating terrorist violence. 
Ethnic profiling exacts a high toll on the individuals, groups, and communities that 
are singled out for differential treatment. It also imposes broader social costs, aggravating 
tensions between different groups, legitimizing discrimination and racism, and imping-
ing on human rights. By subjecting its targets to unjustified stops, searches, and, in some 
cases, intimidation and prolonged periods of detention, ethnic profiling may, in extreme 
cases, foster the very bitterness that may lead people to resort to violence. 
Large numbers of people are directly and indirectly affected by ethnic profiling, 
and victims are often deeply humiliated. Moroccan immigrants in Spain report being 
called “moro de mierda” (“Arab shit”) by police during identity checks, and having their 
trousers pulled down in public while being searched.566 In Germany, a Muslim leader 
observed, “It is humiliating to have policemen with machine guns checking identifi-
cation in a prayer space; even [checking] 10-year-olds. Is that the sort of image that is 
supposed to make children feel at home here?”567
Equally damaging is the sense of fear that ethnic profiling has instilled in Muslim 
communities. Many practicing Muslims believe that they are already subject to surveil-
lance measures, such as wiretapping, and that they could at any time find themselves tar-
geted for more drastic measures, such as raids, arrest, detention, and deportation. This 
fear was clearly evident in interviews conducted for this report with members of Muslim 
organizations and mosque authorities. Many individuals were very guarded about what 
they said on the telephone, and unwilling to be quoted for fear of repercussions.568 In 
Italy, where few immigrants are Italian citizens, many members of Muslim organiza-
tions were afraid to speak at all. 
Fear leads many Muslims to avoid political activities.569 For instance, a leader of 
Italy’s Pakistani community, S. M. Arshad, said that after the 7/7 London bombings, 
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many in his community were afraid to attend a demonstration against terrorism and in 
support of the victims of the London bombings. “They were afraid that they would be 
photographed, that the police are watching. They are terrorized.”570 Fear has also had 
a chilling effect on religious observance, leading some Muslims to hide their practice 
of Islam and avoid mosques. A nonpracticing Muslim from Lyon, France, said, “Due 
to widespread suspicion, I have many friends who have shaved their beards and now 
pray in secret.”571 This fear is increasing the isolation of Muslims within society, and 
damaging interethnic relations and social cohesion.
One of the most serious effects of ethnic profiling is its contribution to stigma-
tizing members of targeted ethnic, religious, or national groups. When the authorities 
single out members of certain groups for monitoring and surveillance, and particularly 
when these actions are given extensive media coverage, the message is sent that the 
entire ethnic or religious group presents a danger to society. Negative stereotypes are 
fostered and reinforced, exacerbating existing social and political tendencies toward 
racism and xenophobia.
This issue has been extensively documented in Italy.572 Public opinion views Mus-
lims as “alien” to Italian society and as “potential terrorists” who undermine the security 
of the country.573 A 2003 survey found that 47 percent of Italians think all Muslims are 
“religious fundamentalists,” and 33 percent are convinced Muslims are “invading the 
country.”574 These intolerant attitudes appear frequently in public debate on immigra-
tion and Muslims,575 and are often articulated by political leaders. The Northern League, 
a partner in Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s governing coalition, has used hateful 
language toward Muslims, encouraging intolerance.576 In the aftermath of 9/11, North-
ern League leader Umberto Bossi supported a proposal to stop issuing visas to Muslim 
immigrants for security reasons.577
Most government authorities across Europe have taken pains to issue public state-
ments emphasizing that all Muslims are not terrorists, and that those Muslims who 
support terrorism are a tiny and unrepresentative minority. But this message is directly 
undermined when police and intelligence officials engage in ethnic profiling that visibly 
singles out Muslims for extra attention and differential treatment.
When individuals are stopped on the street for identity checks, when police sur-
round a mosque, when a business is raided or an individual arrested, the general public 
naturally assumes that law enforcement officials are acting because there is a reason 
to do so—that these persons present a real threat. The lack of any significant counter-
terrorism outcomes—such as detection, charges, or convictions—as a result of ethnic 
profiling does not serve to mitigate the damage done; the bare fact of being singled out 
in the context of counterterrorism measures is sufficient to create the stigma. A repre-
sentative of the Dutch Association of Moroccans and Tunisians described the change 
in perception: 
  Everyone thinks that when there is smoke, there is fire. Since 9/11 and the murder of Theo 
van Gogh, relations between Moroccans and the broader society have deteriorated. People 
look at each other with suspicion. When a Moroccan man walks in the street with a beard 
people look at him differently than before. When the police react in that way, it creates a big-
ger problem. It affects people’s perceptions. For instance, when a train was stopped recently 
and two men in Arabic dress were handcuffed and taken off the train by police, this image 
has a strong effect on those watching. And it makes big news in the media. Afterwards 
when it turns out that these men were not planning anything at all, they were just practicing 
Muslims, but it’s too late, the damage has been done.578 
A German academic who has researched counterterrorism raids in Germany 
concurred: 
  Many raids take place in small towns where the mosque community tried to give a represen-
tation of themselves as part of the community. They have worked hard on building relations 
with the community. Then the police arrive in a very visible manner and check the identity 
documents of individuals outside the mosque. This creates fear; the public thinks if there 
is a problem with these mosques, that there must be a reason. There must be something 
going on.579
For some Muslims, these practices would be more acceptable if they did in fact 
produce clear counterterrorism outcomes. Referring to raids and mass identity checks, 
a Muslim leader from Hamburg said, “We could tolerate such measures if they were 
actually successful.”580
The public and sensational manner in which law enforcement officials carry out 
many antiterrorism operations generates profound public stigma. Whatever the effect 
of these operations in preventing further terrorist attacks, their impact on public percep-
tions is considerable. The U.K. Institute of Race Relations has raised these concerns:
  [T]here is often extensive media attention when police raids result in arrests under antiter-
rorism laws, while there is typically only minimal coverage when those arrested subsequently 
are released. As a result, the public is left with the impression that the British criminal 
justice system is successfully prosecuting Muslim terrorists, although in reality most of 
those Muslims who are arrested on terrorism allegations are never charged with any 
terrorism offense.581 
It appears that some operations are designed to send a message to the public that 
the state is doing its utmost to protect the innocent majority from the threat posed by 
Muslim terrorists. For example, shortly after the July 2005 London bombings, Italian 
authorities raided thousands of Muslim businesses and issued a press release announc-
ing that they had conducted a large-scale nationwide operation against “Islamic meeting 
places.” The statement went on to say that identity checks were conducted on tens of 
E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  T H E  E U R O P E A N  U N I O N    1 1 1
1 1 2    E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M  S I N C E  9 / 1 1
thousands of individuals, 141 had been arrested, and expulsion procedures had been 
initiated against thousands. But only 2 of the 141 arrests were reportedly linked to 
terrorism and the expulsion procedures had nothing to do with terrorism.582 But as 
an Italian NGO representative noted, the authorities “achieved their purpose simply 
by publishing this information. These press releases are meant to calm down public 
opinion, to give the impression that things are under control.”583 But all too often, such 
messages—intended to project a government in action—are seen as suggesting that 
Muslims in general are a threat to the rest of the community.
Ethnic profiling directed at Muslims has the effect of stigmatizing all Muslims 
as potential terrorists. The imam of a Berlin mosque remarked that “before 9/11, what 
Muslims liked a lot was that they had certain rights, and the principle of innocent until 
proven guilty applied to them. From 9/11, the situation reversed. Muslims are now sus-
picious until they are proven innocent and we have to justify our innocence.”584
Ethnic profiling by law enforcement authorities also lends legitimacy to broader 
public discrimination. If the police and government security agencies use ethnicity or 
religion as indicators of who is a terrorist, why should not local shopkeepers or res-
taurant owners do the same? If the state sets the example, why would the public hold 
back from harassing Muslim and immigrant businesses?585 In fact, vandalism against 
Muslim places of worship and businesses, as well as harassment and violent attacks 
against individuals, are problems that have grown significantly across Europe since 
9/11.586 The International Helsinki Federation summarized the situation in selected 
EU countries as follows:
  [A]ttitudes toward Muslims have deteriorated further, and it has become increasingly com-
monplace in public debate to associate Islam with fanaticism and terrorism. A rise in the 
number of attacks on Muslims has also been documented, with the attacks ranging from 
slurs and insults in the street to vandalism and serious physical violence.587
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) reported on 
the situation in France:
  [A] negative trend in public opinion relates to Muslims, who have been an object of mani-
festations of racism and intolerance, increasingly so over the last few years. [...] Mosques or 
Muslim graves are vandalized; Muslim religious leaders physically assaulted; and threats 
and insults directed against Islam and Muslims. These manifestations tend to increase as a 
reaction to certain international events such as the terrorist attacks in the United States and 
Europe and the conflict in Iraq. Sometimes elements of the public draw inaccurate parallels 
between terrorists, religious extremists, and the Muslim population as a whole. In some 
cases these prejudices are said to prompt discrimination, especially in the field of employ-
ment, with Muslims being refused jobs because of the suspicion hanging over them.588
Increases in verbal abuse, physical attacks, and attacks on property owned by 
Muslims were reported in Italy following 9/11.589 Italian antiracism activists say that 
many Muslims who suffered abuse did not report it to the police because they feared 
they would not be taken seriously, and that, in some of the cases where Muslims did 
report abuse, police failed to investigate thoroughly and prosecute.590 The UN Commit-
tee against Racial Discrimination echoed these concerns in its 2002 observations on 
Italy.591 Antiracism activists have also pointed out that Muslims often find it difficult 
to trust the authorities because senior government officials have repeatedly expressed 
hostile attitudes toward Muslims.592 
The lack of redress is raised by Muslims elsewhere as well. In France, few com-
plaints of discrimination filed by Muslims and other minority group members ever 
reach the courts, and when they do, judges rarely apply discrimination provisions.593 
Reports indicate that police in some cases have refused to register complaints of dis-
crimination made by Muslims.594
A final concern about ethnic profiling in the context of counterterrorism reflects 
the tendency for supposedly exceptional and temporary measures to become permanent 
and to be used for purposes beyond the original intent of the law or policy. Experience 
demonstrates that exceptional measures are often used for far broader purposes 
than originally intended and can have far-reaching negative effects.595 In the United 
Kingdom, critics have already expressed concern that Section 44 counterterrorism 
powers are being used for situations beyond the intent of the law, such as the policing 
of public protests against the war in Iraq.596 In France and Italy, observers have noted 
similar trends.597 
H.  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Ethnic Profiling 
  in Counterterrorism: No Evidence of Efficacy
Even apart from the harms already identified, there is no compelling evidence that eth-
nic profiling has produced important gains in protecting Europe from terrorism. Ethnic 
profiling does appear to lead to the detection of illegal immigrants, but immigration 
enforcement was not an explicit objective of the operations in question, and there is 
little evidence to suggest that immigrant crackdowns have prevented terrorist acts. In 
terms of protecting European citizens from terrorism, not only is there little evidence 
that ethnic profiling is effective, but there is cause for concern that it is in fact counter-
productive. Academic analysts and law enforcement practitioners have flagged numer-
ous conceptual and practical problems with ethnic profiling, noting that while ethnic 
and religious profiles are relatively predictable, terrorists’ tactics evolve in response to 
profiling through strategies of evasion, substitution, and adaptation. 
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Prediction, Evasion, Substitution, and Adaptation
In the United States, it has been argued that “those who commit acts of airplane terror-
ism, both before and after September 11, 2001, are disproportionately younger Muslim 
men of Middle Eastern background.”598 In Europe, Europol reported that half of the 
706 arrests on terrorism offenses in 2006 were related to “Islamist terrorism,” and that 
“[t]he majority of the arrested suspects were born in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and 
had loose affiliations to North African terrorist groups.”599 Does this make it possible 
to predict, based on ethnicity and religion, who is likely to commit an act of terrorism? 
If profiling is to be a useful and legitimate tool of law enforcement, a profile including 
ethnicity and religion must be demonstrably efficient, achieving results that could not 
be produced without the use of these criteria.
The fact that a larger percentage of people who commit a certain kind of offense 
are members of a particular religion or ethnicity does not mean that any individual 
member of the group is likely to be a criminal. It can be simultaneously true that most 
jihadi terrorists in Europe are Muslims of North African or Pakistani origin, and that 
99.99 percent of Muslims of North African or Pakistani descent are not terrorists.600 
Furthermore, even if it is true that the majority of jihadi terrorists fit this general descrip-
tion, there are also outliers who do not; for example, black British and white Belgian 
and German converts to Islam, or black Africans such as the Somalis and Ethiopians 
arrested in the United Kingdom for the failed bombing attempt on July 21, 2005. Some 
argue that the number of outliers is increasing. Ray Kelly, former chief of police of New 
York City, remarked on the increase:
  If you look at the London bombings, you have three British citizens of Pakistani descent. 
You have [the fourth London suicide bomber], who is Jamaican. You have the next crew [in 
London], who are East African. You have a Chechen woman in Moscow in early 2004 who 
blows herself up in the subway station. So whom do you profile?601 
In short, the religious, ethnic, and nationality criteria that are relevant to post-9/11 
terrorism are so broad as to offer little guidance to law enforcement. Nor have other 
criteria proven sufficient to provide an effective foundation for profiling. 
A 2005 French parliamentary report concluded that there is no terrorist profile,602 
citing Marc Sageman’s study of Al Qaeda terrorist suspects in which he found that 
90 percent of persons associated with Al Qaeda had not followed religious education; 
17.6 percent were upper class and 54.9 percent middle class; 70 percent were married 
and/or had children; and most had no criminal record.603 The report also noted that 
the majority of similar studies conducted by European intelligence services reached the 
same conclusion, and thus efforts to profile terrorists are not useful.604 A 2007 Dutch 
study examined 242 Muslim terrorists arrested in Europe since September 2001. It 
found the following “profile”: 40 percent had been born in Europe; many were poor and 
had criminal records; almost all were single or divorced men; and they ranged widely 
in age, from their teens to near retirement.605 None of these factors distinguished them 
in any significant way from the broader population of European Muslims. The most 
recent study by Britain’s MI5 comes to a similar conclusion: there is no single pathway 
to violent radicalization and the nature of Muslim practice is not a consistent or reliable 
factor in radicalization.606
These studies highlight a fundamental problem of using ethnic profiles: they are 
both overinclusive and underinclusive. They are overinclusive in that the vast majority of 
the people who fall into the category are entirely innocent; and they are underinclusive 
in that there are other terrorists and other criminals who do not fit the profile and who 
would escape attention if the profile were strictly applied. While overinclusion imposes 
an unnecessary burden on “false positives” (persons who are innocent but match the 
profile), underinclusion may divert police attention from actual threats that lie beyond 
the prescribed profile. Thus, it was reported that, prior to the July 2005 attacks on the 
London public transport system, the leader of the bombers “had come to the attention 
of the intelligence services as an associate of other men who were suspected of involve-
ment in a terrorist bomb plot. But he was not pursued because he did not tick enough of 
the boxes in the pre-July profile of the terror suspect.”607 The most authoritative report 
to date on the 7/7 London bombings concludes that “there is not a consistent profile to 
help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalization.”608
Another fundamental problem of profiling is its failure to account for the dynamism 
of its target: the subjects of profiling evolve in response to policing and law enforcement 
tactics.609 When a terrorist profile is known, terrorists can adapt to it through strategies 
of evasion and substitution. They may evade detection by recruiting individuals who do 
not fit the profile. In February 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that a 
planned attack on Los Angeles had been averted. “Rather than use Arab hijackers,” Bush 
said, “Khalid Shaikh Mohammed sought out young men from Southeast Asia whom he 
believed would not arouse as much suspicion.”610 New York City Police Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly made this observation in a magazine interview:
  You think that terrorists aren’t aware of how easy it is to be characterized by ethnicity? … Look 
at the 9/11 hijackers. They came here. They shaved. They went to topless bars. They wanted 
to blend in. They wanted to look like they were part of the American dream. These are not 
dumb people. Could a terrorist dress up as a Hasidic Jew and walk into the subway, and not 
be profiled? Yes. I think profiling is just nuts.611 
In response to profiling, terrorist organizations “will either (i) recruit more 
individuals from non-profiled groups, thereby expanding the overall pool of potential 
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terrorists, or (ii) substitute different types of terrorist attacks that are more immune to 
profiling.”612 Some suggest that this took place in Israel during the second intifada with 
the substitution of women for male suicide bombers.613 There is some evidence that 
substitution is taking place in Europe, as the Washington Post noted in March 2007:
  [T]errorism suspects from atypical backgrounds are becoming increasingly common in 
Western Europe. With new plots surfacing every month, police across Europe are arresting 
significant numbers of women, teenagers, white-skinned suspects and people baptized as 
Christians…. The demographics of those being arrested are so diverse that many European 
counterterrorism officials and analysts say they have given up trying to predict what sorts 
of people are most likely to become terrorists…. Indeed, there are clear signs that al-Qaeda 
cells and affiliates are intentionally recruiting supporters from nontraditional backgrounds 
as a way to avoid detection.”614 
Tactics or modes of attack may also be changed in response to profiling, although 
there is little data available on the degree to which such substitution may be taking 
place.615 The two reports cited above suggest that most terrorist suspects do in fact fit 
the stereotypical profile (though arguably the profile is so broad as to be of little practical 
value); but there are a number of outliers whose backgrounds suggest substitution tac-
tics, and these may be increasing. For now, the data cannot support a firm conclusion.616 
Thus, it is not possible to say that ethnic profiling is effective. However, it is possible 
that profiling is counterproductive and may “actually increase rather than decrease the 
long-term incidence of the targeted offense.”617
In the United Kingdom, the Islamic Human Rights Commission raised the con-
cern that current policies may drive moderate Muslims into the arms of extremists,618 
and that measures targeting Muslims who have nothing to do with terrorism are 
“extremely counterproductive” because they alienate “the very community that police 
need to help and support the fight against terror.”619 An April 2007 telephone poll of 
500 Muslim adults carried out by Britain’s Channel 4 News found that 55 percent of the 
respondents had no confidence in the police.620 The London Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) has itself recognized that the increase in the use of search and arrest powers 
against certain groups has had a “hugely negative impact” on community relations and 
has increased “the level of distrust” of the police.621 In July 2004, the British govern-
ment announced plans to review the use of counterterrorism stop-and-search powers 
and to take measures aimed at building confidence in the police among groups who 
believe the police treat them unfairly.622 The MPS subsequently reviewed their use of 
Section 44 counterterrorism stop-and-search powers and issued new guidance to police 
officers about the importance of avoiding stereotypes. 
Few political and security authorities in Europe have openly considered the pos-
sibility that their own tactics, including ethnic profiling, may be a significant factor in 
generating the sense of victimization and humiliation that can contribute to the radi-
calization of young Muslims, some of whom may turn to terrorist violence. Indeed, 
there is little evidence that European Union member states’ policymakers or senior law 
enforcement officials are undertaking assessments of the impact and effectiveness of 
their counterterrorism strategies on minority communities. This lack of self-scrutiny is 
a serious error. Smart law enforcement requires assessments of the effects of different 
operational tactics in order to maximize their effectiveness and deploy scarce resources 
efficiently. Assessments of current operational practices should go hand in hand with 
consideration of the range of options that are available, with an explicit consideration 
of alternatives to ethnic profiling. The final section of this report examines the issues 
that should be considered in such policy reviews. 
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V. Alternatives to Ethnic Profiling 
A serious effort to address ethnic profiling requires first monitoring and measuring 
current police practices to determine if ethnic profiling is taking place, then eliminating 
those practices that contribute to ethnic profiling, and finally introducing new, more 
effective policing practices. This requires building policing skills and capacity to oper-
ate without ethnic profiling and expanding efforts to reach out to ethnic minority com-
munities, including increasing ethnic and religious diversity within law enforcement 
agencies. Institutional reforms on this scale require a clear recognition of the problem 
and commitment by political and police leadership to address it. But as the examples 
from the U.S. Customs Service and municipal police of Fuenlabrada, Spain, indicate, 
such reforms are possible, and when they are implemented, greater efficiency results. 
Monitoring Police Practices and Identifying and Eliminating Ethnic Profiling
Police cannot identify and address ethnic profiling unless they collect data on their use 
of identity check and stop-and-search powers, including data on the ethnicity of the 
persons they stop. In December 2006, the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fun-
damental Rights noted that “only the monitoring of the behavior of the public authority 
by the use of statistics may serve to highlight [ethnic profiling] practices.”623 ECRI, the 
UN, and other authorities have also repeatedly called for gathering data on policing 
practices such as identity checks and stops and searches.624 Despite the protestations 
of many EU member states that generating ethnically disaggregated data is prohibited 
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by data protection norms,625 it is in fact possible for police to gather ethnic data without 
infringing on personal data protections.
European data protection law does not ban the creation or maintenance of ethnic 
data, but highlights the need to protect privacy and self-identification while making 
provision for the good-faith collection and dissemination of ethnic data for legitimate 
public interest purposes. It does this, in part, by reasonably distinguishing between 
individual, identifiable data and collective, anonymous, data that cannot be traced to any 
person. The European Union Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data (Directive 95/46/EC “on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data” 
(October 24, 1995)) expressly exempts from its application anonymous statistical infor-
mation of the kind needed to document and prove racial discrimination. The directive’s 
“principles of protection” apply only to “personal data” and “information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person” and states that such principles “shall not apply 
to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifi-
able.” Moreover, processing even of “personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin” is 
permissible where, among other things, it “is necessary [to satisfy] obligations … of the 
controller in the field of employment law,” or it “relates to data which are … necessary 
for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.” 
The Council of Europe’s counterpart norm—the Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981)—similarly 
limits its application to “personal data” which “relat[e] to an identified or identifiable 
individual.” The Committee of Ministers has made clear that it is “[a]ware of the needs 
in both the public and private sectors for reliable statistics for analysis and understand-
ing of contemporary society, and for defining policies.” To that end, Recommenda-
tion No. R(97) 18 of the Committee of Ministers distinguishes between “personal” and 
“anonymous” data (as to which “identification requires an unreasonable amount of 
time and manpower”). “Sensitive data”—including “personal data revealing racial ori-
gin”—may be processed automatically where domestic law provides for the data to be 
“collected in such a way that the data subject is not identifiable.” 
While data gathering is a necessary component of monitoring policing,626 it is 
important to recognize that this is a particularly sensitive topic. The history of ethnic 
extermination policies during World War II has left a powerful legacy in Europe. Fur-
thermore, ethnic data continue to be abused by politicians, and police continue to cite 
arrests of immigrants or overrepresentation of minorities in jail as evidence of higher 
minority offending rates.627 Understandably, many ethnic groups remain uncomfort-
able with the gathering of ethnic data in sensitive areas such as law enforcement and 
offending.628 In this regard, it is important to be clear that collecting ethnic data requires 
close scrutiny of data collection, storage, and access practices in order to prevent any 
possible misuse. This is particularly important in law enforcement, where there are 
evident risks that gathering ethnic data could in fact facilitate certain forms of ethnic 
profiling, such as the data mining discussed in this report. 
Policy assessments or audits have been successful in identifying a range of insti-
tutional factors that may be driving or permitting ethnic profiling. Such audits have 
been effective in addressing ethnic profiling by police in the United Kingdom and 
Canada, particularly regarding their use of stop-and-search powers.629 Policy audits give 
law enforcement institutions the opportunity to review their policies, see how policies 
are translated into practice, assess the effectiveness of those policies and practices, and 
measure their impact on different communities. Audits can identify not only problem 
areas, but also promising practices. A basic principle in conducting policy audits is to 
include the relevant communities in the audit process.630
Beyond monitoring, addressing police discrimination requires the development 
of policies and guidelines that explicitly prohibit the use of ethnicity, race, religion, and 
national origin in targeting persons for suspicion, and that provide clear guidance for 
police on how to use their powers in a fair and neutral manner. The introduction of a 
specific requirement that stops be based on reasonable suspicion of an actual or pos-
sible offense will constrain officer discretion and reduce the influence of stereotypes in 
decisions about whom to stop. As the EU Network of Independent Experts in Funda-
mental Rights has noted, “[i]n most EU Member States, law enforcement officers are 
granted broad discretionary powers in ... the performance of identity checks or ‘stop-
and-search’ arrests.”631
 
Building Police Capacity to Operate without Ethnic Profiling
As discussed earlier in this report, ethnic profiling does not work. It is particularly 
important to recognize this in regard to counterterrorism, which presents a special 
challenge, given the imperative of preventing attacks and the association of many terror 
movements with particular national, regional, ethnic, or religious groups. The threat of 
terrorism and challenge of countering it require the use of only those tactics that work, 
and avoidance of tactics such as ethnic profiling which are at best ineffective and pos-
sibly even damaging to counterterrorism efforts. 
Common elements of successful counterterrorism strategies include: dedicating 
resources to identify and protect possible terrorist targets (known as target hardening), 
reducing the effect of a terror attack, and improving intelligence and enhancing the 
ability of law enforcement agencies to detect suspicious behaviors.632 Counterterrorism 
officials and experts emphasize that these last two factors are key to effectively prevent-
ing terrorist attacks.
In the words of a Swiss intelligence expert, “intelligence is the sense organ of 
the counterterrorist organism—the faculty that takes in and processes information.”633 
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The details that have emerged from trials of terrorists clearly demonstrate the painstak-
ing intelligence and detective work that leads to successful apprehension and conviction. 
In the United Kingdom, Operation Crevice Seven involved intelligence-sharing among 
agencies in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Pakistan; around-
the-clock surveillance; video surveillance and wiretaps in cars and homes; and, 
crucially, information provided by a member of the public who called the police to report 
large quantities of fertilizer in a storage unit.634 Operation Crevice Seven resulted in the 
arrest and prosecution of seven men on terrorism charges, and the conviction of five 
of them.
Most counterterrorism intelligence comes from one of two sources: informa-
tion gleaned from past terror attacks, and information from local communities.635 One 
French intelligence officer estimated that “three-fifths of the information that gets to 
the [French intelligence services] comes from the grassroots level.”636 Police and intel-
ligence officials must have channels into local communities to obtain reliable informa-
tion. Gathering “community intelligence” is essential to all policing. As London MPS 
Commander Ali Dizaei noted:
  Seventy percent of crime is not solved because of Sherlock Holmes techniques, but because 
members of the public call my officers and say that someone is committing a crime. That 
is called community intelligence—without it we may as well pack our bags and go home 
because crime will not get solved. The intelligence doesn’t come on its own; it won’t come if 
we have no legitimacy in the communities that we police.637
If the confidence of Muslim communities is lost, the job of police and intelli-
gence agencies will be much harder. London MPS Assistant Commissioner Tariq Ghaf-
fur noted that there is a real danger of stigmatizing minority communities through 
ethnic profiling:
  The impact of this will be that just at the time when we need the confidence and trust of these 
communities, they may retreat inside themselves. We therefore need proper accountability 
and transparency in all policing that affects communities.638
Information gained from the community often provides vital leads.639 For exam-
ple, when an imam informs law enforcement officials that a group of young men are 
carrying out recruitment activities in the mosque, these men can be placed under sur-
veillance. This can lead law enforcement officials to additional members of the network 
and also provide information on their activities.640 Such cooperation is fundamentally 
based in trust and a sense of belonging to the larger society. 
As with other forms of criminal activity, it is important that counterterrorism 
measures identify behavior that actually is suspicious, rather than be distracted by 
stereotypes. Specific actions—including proselytizing violence, visiting jihadi training 
camps, participating in jihadi chat rooms, transferring money to terrorist organizations, 
attending meetings of terrorist groups, and purchasing bomb-making materials, pro-
vide indications that an individual is involved in terrorist activities. Law enforcement 
officials and those they rely on for information need to identify such behaviors rather 
than falling back on generalizations based on religion, ethnicity, and national origin. 
Costly mistakes have been made when tell-tale individual behaviors were over-
looked. In Madrid, “just before the train bombings there, a businessman reportedly 
watched the terrorists making their preparations but thought it was just a petty crime 
in progress and never called the police.”641 In 2001, at Paris’s Charles de Gaulle airport, 
would-be shoe-bomber Richard Reid was allowed to board an aircraft despite his strange 
behavior and even though, according to the final case file, “every police or security agent 
that was involved in this control procedure indicated being troubled by the personality 
and behavior of this individual who was very neglected, impassive, and who didn’t seek 
to know why he had been controlled.”642 
Increasing Outreach to Minority Communities
Police require training about non-discrimination and how it affects their use of police 
powers. Police can also benefit from training to enhance understanding of and respect 
for minority cultures, although it is important to note that training by itself is unlikely 
to change police behavior. Too often, authorities respond to critiques of police practices 
with a new training program, while leaving other standards and practices untouched. 
Training is most useful when it reflects larger policy reforms that establish new laws, 
operational guidelines, and oversight, as well as penalties for failing to change discrimi-
natory practices.
While strategic adjustments can reduce the negative effects of counterterrorism 
efforts, counterterrorism operations will continue and will likely cause anxiety and fear 
in Muslim communities. Even operations that try to pinpoint suspects and minimize 
broader impacts on the community may be perceived in some quarters as further evi-
dence of police bias. Successfully managing perceptions is one strategy. A number of 
countries have developed initiatives to mitigate the negative impacts of counterterror-
ism operations, understanding that the best way to address misperceptions is to provide 
the affected communities with concrete information and opportunities for discussion 
about why and how operations are carried out. 
Counterterrorism operations conducted in the community, such as raids and 
arrests, provoke high levels of anxiety and a sense of being targeted.643 One way to 
alleviate these tensions is to ensure that community leaders quickly receive reliable 
information about the operation. In Denmark, police have sent officers to community 
leaders’ houses even while terrorism suspects were being arrested, to tell those lead-
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ers what was transpiring and enable them to relay that information to the community, 
to prevent the spread of inaccurate or misleading information.644 In London, police 
respond to community questions about operations through the regular meetings of the 
Muslim Safety Forum.645
Law enforcement authorities can and should use the media as a tool for provid-
ing appropriate information about police strategies and powers and soliciting public 
cooperation and information in return.646 A recently concluded review by the London 
MPS of Section 44 counterterrorism stops found media outreach to be essential in com-
municating to the public how and why these powers are being used in London.647
As described in this report, media reports frequently reflect and reinforce public 
prejudices associating migrants with criminals and Muslims with terrorists. Police also 
need to review their press statements to assure that they avoid any discriminatory asso-
ciation of minority ethnic or religious identity and crime. Senior police officers also can 
and should criticize media reports when they make inflammatory statements of blanket 
association of specific groups or communities with terrorism or crime. 
Policing structures and strategies vary considerably across the European Union’s 
27 member states, and some countries and cities already follow community policing 
practices that include minority outreach components. Several pan-European initiatives 
specifically address the policing of minority communities.648 Nonetheless, efforts to 
build trust and understanding between police and minority communities in Europe 
continue to confront multiple challenges, particularly in ethnic minority communities 
with histories of tension and hostility in their relations with the police. 
Improving police relations with recent immigrants can be particularly challeng-
ing given language and cultural barriers, limited integration, attitudes toward law 
enforcement shaped by repressive policing in the immigrants’ home countries, and 
the presence of significant numbers of illegal migrants who fear and avoid contact with 
police. Immigration enforcement is a particuarly delicate issue. When police aggres-
sively enforce immigration laws, they destroy trust and directly undermine community 
cooperation from legal residents as well as from those persons who lack legal residency 
status.649 There is no easy answer to this issue, but police must not base their use of 
immigration control powers on an assumption that those who “look different” are not 
citizens or legal residents. Police policies, guidance, and training need to reflect the 
challenges of policing crime, terrorism, and immigration in multiethnic societies.650 
There are many strategies for reaching out to minority communities and Box 1, 
below, provides some concrete examples from the United Kingdom. Building trust and 
cooperation is not easy and requires dedication and ongoing effort. An example of 
good intentions gone awry is the 2005 Preventing Extremism Together (PET) initiative 
in the United Kingdom, which had at best limited results. Indeed, some argue that it 
worsened rather than improved government relations with the Muslim community 
due to a series of flaws including a rushed timetable, scheduling meetings on Muslim 
holidays, the perception that government predetermined the agenda, and a lack of fol-
low through.651
BOX 1
Police Outreach to Muslim Communities in the United Kingdom
The London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) launched multiple initiatives 
to improve relations with Muslim communities in response to the new strains 
created by counterterrorism efforts. These initiatives included the following:
• Creating some 300 third-party reporting centers that allow people who are 
reluctant to go to a police station to report crimes or other concerns at 
schools, places of worship, community centers, and other locations in their 
local communities.
• Working with the Muslim Safety Forum (MSF), a body created in 2000 by a 
coalition of Muslim organizations concerned with police focus on Muslim 
communities. Police officials say that the MSF has been an important arena 
for police and Muslim community representatives to exchange information 
and discuss problems, including terrorism, Islamophobia, police sensitivity, 
and similar issues. 
• Developing a Cultural and Community Resources Unit (CCRU) that runs 
a confidential database of police officers with expertise in particular areas. 
Officers possessing relevant ethnic or religious backgrounds and language 
skills can volunteer to participate in CCRU. (Of 30,000 police in London, 300 
are Muslim.) The database has proven useful in several situations, including 
negotiating the police relationship with the Finsbury Park Mosque and the 
Algerian community in that neighborhood.
• Beyond London, the British police developed a “Community impact assess-
ment document and guidance” that has been circulated to all U.K. police 
services for use in terrorist operations, and another guide on policing 
religiously sensitive premises.
Sources: Ali Dizaei, remarks made at a May 31, 2007 meeting co-hosted by the European Policy Center, 
the King Badouin Foundation and the Open Society Justice Initiative, Brussels; http://muslimsafetyforum.
org/history.html; Sixth Report, Select Committee on Home Affairs, House of Commons, session 2004–2005, 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmhaff/165/16509.htm#n169; Briggs, 
Fieschi, and Lownsbrough, Bringing It Home, (London: DEMOS, December 2006), at 33–34.
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Community outreach efforts almost always confront the question of who repre-
sents the community and which voices are accepted as legitimate partners or interlocu-
tors. In ordinary policing, there are typically certain groups, such as young people, that 
are notoriously difficult to include in dialogues with the police. Current police efforts 
to build bridges to Muslims are challenged by the existence of many Muslim communi-
ties, of varied national origin, ethnicity, and religious belief and practice. The challenge 
is magnified by the lack of police officers in Europe who are Muslim, and the lack of 
non-Muslim police officers who are well-versed in Islam. 
A 2006 British study of efforts to build police relations with Muslim communities 
emphasized that such initiatives be locally based, transparent, and rooted in an under-
standing of the faith.652 If possible, police outreach efforts should be inclusive of the 
diverse voices in different communities and avoid generating or aggravating divisions 
in the Muslim community. Some experts argue that a strategy of encouraging moderate 
Muslim voices to create a bulwark against more radical forms of Islam is based in lack 
of understanding of different streams of Islam and is as likely to create divisions and 
problems as it is to advance a solution.653 This perspective notes that moderate Islamic 
voices have little relation with the communities or individuals who are attracted to radi-
cal forms of Islam, and that Salafist groups are not monolithic and many are highly 
critical of violent jihad. Radical streams of Islam that reject violence are those with 
the most authentic voice and greatest ability to counter violent jihadists and therefore, 
though the process is extremely difficult, these communities should be included in 
community outreach initiatives. This is the approach of the work of the London MPS’s 
Muslim Contact Unit, which works with Salafist and Islamist groups.
BOX 2
Working with Salafist Groups in London
The London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) created the Muslim Contact 
Unit (MCU) in 2002 to reach out to Salafist and Islamist groups and work with 
them to reduce the pool of recruits for Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism. The MCU’s 
work reflects the understanding that most Salafist and Islamist groups are non-
violent and can reduce terrorism rather than contribute to it. The MCU includes 
Muslim officers who have been central to the MPS’s ability to develop a dialogue 
with Muslim communities. The head of the MCU notes that the unit does not 
develop indicators of radicalization, but instead looks to the leaders of Salafist 
organizations for insights and information: 
“They tell us. They lived with Abbu Qattada and the Finsbury Park Mosque and they 
know better than we do what is happening.…The community and religious leaders 
would be the ones with the skills to deal with that situation and dissuade people from 
violence.”
The former head of the MCU says that the partnership approach led Muslim 
community groups to assist terrorist investigations in important operational 
matters over the 2002 to 2007 period. 
The “Street” project is another model of outreach to young Muslims in South 
London. It is run by the former chairman of the Brixton Mosque, a trusted figure 
in those communities. Street offers leisure activities—computer games, TV, 
sports, and outdoor camping trips—as well as counselling and advice services 
that provide “legitimate accounts of Islam that challenge the jihadis.” Street also 
offers services to recently released prisoners, and has informal relationships 
with both local police and special police units. 
Sources: Justice Initiative Interview, Robert Lambert, head of the MPS Muslim Contact Unit, Washington, 
DC, June 14, 2007; Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough, Bringing It Home, at 75–6.
Media Strategies
While counterterrorism may be the catalyst for initiatives to build trust and cooperation 
in Muslim communities, it cannot be the sole focus of community outreach efforts. To 
build real trust and cooperation, police must also address the communities’ security 
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concerns regarding ordinary crime, hate crime, and the negative effects of discrimina-
tory policing practices. A proactive stance on hate crimes may be especially important 
in demonstrating that police take community safety seriously and are sensitive to the 
plight of vulnerable groups. While certain European Union member states have clear 
legal standards and mechanisms in place to encourage the reporting of hate crimes, 
the European Union Monitoring Center (EUMC) concluded in 2005 that police forces 
in the majority of member states required “further development” in responding to hate 
crimes effectively.654
Any genuine effort to improve police relations with minority communities must 
also take seriously concerns about discriminatory policing practices. Results of an 
EUMC survey of ethnic minorities in 12 member states found that a quarter of the 
respondents felt they had been subject to discrimination by the police in the past year, 
but that few of them reported this discrimination.655 Police must treat all reports of 
police abuse with utmost seriousness and, if necessary, strengthen complaints mecha-
nisms to ensure they are accessible, known, and trusted. Where independent civilian 
review of police does not exist, it may be advisable to create such an entity, given the 
often poor track record of internal police disciplinary mechanisms. 
Police efforts to reach out to and build better relations with Europe’s diverse and 
extensive ethnic and religious minority communities will foster greater accountability 
of the police to the communities they serve. This in turn will foster community trust 
and increased collaboration. These are not simply cosmetic measures: studies in vari-
ous countries show unambiguously that regular community consultation contributes 
directly to reducing crime and improving the public’s sense of security.656 
Police training and recruitment must also reflect a commitment to non-discrimi-
nation and the challenges of policing multiethnic societies. Police, like other institutions 
in democratic societies, should represent all segments of the society itself.657 It is easier 
to develop a dialogue and build trust with minority communities when the police look 
like the community that they serve. Community engagement may well be necessary in 
efforts to recruit police officers from minority groups. 
Given the evidence indicating that ethnic profiling is not only ineffective, but 
counterproductive in fighting crime and terrorism, the onus is on law enforcement 
authorities to explore and implement better alternatives. These alternatives include 
reducing officer discretion in the use of stops and searches, improving intelligence 
through improved relations with minority communities, and enhancing police capacity 
to identify suspicous behaviors. By adopting these ethnically neutral strategies, police 
can reduce discrimination and become more effective in reducing crime and prevent-
ing terrorism.
VI. Conclusion
Ethnic profiling—a longstanding practice that has increased since 9/11—is pervasive in 
the European Union. As documented in this report, it is also inefficient, ineffective, and 
discriminatory. Evidence gathered from multiple countries with highly varied ethnic 
minority communities consistently indicates that police officers across the European 
Union routinely use generalizations about race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin in 
targeting suspicion and deciding whom to pursue for an identity check, a search, a raid, 
or surveillance. Whether in counterterrorism efforts or in ordinary policing practices, 
the harms associated with ethnic profiling are many, and they are felt by all sectors 
of society.
As this report has argued, ethnic profiling is a form of discrimination that focuses 
disproportionate law enforcement attention on particular individuals and communities, 
based on generalizations about religion or ethnicity. In light of European law’s historical 
aversion to distinctions based on ethnic origin, and in light of the considerable harms 
caused by ethnic profiling and the absence of any evidence to support claims that it actu-
ally prevents crime or terrorism, there can be little doubt that ethnic profiling violates 
international human rights standards. The practice clearly falls afoul of the principle of 
nondiscrimination, which must be respected even in times of terrorist threat. 
In addition, specific law enforcement measures based on ethnic profiling violate 
other human rights, such as the right to liberty and security, including freedom from 
arbitrary detention and imprisonment; a fair trial; respect for private and family life; 
home and correspondence; freedom of thought; conscience and religion; freedom of 
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expression; and freedom of assembly and association. Any interference with liberty 
must be in accordance with a clear legal process and for specific reasons that are defined 
in the law. A proportionality test is applied with the right to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
freedom of expression; and freedom of assembly and association. In general, no deroga-
tion is permitted from fundamental rights during times of emergency. If governments 
seek to opt-out of some human rights guarantees, then they must do so clearly and 
unambiguously, and any emergency responses must also be proportionate to the threat 
that is claimed. As this report makes clear, these practices fail that test. Ethnic profiling 
practices violate not only the right of individuals to be free from discrimination, but 
also other fundamental rights.658 The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has 
concluded that:
  Terrorist profiling practices that are based on “race” are incompatible with human rights. 
Profiling based on ethnicity, national origin and/or religion involves differential treatment 
of comparable groups of people. Such differential treatment is only compatible with the 
principle of non-discrimination if it is a proportional means of countering terrorism. Profil-
ing practices based on ethnicity, national origin and/or religion regularly fail to meet this 
demanding proportionality requirement: not only are they unsuitable means of identifying 
potential terrorists, but they also entail considerable negative consequences that may render 
these measures counterproductive in the fight against terrorism.659
Ethnic profiling affects thousands of people every day. It harms the Roma pedes-
trian who is stopped and searched just because a police officer subscribes to anti-Roma 
stereotypes. It harms the Muslim owner of a call center whose shop is raided just 
because he prays at a particular mosque. More broadly, ethnic profiling harms entire 
communities, which are traumatized by raids and mass controls and stigmatized by 
generalizations linking certain ethnic or religious groups to crime and terrorism. As a 
pervasive practice that does not work and that wastes law enforcement resources, ethnic 
profiling ultimately leaves millions of people in the EU—even if they are never profiled 
themselves—less safe.
Ethnic profiling leads to the misuse of police resources. In an environment 
marked by a plethora of crime and terrorism threats and a paucity of law enforcement 
resources, such misuse is not just profligate, it is dangerous. 
Ethnic profiling does not work. Many factors render ethnic profiling ineffective, 
regardless of the law enforcement method being used: stops and searches, identity 
checks, data mining, antiradicalization efforts, raids, arrests and detention, or surveil-
lance. When they rely on ethnic profiling, these law enforcement methods are impeded 
by problems of over- and underinclusion, evasion, substitution, and distortion. They 
also produce worrisome counter-effects. Ethnic profiling may hinder the ability of 
law enforcement officials to gather necessary intelligence by alienating the very com-
munities that could help police identify potential terrorists and ordinary criminals. 
Furthermore, ethnic profiling may actually increase the pool of potential terrorists by 
humiliating those who are profiled, creating the possibility of a greater terrorist threat 
in the future. 
Fortunately, a number of the practices described in this report are less prevalent 
in mid-2009 than they were immediately following the March 11, 2004 Madrid and 
July 7, 2005 London bombings. In particular, highly visible forms of ethnic profiling, 
such as large-scale raids, broad data mining, and mass identity checks outside places 
of worship, are now less common. This is both because ethnic profiling is ineffective 
and because counterterrorism authorities are targeting their investigations somewhat 
more narrowly.
The decline in ethnic profiling also reflects a political reality that is subject to 
change: in the absence to date of further major terrorist attacks in Europe, elected 
authorities do not currently face public pressures to be seen to be tackling terrorism. 
The apparent decline in the more egregious forms of ethnic profiling does not however 
reflect an increased awareness of and concern with ethnic profiling as a form of discrim-
ination, nor the creation of greater oversight or accountability. Another terrorist attack 
would likely put ethnic profiling back at the center of law enforcement practices.
Better, more effective alternatives to ethnic profiling exist. Examples taken from 
a federal law enforcement agency in the United States and a municipal police force in 
Spain indicate that police are more efficient and effective when they abandon ethnic 
profiling. Policing based on intelligence, data, and community consultation has proven 
to work better than policing based on stereotypes and generalizations.
It is incumbent on European authorities, national governments, law enforcement 
authorities, and civil society groups to take concrete steps that will reduce the use of 
tactics based on ethnic profiling and replace them with more rational law enforcement 
measures. An important first step would be to define ethnic profiling and outlaw it at 
the European level and in national legislation. Many other steps must be taken as well, 
from gathering data on law enforcement and ethnicity, to funding police collaboration 
with minority communities, to implementing new police practices.
As this report has shown, the damage from ethnic profiling—to the rule of law, 
to effective law enforcement, to police-community relations, and especially to those tar-
geted by the practice —is considerable. Until ethnic profiling is recognized as a problem, 
expressly outlawed, and replaced by better law enforcement measures, the damage it 
does will only increase. In a Europe threatened by ordinary crime and terrorist attacks, 
the stakes are too high to allow this ineffective, inefficient, and discriminatory practice 
to continue. 
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Ethnic profiling—a longstanding practice that has increased since 
9/11—is pervasive in the European Union. In France and Italy, raids 
on homes, businesses, and mosques—often lacking a basis in specific 
evidence—have targeted Muslims. In Germany, police have used 
preventive powers to conduct mass identity checks outside major 
mosques. And in the United Kingdom, stops and searches of British 
Asians shot up five-fold after the July 2005 London Underground bomb 
attacks.  
Ethnic Profiling in the European Union examines the scope of ethnic 
profiling, showing how police officers in the U.K., France, Italy, Germany, 
and the Netherlands routinely use generalizations about race, ethnicity, 
religion, or national origin when deciding whom to target for stops, 
searches, raids, and surveillance. 
The report analyzes ethnic profiling both in ordinary policing and in 
counterterrorism, and finds that it is not just a violation of European 
laws and international human rights norms—it is also an ineffective use 
of police resources that leaves the public less safe. The damage from 
ethnic profiling—to the rule of law, to effective law enforcement, to 
police-community relations, and especially to those who are targeted—
is considerable.
In addition to providing a comprehensive examination of ethnic 
profiling and considering the legality of the practice, Ethnic Profiling in 
the European Union offers effective alternatives that increase security, 
advance counterterrorism efforts, and respect human rights. 
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